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 ABSTRACT  
The last two decades have seen more and more cities joining the competitions for 
hosting the Olympic Games, resulting in soaring investments, both public and private, in 
Olympic-related projects. The Olympic Games have become a two-week gigantic event 
with tremendous costs burdening host cities. Meanwhile, the last three decades have 
witnessed underused facilities and lack of financial support for maintenance of the 
Olympic venues after the Games. 
Based on previous literature, the “white elephant” effect has happened in every 
Olympic city during the last twenty years. In terms of Beijing, scholars have yet to 
substantially investigate the post-Games utilization of the Olympic venues in the city. 
This study made an effort to address this concern. This study investigated Beijing’s 
post-Games utilization of Olympic venues and examined what cultural, social, economic, 
political, and historical reasons underscore their current status. To achieve the goal, the 
researcher interviewed venue managers, municipal officials, scholars and sport 
administration officials in Beijing.  
By describing the various conditions of the venues and analyzing the interviews, 
the study indicated that post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues varied 
significantly. Use of venues differed depending on their ownership, administration system, 
management and operational mode, sports/event functions, locations, structural scale and 
complexity, and even their reputation and popularity throughout the city. In general, a 
brief summary in terms of utilization can be concluded. During three and a half years 
after the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games: (1) venues built on campuses were well utilized; 
(2) pre-existing venues were largely well utilized such as the Workers’ Stadium, the 
iii 
 NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, and the Lao Shan 
Mountain Bike Course; (3) multifunction venues were largely better utilized than those 
with mono functions such as the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and the Clay Target Field, 
the Olympic Archery Field, and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (4) medium scale 
venues were better utilized than the large scale ones such as the Bird’s Nest and the Shun 
Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (5) those owned by the governments, especially the five 
district governments, were underused, which included the Feng Tai Sport Center Softball 
Field, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the Olympic Tennis Court, the Ming 
Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic Hockey Field; and (6), in contrast, 
those owned by the universities, GASC, and private enterprise, largely showed better 
utilization conditions than their government-owned (district governments) counterparts. 
Because of the co-existence of both well-used and underused venues in Beijing, the study 
contends that the status of Olympic venues in Beijing cannot be simply evaluated as 
either positive or negative, due to the complicated socio-cultural environments and 
historical and traditional background. However, some practical experiences in Beijing 
can be recommended, while certain lessons should be learned for the future.   
 
Keywords: 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Olympic Legacy, Post-Olympic Utilization, 
Sport Venues, Olympic Host Cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 Table of Contents 
 
 
ABSTRACT...........................................................................................................................................iii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................viii 
Chapter 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................1 
1. Identifying Olympic Venues: The Beijing Case ..........................................................................4 
2. Significance of the Study ............................................................................................................9 
3. Study Purpose and Research Questions ....................................................................................10 
4. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 11 
4-1. Research Rationale......................................................................................................... 11 
4-2. Data Collection ..............................................................................................................13 
4-3. Data Analysis .................................................................................................................17 
5. Limitations and Delimitations ...................................................................................................20 
6. Outline of the Findings..............................................................................................................21 
Chapter 2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................23 
1. Post-Olympic Effect on Host Cities ..........................................................................................23 
2. Historical Retrospect: “Olympic Cities” ...................................................................................32 
3. Current Studies on Post-Games Utilization of Beijing Olympic Venues ..................................33 
Chapter 3. Findings ...............................................................................................................................41 
1. An Overview of the Olympic Venues in Beijing .......................................................................41 
1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look .......................................................................44 
1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area..........................................................................48 
1-2-1. Selection of Location..........................................................................................52 
1-2-2. BOPAC ...............................................................................................................56 
1-2-3. BODA.................................................................................................................58 
2. Government-Owned Venues......................................................................................................61 
2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise............................................................................................61 
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (The Fencing Hall) .....................................61 
2-1-2. “Water Cube”......................................................................................................65 
2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities.....................................................................................76 
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center.......................................................................................76 
2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course ...............................................................................88 
2-3. By District Governments ...............................................................................................88 
2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District ...............................................89 
2-3-2. BMX Course and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District ......................95 
2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District ...................................................98 
2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District................................................................99 
2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District .......................................................................101 
2-4. Transferred Ownerships ...............................................................................................103 
2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest”.....................................................................................................103 
2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS)......................................................................... 117 
2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Facilities ..........................126 
3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues ...........................................132 
3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome....................................................................................................132 
3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field ....................................................137 
3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) ......................................................................................142 
3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC) .....................................................................147 
3-4-1. NOSC Stadium .................................................................................................149 
3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium ...........................................................................................154 
3-4-3. Ying Tung Natatorium ......................................................................................159 
4. University-Owned Venues.......................................................................................................165 
v 
 vi 
4-1. Peking University Gymnasium ....................................................................................166 
4-2. China Agriculture University Gymnasium...................................................................172 
4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium ...............................................................179 
4-4. Beihang University Gymnasium..................................................................................185 
4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing Gymnasium .......................................190 
4-6. Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium............................................................196 
5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues...........................................................................................202 
5-1. MasterCard Center and Baseball Field ........................................................................202 
Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................................215 
1. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................215 
1-1. Category 1: New, Pre-existing, and Temporary ...........................................................215 
1-2. Category 2: Location....................................................................................................220 
1-3. Category 3: Ownership ................................................................................................225 
1-4. Post-Games Use ...........................................................................................................234 
2. Recommendations ...................................................................................................................238 
3. Future Research.......................................................................................................................245 
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................247 
Appendix A. Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing ...............................................................254 
Appendix B. List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing...........................................................................256 
Appendix C. Outline of Interview Questions......................................................................................258 
Appendix D. Venue Category by Newly, Pre-existing and Temporarily Built ....................................261 
Appendix E. Venue Category by Geographical Location....................................................................262 
Appendix F. Ownerships of the Venues ..............................................................................................263 
Appendix G. Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area............................................................265 
Appendix H. Map of the Venues in the West Community Area ..........................................................266 
Appendix I. Map of the Venues in the University Area.......................................................................267 
Appendix J. Map of the Venues in the East Community Area ............................................................268 
Appendix K. Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area.................................................................269 
Appendix L. Map of the Olympic Central Area ..................................................................................270 
Appendix M. Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race.......................................................................271 
Appendix N. Aerial View of the Olympic Archery Field in 2010 .......................................................272 
Appendix O. Pictures of CIS...............................................................................................................273 
Appendix P. Aerial View of the National Olympic Sport Center ........................................................275 
Appendix Q. Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium ..................................................................................276 
Appendix R. Pictures of BUAA Gymnasium......................................................................................278 
Appendix S. Pictures of USTB Gymnasium .......................................................................................280 
Appendix T. Pictures of BJUT Gymnasium........................................................................................282 
Appendix U. Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center.....................................................283 
Curriculum Vitae .................................................................................................................................289 
  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AEG   Anschutz Entertainment Group 
BIT    Beijing Institute of Technology 
BJUT   Beijing University of Technology 
BMCDR  Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
BMX   Bicycle Motocross 
BOBICO  Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Committee 
BOCOG Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad 
BODA   Beijing Olympic City Development Association  
BOPAC   Beijing Olympic Park Administration 
BPA   Beijing Performance & Arts Group 
BSAM   Beijing State-Owned Assets Management CO., LTD. 
BSU   Beijing Sport University 
BUAA   Beihang University 
BUCID   Beijing Urban Construction Investment Development Co., Ltd. 
FIVB   Fédération Internationale de Volleyball 
CAU   China Agriculture University 
CBA   Chinese Basketball Association 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CCTV   China Central Television 
CIS    Beijing Capital Indoor Stadium 
CITIC   China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
CNCC   China National Convention Center 
CNSVM  China National Sports Venue Management Co., Ltd. 
CNY   Chinese Yuan Renminbi 
CTF   Beijing Clay Target Field 
FINA   Fédération Internationale de Natation  
GASC   General Administration of Sport China 
IOC   International Olympic Committee 
ISF    International Softball Federation 
ITU    International Triathlon Union 
MCC   Beijing MasterCard Center 
NBA   National Basketball Association 
NIS    Beijing National Indoor Stadium 
NOSC   National Olympic Sport Center 
PKU   Peking University 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
PSB   Public Security Bureau  
SRH   Beijing Shooting Range Hall 
UCI   International Cycling Union 
USD   US Dollar 
UTSB   University of Technology and Science Beijing 
 
vii 
 viii 
LIST OF APPENDICES  
Appendix A    Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing 
Appendix B    List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing 
Appendix C    Outline of Interview Questions 
Appendix D Category by Newly, Pre-existing and Temporarily Built 
Appendix E    Category by Geographical Location 
Appendix F    Ownerships of the Venues 
Appendix G    Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area 
Appendix H    Map of the Venues in the West Community Area 
Appendix I    Map of the Venues in the University Area 
Appendix J    Map of the Venues in the East Community Area 
Appendix K    Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area 
Appendix L    Map of the Olympic Central Area 
Appendix M    Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race 
Appendix N Bird View of the Olympic Archery Field  
Appendix O    Pictures of the Capital Indoor Stadium 
Appendix P    Bird View of the National Olympic Sport Center  
Appendix Q    Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium 
Appendix R    Pictures of the BUAA Gymnasium  
Appendix S    Pictures of the USTB Gymnasium 
Appendix T    Pictures of the BJUT Gymnasium 
Appendix U    Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center 
 
      
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
On the cover page of the Final Report of the International Olympic Committee 
Coordination Commission for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008, one finds 
the statement: “Once an Olympic City, always an Olympic City.”1 Obviously, this speaks 
about Beijing! It also speaks about all host cities in the history of the Modern Olympic 
Games. But staging the Games is one thing; the influence and impact of the Olympics on 
those cities, both positive and negative, to some degree, endure. The distinction of being 
an Olympic city leaves a lasting image; the memories of once having hosted the Olympic 
Games linger interminably.   
When the brilliant Olympic moments fade, and jubilant crowds leave, the city 
transforms right away from an Olympic host to a place where the Olympic festival has 
been staged; such hosts become post-Olympic cities. Being an Olympic host and being a 
post-Olympic city present totally different situations. Given the laudatory conclusions 
rendered by IOC presidents in their closing ceremony speeches, such as “best ever,” 
“unforgettable,” and “exceptional,” most host cities are seen to have accomplished their 
jobs in an excellent manner. With some 10 years involved in efforts on bidding for, 
preparing for, and staging the games, host cities merit such honorary remarks. The 
contributions that the host cities and the Organizing Committees of Olympic Games 
(OCOGs) make are vital and significant, not only to the development of the Olympic 
movement and global sports, but also to building and enhancing sport enthusiasm, certain 
Olympic-related economic benefits, national pride, and international identity.     
                                                        
1 The International Olympic Committee, Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission for the Games 
of the XXIX Olympiad – Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: January 2010). 
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Putting aside the aura of staging an Olympic Games, being a post-Olympic city 
carries many meanings. When the Games are completed, the OCOG disbands less than a 
year later. Attention from the international society and global media disappears. Athletes 
start to pursue their next goals, and guests and tourists depart the city with whatever 
memories they have about the Games and the host. With the disappearance of the OCOG 
and IOC, the host city is the major entity responsible for handling whatever the Olympic 
Games leave behind after the party.  
Starting from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, commercialism has been 
dramatically involved in the Olympics, which makes the leaders of potential host cities 
realize that hosting the Olympic Games could be a way to generate financial profit and 
build a substantial international image. As a result, the last three decades have seen more 
cities than ever joining the competitions for holding the Olympic Games. This, in turn, 
has prompted soaring investment, both from public and private sources, into so called 
Olympic-related projects regarding athletic facilities and infrastructure for the 
competitions. The Olympic Games have become a gigantic event held every four years in 
various locations around the globe. The duration of the Games is short, compared with 
their relatively long preparation period. On the other hand, the last three decades, in 
particular, have witnessed underused facilities and lack of financial support for 
maintenance of the Olympic venues after the Games, largely due to lack of practical 
strategy planned for post-Games development or lack of efficient supervision and 
implementation of post-Games utilization plans (see details in Chapter 2).   
During the more than one hundred year history of the Modern Olympics, Olympic 
host cities around the world faced diverse situations in dealing with post-Olympic issues. 
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With constantly changing global political and economic conditions, various regimes, 
cultural traditions, and populations, post-Olympic effects on host cities are difficult to 
simply generalize. The strength and opportunities of one city might be the weakness of 
others. Although the IOC consistently uses the term “legacy” to express what the 
Olympic Games leave behind to host cities, in general, there are not too many positive 
exclamations heard from previous host cities regarding their post-Olympic development, 
particularly, the ways used to cope with the Olympic athletic facilities in the cities. In 
evaluating and planning for post-Olympic periods, a sober, objective, and practical 
perspective from the academic field is needed, not only because such an academic 
analysis and evaluation regarding host city post-Olympic planning and development is 
beneficial to the cities, but also because it can provide the International Olympic 
Movement with a pragmatic guideline for sustainable improvement. 
The term “post-Olympic effect” was absent until the impact of the Olympic 
Games on host cities dramatically increased during the last couple of decades. Prior to 
that, little impact can be traced from earlier editions of the Olympics due to their lack of 
scale and influence around the world. But, of late, changes in our world are accelerating. 
The Olympics are not excluded from this. As global attention, media involvement, and 
commercialism of the Olympic Games have intensified, Olympic impact as well as 
post-Olympic impact increases. Specifically, the last three decades have seen 
post-Olympic issues such as underused Olympic venues, public debt burdens on 
taxpayers, and lack of supervision with respect to Olympic legacy, both tangible and 
intangible, arising in almost all host cities, from Montreal in 1976 to Athens in 2004, and, 
in the context of this study, Beijing in 2008 (see details in Chapter 2).  
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1. Identifying Olympic Venues: The Beijing Case 
Past experience indicates that among various post-Olympic issues regarding sport 
in host cities, post-Games utilization of Olympic venues has been one of the most 
problematic issues haunting city authorities as well as taxpayers. The experiences of 
certain host cities such as Montreal and Athens became typical cases generally criticized 
around the world. Some others, such as Atlanta and Los Angeles, provided subsequent 
hosts with semi-positive examples regarding utilization of Olympic venues after the 
Games. A key point or criterion can thus be used to evaluate post-Games utilization of 
Olympic venues: whether or not those Olympic facilities left in the cities continue 
serving society in a sport context, either mass sport service among local communities, 
national elite sport, or professional sport in the city.  
Due to the diversity of various host cities, past studies regarding the investigation 
of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues were usually focused on a certain Olympic 
Games, which seems to (or has to) be the best (or only) method for thorough examination 
and detailed analysis based on first hand evidence. Applying the same method as 
presented in those existing studies regarding previous host cities’ utilization conditions, 
this study exclusively focused on the 2008 Olympic Summer Games in Beijing. 
In terms of the 2008 Beijing Games, according to the Beijing Organizing 
Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), there were thirty-seven (37) 
sport venues that were used as competition sites for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, 
either in Beijing or other auxiliary host cities in China. In Beijing proper, there were 
thirty-one (31) sport venues used for the competition events held within the city, 
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including eleven (11) converted or expanded pre-existing venues, twelve (12) newly-built 
sport facilities specifically for the Olympic Games, and eight (8) temporary sport 
facilities built for the Games and planned to be either removed or transformed for other 
functions after the Games (see the map on next page and Appendix A for details).2  
An examination of the Candidature File that the Beijing Bid Committee submitted 
to the IOC in January 2001 showed that one planned Olympic facility, the Beijing 
Country Equestrian Park, was replaced and its location changed to Hong Kong. Other 
than that one exception, all the other preliminarily planned sports events were held in 
Beijing as promised in the File.3 In addition, some Olympic facilities changed their 
originally planned locations from downtown Beijing to the outskirts of Beijing, These 
included the triathlon site, from the Forbidden City (the centre of Beijing) to the Ming 
Dynasty Tomb Reservoir, about 30 km north; and the beach volleyball venue, from 
Tiananmen Square to the Chao Yang Park at Beijing Chao Yang district, about 10 km east 
of the centre of the city.4  
Geographically, according to BOCOG, the venues in Beijing were mainly located 
in four areas: (1) the Olympic Central Area, (2) the West Community Area, (3) the North 
Scenic Area, and (4) the University Area (see the map on next page and Appendix A for 
details).5  
The highest concentration of Olympic facilities was in the Olympic Central Area, 
which included the Olympic Park (the Olympic Green) and the National Olympic Sport 
Centre (NOSC). There were seven Olympic sports venues built in the Olympic Park for  
                                                        
2 Official Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Venues,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/ (accessed April 26, 
2012). 
3 The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001. 
4 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 30-34; the Candidature File of 
Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, pp. 12-18. 
5 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38. 
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A Demonstration Map 
 
Source: The internet (without the Triathlon Course and the Shun Yi Aquatic Park)
 
7 
permanent or temporary use. They included: the National Stadium (“Bird’s Nest”), the 
National Aquatic Centre (“Water Cube”), the National Indoor Stadium (NIS), the 
Olympic Tennis Centre, the Olympic Hockey Field, the Olympic Archery Field, and the 
China National Convention Centre (CNCC) Fencing Hall.6 Within this area, NOSC was 
adjacent to the Olympic Park. There were three pre-existing Olympic sport venues in 
NOSC built for the 11th Asian Games held in Beijing in 1990 and upgraded specifically 
for the 2008 Olympic Games. They included: the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, 
and the Ying Tung Natatorium.7 Then, too, there were non-sport Olympic facilities in the 
area, such as the International Broadcast Centre (IBC), the Main Press Centre (MPC), and 
the Olympic Village. This central core area was the largest Olympic functional region 
associated with the Beijing Games. 
The West Community Area was another cluster of Olympic venues in the city. 
There were eight Olympic venues grouped into the area, all of which were located on the 
west side of the city. They included the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target 
Field, the Lao Shan Cycling Centre (including the Velodrome, the mountain bike course, 
and the BMX field), the Feng Tai Sports Centre Softball Field, and the Wu Ke Song 
Sports Centre (including the Olympic Basketball Gymnasium and the Olympic Baseball 
Field that were dismantled right after the Olympic Games).8  
The North Scenic Area contained two sites, the Shun Yi Olympic 
Rowing-Canoeing Park in Shun Yi District and the Olympic Triathlon Course at the Ming 
Dynasty Tomb Reservoir in Chang Ping District.9  
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
 
8 
The University Area was located northwest of the city. Six Olympic venues were 
built or renovated either on campus or within the same region. They included: Peking 
University, China Agriculture University, Beijing Institute of Technology, University of 
Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and 
the Capital Indoor Stadium (not on campus but within the area).10  
In addition to these four clusters, at the east side of the city there were also four 
Olympic venues built or renovated for the Games in 2008: the Beach Volleyball Ground 
(dismantled and transformed into a beach theme park right after the Games) in the Chao 
Yang Park in Chao Yang District, the Worker’s Stadium and Gymnasium built in the 
1960s and renovated before the 2008 Olympics, and the Beijing University of 
Technology Gymnasium. The thirty-one venues, built or renovated between 2004 and 
2008, held all the competitions in twenty-six sports during the Games (see Appendix B 
for details).  
Following the Games, depending on specific tangible factors (functions, scale, 
locations, administration systems, and ownerships) and intangible factors (historical 
background, political context, cultural traditions, and symbolic value), Beijing Olympic 
venues have been developed and utilized through various trajectories in the last three and 
a half years. When facing the issues of post-Games use of the Olympic venues, on one 
hand, venue supervisors in Beijing met the same situations and similar problems such as 
post-Olympic use of sport facilities that haunted their previous counterparts for years. On 
the other hand, specific conditions in China provided them with both opportunities and 
challenges. 
 
                                                        
10 Ibid. 
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2. Significance of the Study 
Based on previous literature, in the last three decades, issues such as underuse, 
operational finance deficit, poor organization, or even abandoned Olympic venues, 
commonly known as the white elephant11 effect, have consistently occurred in every 
Olympic city during its post-Olympic period. In terms of the 2008 edition of the Olympic 
Games, although three and a half years have passed, Beijing remains largely 
uninvestigated regarding post-Games utilization of its Olympic venues. Moreover, the 
few attempts that have been made, including academic articles and media reports, in both 
English and Chinese, implicitly indicated a potential trend of polarized attitudes, either 
overly positive or overly negative, toward this specific issue. Possible reasons for this 
situation can be listed as follows: 
(1) Lack of information regarding the venues released to the public 
(2) Inaccessibility of information regarding the venues 
(3) Incorrect information disseminated 
(4) Public and authorities’ interests decrease 
(5) Authorities of the venues do not want to disclose the facts to either the media or 
academic researchers 
(6) Specific venues rather than all the venues are investigated when conducting 
research 
(7) Political purposes 
Simply speaking, what happened regarding Beijing Olympic sports venues during 
                                                        
11 “White Elephant” is an idiom, according to a general explanation on Wikipedia.org, for a valuable but 
burdensome possession of which its owner cannot dispose and whose cost is out of proportion to its 
usefulness or worth; it is an object, scheme, business venture, or facility, considered to be without use or 
value, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_elephant (accessed June 10, 2012). 
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the post-Olympic period has not been thoroughly examined. Such an examination is 
required for both the knowledge base of international Olympic studies and Beijing’s 
post-Olympic city development. Moreover, as mentioned, an objective and systematic 
examination from an academic perspective is needed. This study, three and a half years 
after the Games, examined the present status of all the Olympic sport venues in Beijing 
utilized for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
 
3. Study Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of the study is to investigate post-Games utilization of the Olympic 
venues in Beijing and to examine and discover what socio-cultural reasons underscore the 
status of the venues in Beijing three and a half years after the 2008 Olympic Games.  
Based on the purpose of the study, the primary research question can be addressed: 
What is the current status of post-Games utilization of Olympic sport venues in Beijing 
three and a half years after the 2008 Olympic Games? To answer this general question 
thoroughly and explore what the reasons behind the status were, four sub-questions that 
would potentially guide the direction of the study were proposed as follows:  
(1) Are those venues in Beijing “white elephant” or “precious resources” for both 
local communities and the entire city (even the entire country)?  
(2) Do those venues left in Beijing continue serving the city in sport contexts? For 
mass sport, or elite sport? 
(3) Are those venues now financially self-sustaining or are they continuing to drain 
public money to offset ongoing maintenance and operating cost during the 
post-Games period? And who are the owners of those venues, in other words, who 
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should be responsible for them? 
(4) What lessons or recommendations from the Beijing case emerge for future host 
cities regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues? 
 
4. Methodology 
4-1. Research Rationale 
This study, presented as a qualitative exploratory research examination, is heavily 
based on the material and information derived from both in-depth key figure interviews 
and relevant document research. In terms of qualitative research, Creswell defined it as 
an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of 
inquiry that explore a social or human problem, through which researchers usually build a 
complex, holistic picture, analyze words, report detailed views of informants, and 
conduct the study in a natural setting.12 To complete this study, the research has to be 
done in a natural setting, namely, investigation of the Olympic sport venues in Beijing. 
According to the purpose of the study, to discover the current status of post-Games 
utilization of Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher was the key instrument of data 
collection through applying key figure interviews, which is a major characteristic of 
qualitative research.13 With the information from the interviewees, the researcher 
conducted time-consuming processes of data analysis sorting through large amounts of 
data and reducing them to a few themes or categories.14 The data results from 
interviewees’ responses are complicated, personal opinions from multidimensional 
                                                        
12 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions 
(Thousand Oaks, CA, USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1998), p. 15. 
13 Ibid., p. 16. Table 2.1. 
14 Ibid., p. 16. The author considers this type of data analysis as a characteristic reason with which 
qualitative research should be conducted. 
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perspectives, which are the meanings and focuses of the study and are analyzed 
inductively.15 Therefore, to answer these research questions and accomplish the purpose, 
qualitative research methods were applied in this study. 
In terms of exploratory research, Marshall and Rossman stated that it was a type 
of research usually conducted to investigate little-understood phenomena or an unclearly 
defined problem, to identify/discover important variables, and to generate hypotheses for 
further research, by using certain data collection techniques such as in-depth interviewing, 
elite interviewing, or participant observation.16 According to this definition, exploratory 
research usually serves a research question that has not been thoroughly investigated or 
there are few previous studies focusing on it, which is suitable for this study. First, 
although there is plenty of literature investigating previous Olympic host cities within 
similar Olympic contexts regarding venues’ post-Games utilization, due to the diversity 
among the host cities in terms of economic, cultural and social conditions and 
circumstance, specifically, conclusions, potential hypotheses and theories from previous 
studies cannot be simply generalized appropriate to the Beijing case. Second, there are 
studies, especially from Chinese scholars, focusing on Beijing’s Olympic venues after the 
Games, but most of them examined specific venues instead of the entire venue line. 
Moreover, most of the studies from Chinese scholars were conducted around one year 
after the Games, namely, 2009 and 2010. No studies specifically examined post-Games 
utilization in the context of the entire venue line. The status of post-Games utilization of 
Olympic venues is dynamic and constantly changing with passing time. Third, 
inaccessibility of information due to various reasons regarding current conditions of the 
                                                        
15 Ibid., p. 16. Table 2.1. 
16 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Bewbury Park, CA, 
USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1989), p. 78. Table 3.3. 
 
13 
Olympic venues in Beijing (see page 8) has been a major issue that potentially 
undermined the value of relevant studies from Chinese scholars. The researcher of this 
study intended to find out what the current status of post-Games utilization for the entire 
venue line in Beijing looked like three and a half years after the 2008 Games through 
conducting in-depth interviews with the managers/supervisors/directors, by which the 
first-hand information regarding the venues could be achieved. Therefore, this study, 
intending to find out unclear and non pre-examined conditions of post-Games utilization 
of Beijing’s Olympic venues and attempted to provide future host cities with some 
recommendations regarding post-Games use of Olympic venues, can be identified as an 
exploratory research study.   
To discover what potential factors were behind the current status of post-Games 
utilization of Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher collected interview data from venue 
managers, made multiple visits to the venue sites, and developed and interrelated 
categories of information. As an exploratory research, at the beginning of the study, the 
researcher, not influenced by the results from the studies on previous Olympic host cities, 
put aside theoretical ideas and notions so that the substantive facts and conclusions can 
emerge from the results of the investigation. During the investigating process of this 
study, data were collected and then analyzed before potential and possible conclusions. 
This procedure fits the measure of exploratory research in which usually data inducts 
conclusions instead of the other way around.   
 
4-2. Data Collection 
To collect data, the researcher conducted on-site investigations in Beijing (1 
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August 2011 to 31 October 2011). In-depth key figure interview was the major method 
for this study for collecting data. In-depth interviewing as a data collection technique is 
much more like conversations than formal, structured interviews.17 The interviews were 
conducted following a semi-structured interview outline specifically developed for this 
study. The interview questions in the outline were composed by the researcher to discover 
the answers for the research questions. The questions focused on three aspects of 
information regarding respective Olympic venues in Beijing: (1) history of the venue, (2) 
current status of the venue, and (3) future strategic development of the venue. Through 
these three general topics, the researcher expanded the conversation to achieve the 
interviewees’ perspectives, which is an assumption fundamental to qualitative research – 
the participants’ perspectives on the social phenomenon of interest should unfold as the 
participants view it, not as the researcher views it.18 Specifically, for this study, to fully 
analyze and understand reasons and motives behind the post-Games utilization of Beijing 
Olympic venues, providing a context, within which socio-cultural factors intertwine with 
political and economic factors, and even international relations, is a must. With a 
semi-structured and in-depth interview, interviewees responded based on their first-hand 
experience of both the host city development and the Olympic Games, which made it the 
most suitable method by which this context could be understood.  
Interviews in Beijing mainly aimed at venue managers/supervisors/directors who 
were either in charge of the venues before or during the Olympic Games, or were 
currently operating the venues. The researcher also interviewed some municipal and sport 
administration officials and scholars sharing similar research direction. All the interviews 
                                                        
17 Ibid., p. 82. 
18 Ibid. 
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were conducted in Chinese. Participant recruitment followed a non random sampling 
method. For all the Beijing Olympic venues, it was impossible for the researcher to know 
all the managers, so a snowballing method was used as a sampling technique to access 
and contact interviewees.19 In this study, the researcher’s acquaintanceship in the 
Olympic-related field in Beijing helped the researcher find a few potential interviewees 
and then pass the researcher’s contact information along to them so that they could 
contact the researcher to participate in the study. Then, the interviewees who participated 
in the interview helped the researcher again to pass his contact information through their 
own social networks to find the next possible interviewees, and so on.  
According to Rothe, with snowball sampling the researcher uses participants to 
find new participants until she or he believes that a sufficient number of people have been 
interviewed.20 In this study, the researcher made an attempt to find managers of the 
Olympic venues that covered the entire venue line. Finally, there were thirty-six (36) 
individuals who participated in the interviews during the data collection period that lasted 
one and a half months in Beijing. There were eleven (11) out of twelve (12) newly-built 
venues’ supervisors/directors or marketing/management managers, ten (10) out of eleven 
(11) pre-existing venues’ supervisors or marketing managers, and three (3) out of eight (8) 
temporarily-built venues’ marketing managers or supervisors, who were interviewed by 
the researcher at the time. Other interviewees included officials from GASC, BODA and 
BOPAC, and scholars in the similar academic field in Beijing. Each interview took 
approximately one hour and was held at the place and date the interviewees designated 
                                                        
19 Lisa J. McIntyre, Need to Know: Social Science Research Methods (New York, NY, USA: McGraw Hill, 
2005), p.105. According to the author, snowball sampling is the technique of identifying one member of a 
particular population and then asking him or her to identify another member who, in turn, is asked to 
identify another member, and so on. 
20 J. Peter Rothe, Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide (Toronto, ON, Canada: RCI/PDE Publications, 
1993), p. 167. 
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for their convenience. The interviewees were given an outline of the interview (see 
Appendix C for details) on site before the interview started.  
Simultaneously, document research was also conducted to collect relevant data at 
the time. Although the interview is generally considered an effective way to collect data 
for this kind of study, interviewees’ narratives based on their memories and opinions 
about certain events might be subjective and from their own perspectives, which could 
negatively affect the value of study. Thus, the researcher also applied document research 
in order to find other primary sources supplemental to the data obtained from interviews. 
The documents the researcher focused on included Official Report of the Beijing 2008 
Olympic Games (BOCOG), Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission for the 
Games of the XXIX Olympiad – Beijing 2008 (IOC), The 2008 Annual Summary of 
Research Studies on Beijing Olympic Year (Beijing Social Science), Beijing Olympic 
Venues and Related Facilities (Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office), 
Audit Result Announcement: Financial Balance Conditions of the Beijing Olympic 
Games and the Auditing Result of the Olympic Venues Construction Projects (National 
Audit Office of the PRC), Beijing Olympic Action Plan (Beijing Municipal Government 
and BOCOG), Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Bid, Replies to the 
Applicant City Questionnaire regarding Sport Facilities (BOBICO), 2010 Beijing 
Olympic Park Culture Development Forum – Collection of Speech and News Collectanea 
(BOPAC), and online documents at the official website of Beijing Municipal Commission 
of Development and Reform. It also included relevant official documents in the 
possession of venue authorities or other managers who assumed responsibilities for the 
venues, such as certain universities where an Olympic venue was on campus. Moreover, 
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coverage regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues in Beijing in local 
newspapers and magazines during the last three years complemented the material search. 
All written materials were obtained by either searching online or physically accessing 
them on site in Beijing.  
 
4-3. Data Analysis  
Because of the various responses received from the interviews, which usually did 
not fall into pre-defined statistical designs, the researcher often analysed those diverse 
responses by categorizing them and then coding the categories.21 Creswell recommended 
a standard format of the process of data analysis that typically included three steps: open 
coding, axial coding and selective coding.22  
The open coding step is also known as a categorization phase.23 In this phase, the 
researcher formed the categories of the venues based on the data collected both from the 
documents examined and the in-depth interviews. First of all, through investigating 
relevant documents related to Beijing Olympic venues, the researcher originally 
categorized the thirty-one Olympic venues into three groups in terms of new, pre-existing 
and temporary built (see Appendix D for details), which was the way of categorizing 
Beijing Olympic venues generally used through most of the existing studies regarding 
post-Games utilization of the venues. Then, through on-site visits to the venues in Beijing 
along the entire venue line, the researcher further formed a category of the venues by 
                                                        
21 Ibid., p. 103. 
22 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions 
(Thousand Oaks, CA, USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1998), p. 57. According 
to the author, there is another step following the three steps mentioned above, which is a conditional matrix 
that elucidates the social, historical, and economic conditions influencing the central phenomenon.  
23 Ibid., According to the author, in the phase of open coding, researcher forms initial categories of 
information about the phenomenon being studied by segmenting information. 
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their geographical distribution, which divided the venues into five areas: the Olympic 
Central Area, the West Community Area, the University Area, the East Community Area, 
and the North Scenic Area (see Appendix E for details). The reason for forming this 
category was that by his own on-site investigating, the researcher realized that his own 
category of geographical location was different from the category generally used in 
existing studies, and even in the official report of the Beijing Olympic Games. Finally, 
based on the analysis and contemplation of the information acquired from the interviews, 
the researcher formed the third category of the venues in which all thirty-one Olympic 
venues in Beijing were grouped by their types of ownerships, which consisted of four 
groups: government-owned, GASC-owned, university-owned and private 
enterprise-owned (see Appendix F for details). The reason for using different ownership 
types as an order to categorize the venues was that based on the results from the 
interviews, the ownerships and the relationships between certain venues and their owners 
or local authorities are the major cause underscoring present status of the venues in 
Beijing; thus, putting the venues into a category by their various ownerships is the best 
way to clearly show the differences of the venues’ current status. As a result, the findings 
of this study followed the ownership category as an order, which is briefly listed as 
follows: 
(1) Government-Owned Venues 
a) State-owned Enterprises  
b) Municipal Level Authorities24 
c) District Government25 
                                                        
24 In the context of this study, particularly, municipal level authorities included Beijing Municipal 
Government and Beijing Federation of Trade Unions.  
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d) Transferred Ownership 
(2) GASC -Owned Venues 
(3) University-Owned Venues 
(4) Private Enterprises-Owned Venues 
In terms of Group 1 above, government-owned venues in Beijing, there are three 
major types of ownerships. Municipal level government-owned and district level 
government-owned venues are directly authorized by the governments. The third type is 
so called state-owned enterprises, a specific term used in China, which means that the 
venues in this sub-group are owned by those enterprises that are, in turn, owned by the 
governments - municipal government, district government, or central government. Thus, 
all three types of venues are actually owned by government. The fourth type in this group 
is called “Transferred Ownership,” which means that during the last three and a half years, 
the ownerships of the venues transferred from one of the three types to the other, while 
they still belonged to “Government-Owned Venues” group. 
The second step of data analysis in this study was the axial coding phase, which 
followed the results from the open coding, namely, the categorization phase.26 According 
to the outline of the interview, for each venue, information from in-depth interviews was 
grouped into three parts: historical background, current status, and future development of 
the venue, which were reported in this phase. Moreover, the contents from other sources 
such as official documents, newspapers, and information from official websites were also 
                                                                                                                                                                     
25 District level governments in Beijing are under the authority of Beijing Municipal Government; the term 
“ward” is the equivalent expression used in Canada. 
26 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions 
(Thousand Oaks, CA, USA; London, UK; New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1998): p. 57. According 
to the author, in axial coding, the researcher assembles the data after open coding by using a certain coding 
paradigm or logic diagram in which researcher identifies a central phenomenon, explores causal conditions, 
specifies strategies, identifies the context and intervening conditions, and delineates the consequences for 
the phenomenon. 
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reported accordingly.   
Based on the results derived from the axial coding phase, the third step, the 
selective coding phase, was conducted.27 In this phase, the researcher attempted to 
summarize possible recommendations on the basis of both open coding and axial coding, 
which was expected to be helpful and potentially applied to future Olympic host cities. 
Furthermore, conclusions regarding the exploration on post-Games utilization of 
Beijing’s Olympic venues were inductively addressed based on all the investigations 
reported. 
 
5. Limitations and Delimitations 
A scarcity of literature sources (either hard copies or electronic documents) 
regarding post-Games utilization of Beijing Olympic venues is a major limitation for this 
study. Detailed and authentic information and facts regarding the venues have not been 
released to the public by relevant authorities through any accessible channels. Further, 
incorrect facts regarding the venues have been “copied and pasted” and circulated. In 
effect, they are nothing but rumors. The researcher must be highly cautious in this regard.  
In addition to written materials, accessibility is also a major limitation for key 
figure interviews. Authorities of the venues were often reluctant to disclose facts to either 
the media or members of the academic field, especially facts that may cause negative 
repercussions for the authorities. The directors or supervisors of certain venues, 
especially those owned by multi-governments were reluctant to accept interviews because 
of their purviews, regulations and discipline of the system in which they work. Their 
                                                        
27 Ibid., according to the author, in selective coding, the researcher identifies a “story line” that integrates 
the categories in the axial coding, and in this phase propositions or hypotheses are presented. 
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limiting considerations are: limit of authorization or rules, lack of mutual trust, 
self-judged low-level of interviewers, not enough interest to be interviewed, or even their 
own personalities. Under such situations, directors/managers/supervisors of Olympic 
Tennis Center, Hockey Field, Archery Field, Olympic Softball Field, Beach Volleyball 
Ground, and Triathlon Course rejected the researcher’s request for interview. Thus, the 
lack of information from those venues became a limitation.  
In terms of delimitations, only the thirty-one Olympic venues in Beijing were 
investigated, though there are another six sport venues located at other cities in China that 
were also used as competition sites during the Olympic Games in 2008. As to the 
temporarily-built Olympic Venues, some of the total of eight were dismantled right after 
the Olympic Games. For instance, the Road Cycling Race Course was restored back to 
city roads for regular traffic. Thus, these temporary venues were not considered. 
 
6. Outline of the Findings  
1. Overall Investigation of the Venues 
1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look 
1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area 
1-2-1. Original Selection of Location 
1-2-2. BOPAC 
1-2-3. BODA 
2. Government-Owned Venues 
2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise 
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (CNCC)  
2-1-2. “Water Cube”  
2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities 
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center 
2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course 
2-3. By District Governments 
2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District 
2-3-2. BMX Field and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District 
2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District 
2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District 
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2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District 
2-4. Transferred Ownerships 
2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest”  
2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS)  
2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Field 
3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues 
3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome 
3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field 
3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) 
3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC)  
3-4-1. NOSC Stadium 
3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium 
3-4-3. Ying Tung Natatorium 
4. University-Owned Venues 
4-1. Peking University (PKU) Gymnasium 
4-2. China Agriculture University (CAU) Gymnasium 
4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) Gymnasium  
4-4. Beihang University (BUAA) Gymnasium 
4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium 
4-6. Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasium 
5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues 
5-1. Wu Ke Song MasterCard Center (MCC) and Baseball Field 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
1. Post-Olympic Effect on Host Cities  
In 2002, the IOC held an international symposium in Lausanne, Switzerland, 
titled “the Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984-2002.” The Proceedings of the 
symposium grouped the legacies into seven aspects: urban and environmental legacies; 
sporting legacies; economic and tourism legacies; political legacies; cultural, social and 
communication legacies; education and documentation legacies; and organizing and 
planning legacies. The messages derived drastically emphasized the importance and great 
significance of Olympic legacy, in particular to the host cities, especially those hosting 
after Los Angeles in 1984.1 Some scholars discussed the Olympic legacies for the 
international Olympic movement in general. From an historical perspective, Barney 
grouped the legacies into five aspects: rebirth legacy, symbol legacy, (Olympic) mark 
protection legacy, television (rights) legacy, and commercialism legacy, by which the 
legacy of wealth from the Olympics was contended as a double edge sword.2 Kidd stated 
that the Olympic sporting legacy had been highly uneven and uncertain; and for the host 
cities positive legacies did not always happen.3 Further, it was stated that new Olympic 
facilities in the host cities could be too expensive to operate and maintain or might have 
little connection with local sporting culture.4 Kidd also made positive comments on the 
sport facilities built in Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic Games regarding their spatial 
                                                        
1 International Olympic Committee, The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000. Lausanne: (November 
2002). 
2 Robert K. Barney, “The Olympic Legacy of Wealth: A Double Edged Sword,” in The Legacy of the 
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, eds., Miquel de Moragas, Christopher Kennett, and Nuria Puig (Lausanne: 
IOC, November 2002), pp. 43-53. 
3 Bruce Kidd, “The Global Sporting Legacy of the Olympic Movement,” in The Legacy of the Olympic 
Games: 1984-2000, p. 136. 
4 Ibid. 
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distribution, but he also stated that the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games raised the bar 
significantly, including the standard and requirement of sport facilities for future host 
cities.5    
In terms of the context of the legacies to the host cities, Cashman questioned the 
term “legacy” and stated that it should be replaced by the term “outcomes,” because there 
were both positive and negative “legacy aspects” of the Olympic Games.6 For the 
negative outcomes, Cashman listed post-Games issues such as public debt and continuing 
cost of operating those expensive and under-used Olympic facilities.7 Cashman classified 
Olympic legacies (outcomes) into six groups: economic legacy; legacy of the built and 
physical environment; information and education legacy; legacy of public life, politics 
and culture; legacy of sport; and legacy of symbols, memory and history.8 Through this 
categorization of legacies, Cashman discussed how a host city should utilize the benefits 
and avoid negative outcomes from the Olympic Games during the post-Games period. 
In addition, Geraint John discussed the Olympic impact on urban planning policy; 
he also discussed what geographical factors needed to be taken into consideration when 
designing Olympic sport facilities.9 By providing readers with the examination of the 
Barcelona Olympics, Truñó reported the legacy of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games 
on a positive note and stated that the impact of the Games stimulated the post-Games 
development of the city.10 In terms of the Sydney Games, facing the huge cost of the 
                                                        
5 Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
6 Richard Cashman, “What is ‘Olympic Legacy’?” In The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, pp. 
31-42. 
7 Ibid., p. 34. 
8 Ibid., pp. 35-37. 
9 Geraint John, “The Impact of the Olympic Games on the Urban Planning Policy of the City,” in The 
Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, pp. 69-73. 
10 Enric Truñó, “The Political Legacies of the Olympic Games: Barcelona 1992,” in The Legacy of the 
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, pp. 253-258. 
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Olympic venues both from the construction before the Games and the maintenance after 
the Games, Searle stated that the main post-Games issue concerned how the on-going 
operation and maintenance costs of the venues can be paid for.11 It was also stated that 
the two main Olympic stadiums, Stadium Australia and the Super Dome, would 
eventually involve significant costs to the State government and private sector.12                   
Although Olympic legacies were generally considered in either tangible or 
intangible context, some scholars pointed out post-Games issues for Olympic host cities. 
Essex and Chalkley stated that the OCOGs and city planners might overstate the positive 
post-Games impacts and understate the negative impacts for their own group interests.13 
Many post-Olympic issues that host cities face derive from the OCOGs’ unrealistic and 
over-ambitious plans and expectations.14 Unfortunately, the host cities themselves are 
intricately involved in those plans and expectations. The authors also contended that 
under-utilization of Olympic sport venues after the Games was a common issue in the 
host cities – a problem still unsolved.15 And finally, the authors concluded that host cities 
should follow a long-term development plan that would not depend exclusively on the 
Olympics for implementation.16 
Hiller pointed out that post-Games outcomes instead of legacies caused serious 
issues for the host cities; and one of those issues related to post-Games usage of facilities, 
namely, whether those facilities built with public money would be used by elite athletes 
                                                        
11 Glen H. Searle, “The Urban Legacy of the Sydney Olympic Games,” in The Legacy of the Olympic 
Games: 1984-2000, p. 120. 
12 Ibid., p. 118. 
13 Stephen Essex and Brian Chalkley, “The Infrastructural Legacy of the Summer and Winter Olympic 
Games, A Comparative Analysis,” in The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, p. 95. 
14 Ibid., p. 96. 
15 Ibid., p. 97 
16 Ibid., p. 99. 
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or the general public.17 In terms of the economic impact of the Olympic Games, from a 
longitudinal perspective, Hiller proposed a political economy model that distinguished 
three kinds of linkages: forward linkages, backward linkages and parallel linkages, by 
which long-term impact of the Games and their intended/unintended and 
anticipated/unanticipated consequences can be identified in a longitudinal or historical 
context.18 Moreover, though Hiller admitted that Olympic sport facilities were lasting 
Olympic legacies in the host cities, they also represented dilemmas and challenges.19  
Other scholars weighed in on the impacts of the Olympic Games on the host cities 
in a broad context. Ritchie identified six aspects of impact from a mega-event such as the 
Olympic Games on the development of host cities: (1) economic, (2) physical, (3) 
tourism, (4) socio-cultural, (5) psychological, and (6) political.20 Similarly, Malfas, 
Theodoraki and Houlihan grouped the impacts into four aspects: (1) socio-economic, (2) 
socio-cultural, (3) physical, and (4) political.21 Meanwhile, certain studies focused on o
specific aspect of the impacts, such as economic impact, and analyzed the realities (or 
myth) between costs and benefits with respect to the Olympic Games.
ne 
                                                       
22 Furthermore, 
from a global perspective, Short discussed the impact of globalization of the Olympic 
Games on those host cities which tried to enhance their city image in international 
 
17 Harry H. Hiller, “Toward a Science of Olympic Outcomes: The Urban Legacy,” in The Legacy of the 
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, p. 108. 
18 Harry H. Hiller, “Assessing the Impact of Mega-events: A Linkage Model,” Current Issues in Tourism 1, 
no.1 (1998), pp. 47-57. 
19 Harry H. Hiller, “Post-Event Outcomes and the Post-Modern Turn: the Olympics and Urban 
Transformations,” European Sport Management Quarterly 6, no.4 (December 2006), pp. 317-332. 
20 Brent Ritchie, “Assessing the Impact of Hallmark Events: Conceptual and Research Issues,” Journal of 
Travel Research 23, no. 2 (1984), pp. 2-11. 
21 M. Malfas, E. Theodoraki, and B. Houlihan. “Impacts of the Olympic Games as Mega-events,” 
Municipal Engineer 157, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 209-220. 
22 Holger Preuss, “Rarely Considered Economic Legacies of Olympic Games,” in The Legacy of the 
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, pp. 245-252; Klaus Heinemann, “The Olympic Games: Short-Term Economic 
Impacts or Long-Term Legacy?” In The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, pp. 181-194; Evangelia 
Kasimati, “Economic Aspects and the Summer Olympics: A Review of Related Research,” International 
Journal of Tourism Research 5, no. 6 (2003), pp. 433-444. 
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context.23 Gratton and Preuss also made an attempt to clarify the correlation between the 
Olympic impact and its so called legacies by discussing the definition of Olympic legacy 
and by identifying six key elements of Olympic structures, which were: (1) infrastructure, 
(2) knowledge, skill-development and education, (3) image, (4) emotions, (5) networks, 
and (6) culture.24 
Some scholars investigated specific editions of the Olympic Games from which a 
more detailed scenario can be scrutinized. Gerlach focused on the issue of creating a 
memorial park in Salt Lake City where the 2002 Olympic Winter Games were hosted. He 
stated that when the Games passed, people’s interests passed and few had passions to care 
for Olympic-related matters that could adversely affect legacy left from the Games.25 
Wood described woeful economic situations in Greece and questioned whether those 
luxurious and magnificent Olympic sport facilities were essential in a country in need of 
more hospitals and long-term economic benefits that better highways might provide.26 B
describing the conditions of Sydney’s Olympic venues a couple of years after the 2000
Games and discussing the lessons future host cities might learn, Ren proposed severa
impacts that Olympic Games had on host cities and countries such as sporting, political
economic and environmental impact.
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23 John R. Short, “Globalization, Cities and Summer Olympic Games,” City 12, no. 3 (December, 2008), 
pp. 321-340. 
24 Chris Gratton and Holger Preuss, “Maximizing Olympic Impacts by Building up Legacies,” 
International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (December 2008), pp. 1922-1938. 
25 Larry R. Gerlach, “From Gathering Place to Visitor’s Center: Power, Politics, and Salt Lake City’s 
Olympic Legacy Park,” OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, XIX (2010), pp. 1-40. 
26 Clement Wood, “Costly Sporting: Greece’s Post-Olympic Woes,” Harvard International Review (Spring, 
2005), pp. 11-12. 
27 Hai Ren, “Impacts of Olympic Games on the Host Cities and Countries,” Journal of Sport and Science 
27, no. 1 (January 2006), pp. 4-6. To avoid confusion between the usual “Chinese manner” of expressing 
the proper names of individuals, that is, by noting the family name first, followed by the given name, and 
that of the English-language world of expression, that being noting a person’s given name first, followed by 
the family name, I have elected to follow the “English language” format. All Chinese names noted render 
the given name first, followed by the family name. 
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The Sydney case, as the first Olympic Games in the new century, inevitably 
attracted the attention of scholars. Cashman made concerted efforts on the Sydney case. 
In his book published in 2006, six years after the Sydney Games, Cashman provided 
readers with a general description regarding post-Games issues the city faced.28 
Comparing Cashman’s view in 2006 with Cashman’s and Hughes’ message from their 
book, Staging the Olympics,29 in 1999, regarding what the Olympic legacy in Sydney 
would be, it can be found that Cashman’s view about Olympic legacy and post-Games 
effect evolved into an objective and rational context, in which legacy and outcomes 
relative to post-Games effect was dynamic and constantly-changing. Further, Cashman 
stated that the condition of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues in Sydney 
fluctuated depending on various factors which intertwined with local cultural and 
tradition backgrounds, international environments, and economic situations.30 He 
contended that in terms of the legacy, the most important one that was always 
emphasized was economic impact because undoubtedly commercial interests and 
economic benefits had higher priority than sports, culture and environment in the context 
of Olympic Games, especially during the last three decades.31 As to the venues in Sydney
he stated that the bigger the venue, the more negative usage conditions experienc
during the first couple of years after the Games.
, 
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32 Also, nine years later in 2009, 
Cashman proposed four stages of the development of Sydney’s Olympic legacy: (1) local 
Olympic vision before the Games, (2) realizing the insufficient plan right after the Game
 
28 Richard Cashman, The Bitter-Sweet Awakening: The Legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games 
(Sydney: Walla Walla Press, 2006). 
29 Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes, “Cost and Benefits,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its 
Impact, eds., Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), pp. 195-200. 
30 Richard Cashman, The Bitter-Sweet Awakening: The Legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. 
31 Ibid., Chapter 4. 
32 Ibid., Chapters 6 and 7. 
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(3) belated plan developed, and (4) the vision adapted and modified to suit the changing
post-Games environment.
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A more critical book regarding Sydney’s Olympics, Lenskyj’s The Best Olympics 
Ever? Social Impacts of Sydney 2000 criticized the Olympics in Australia and the global 
Olympic movement in general in various aspects, including their so-called legacy.34 The 
style of post-modernism defines the author clearly against those so-called sycophant 
scholars of the Olympics. While defending the protesters surrounding the Sydney 
Olympics, the author placed herself in the same position of criticism – exploitation of the 
Olympics as a platform to realize one’s own purpose and group interests.  
Some scholars consider the 1992 Barcelona Games as successful as Sydney 2000. 
In addition to Truñó’s contribution mentioned above, Brunet stated that the Olympics in 
1992 were considered a stimulant for the city to accomplish its sustainable development 
during the following years and emphasized that a long-term strategy would be extremely 
important for city planning in the Olympic context and maintaining the Olympic impetus 
in a relatively long term after the Games.35  
Speaking of the “successful” editions of the Olympic Games, one festival cannot 
be ignored, the 1984 Los Angeles Games, which were considered the turning point of the 
Modern Olympic Movement. Particularly with regard to sport facilities, to control the 
cost of the Games, the organizers made extensive use of existing facilities. By 
refurbishing existing sport venues in Southern California, the organizers saved millions 
 
33 Richard Cashman, “Regenerating Sydney’s West: Framing and Adapting an Olympic Vision,” in 
Olympic Cities: 2012 and the Remaking of London, Chapter 8. 
34 Helen Lenskyj, The Best Olympics Ever? Social Impacts of Sydney 2000 (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2002). 
35 Ferran Brunet, “The Economy of the Barcelona Olympic Games,” in Olympic Cities: 2012 and the 
Remaking of London, edited by Gavin Poynter and Iain MacRury (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), Chapter 6. 
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of dollars. As a result, there were only three venues, cycling, swimming and shooting, 
built specifically for the Games.36 Unfortunately, no organizers since 1984 followed this 
method, that being heavily relying on existing facilities to reduce the cost of the Games.37 
MacRury compared two typical but opposite cases, the 1976 Montreal Games and 1984 
Los Angeles Games, and stated that the former mainly relied on public funding, while the 
latter relied on private funding.38 Also, in tune with Los Angeles, funding for the 1996 
Atlanta Olympic Games came largely from private/corporate money. On the other hand, 
for Barcelona in 1992 and London in 2012, public funding exceed (ed) 70% of the total.39 
However, Crompton stated that also in the United States, professional sports often gained 
public subsidies from multilevel governments such as the investment in facilities for team 
sports.40 The rationale was also provided: (1) economic impact (usually positive) from 
spending of visitors, (2) increased community visibility, (3) enhanced community image, 
(4) stimulations of other development, and (5) psychic benefits.41 Contrastingly, the 
different attitudes toward the Olympic Games and professional sports in the United States 
can be seen from these studies. 
As to comparative studies, Andranovich, Burbank and Heying undertook a 
comparison among the Olympic cities in the US.42 They examined the Olympic 
experiences of Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City regarding the differences and 
                                                        
36 Wayne Wilson, “The Legacy of Raised Expectations: The Impact of Los Angeles 1984 Games,” in The 
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37 Ibid., p. 483. 
38 Iain MacRury, “Branding the Games: Commercialism and the Olympic City,” in Olympic Cities: 2012 
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39 Ibid., p. 48. 
40 John Crompton, “Public Subsidies to Professional Team Sport Facilities in the USA,” in Sport in the 
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41 Ibid. 
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similarities of the methods and approaches applied during the bidding phase and 
preparation phase of their Olympic journeys. To some extent, all three US cities applied a 
Private-Public Partnership (PPP) model.43 Although they are very different in terms of 
size, economic base, social composition, political history, and hosted lengthy time 
periods apart, they share solid similar characteristics, such as political systems, national 
structure, cultural background, traditions, social norms, and macro economic 
surroundings, all of which are indispensable when composing such comparative studies. 
In contrast, certain comparative studies comparing different Olympic host cities in terms 
of their economy of hosting the Games, lack basic similarities, which makes it like “water 
without sources” and “trees without roots.” Preuss’ book made efforts to analyze and 
compare the economics of hosting the Olympic Games among host cities between 1972 
and 2008.44 Undoubtedly, solid statistical data were utilized and scientific methods were 
applied throughout the entire book. Since the data used in the book when analyzing 
benefits and costs of hosting the Games mainly stemmed from the OCOGs’ official 
reports after the Games were finished, it was easy to organize and justify because the 
OCOGs, with their short-lived life span were consistently characterized by similar 
organizational structure and goal. However, a true cost-benefit analysis should not be 
drawn from an obviously biased OCOG. Without essential data from reliable sources, 
Preuss’ work can be misleading.     
 
                                                        
43 Ibid., p.114. The PPP model was introduced as an advanced approach to the Beijing Olympics when 
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44 Holger Preuss, The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008 
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2. Historical Retrospect: “Olympic Cities”  
For general discussion of Olympic cities and relationships between the Olympic 
Games and host cities, scholars have focused viewpoints from an historical perspective. 
Chalkley and Essex identified four chronological phases in the development of the 
Olympics in terms of the impact of each Olympic Games on a host city’s facilities, 
environment, and infrastructure: (1) the period from 1896 to 1904 when the Games were 
small-scale, poorly-organized and their urban impacts minimal, (2) the period from 1908 
to 1932 when the Games became larger in scale, better-organized and usually involved 
the construction of some substantial new purpose-built sports facilities, (3) the period 
from 1936 to 1956 when sports facilities emerged as “flag-ship” symbols of the host 
cities, even though urban impacts remained modest, and (4) the period from 1960 to 1996 
when the Games triggered large-scale urban improvement and had more substantial 
impacts on host cities’ environments.45 Since, in certain phases, there are unique cases 
that are not consistent with the others, that is, not in accord with the defined characters of 
development, such as the 1936 Berlin Games in the second phase and the 1968 Mexico 
Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Games in the fourth phase, the arguments Chalkley and 
Essex advocated, weaken.  
In an earlier article, Essex and Chalkley focused on the development of Olympic 
sports facilities, namely, the built environment. Olympic venues built in various cities 
were reviewed along with the order based on their influence and impact on the cities’ 
development. The authors categorized the cities into three groups according to the level 
of the scale of facilities: (1) low impact Games (1900, 1904, 1948, 1968 and 1984), (2) 
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of the Olympic Games,” Planning Perspectives 14, no. 4 (1999), pp. 369-394. 
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modest impact Games with some additional sport facilities (1908, 1912, 1932, 1936, 
1952, 1956 and 1996), and (3) heavy impact Games that stimulated transformation of the 
cities (1960, 1964, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1988, 1992 and 2000).46 Based on the 
characteristics the authors defined, the 2008 Beijing Games undoubtedly should be 
placed in the third group. 
Gold and Gold’s book, Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the World’s 
Games, 1896-2012, provided readers with an historical panoramic scenario of the 
development of the Olympic Movement.47 Each Olympic city was introduced, one by 
one, with a time order, both for Winter Games and Summer Games, in which Olympic 
sport facilities were listed and discussed, respectively, providing readers with a 
systematic thread and outline for the Olympic venues and their post-Games utilization. 
Chronologically, the Olympic Games were categorized by certain similar characteristics. 
For instance, the 1980 Moscow Games and 1984 Los Angeles Games were grouped into 
a category called “Ideological Games.”48 In addition, several themes were also proposed 
and discussed, such as the Olympic Winter Games, Cultural Olympiad, Paralympics, 
commercialism and finance of the Games, which were followed by several specific 
studies, such as Berlin 1936, Montreal 1976, Barcelona 1992, Sydney 2000, Athens 2004, 
and Beijing 2008. 
 
3. Current Studies on Post-Games Utilization of Beijing Olympic Venues 
During the three and a half year period following the Beijing Olympic Games, 
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scholars, especially those from China, paid much attention to post-Games effects on 
Beijing’s Olympic venues, the city’s economic conditions, the finance of the Games, and 
Olympic legacies. The 2008 Annual Summary of Research Studies on Beijing Olympic 
Year, published at the beginning of 2009, stated that the Olympic economy significantly 
stimulated the development of the city, improved its industrial structure, and accelerated 
the progress in social environment and civil behaviors.49 The document also pointed out 
that the government should be highly sensitive towards the fact that negative influences 
could occur after the Games experienced by previous host cites, such as inflated real 
estate bubbles, extra public cost that burdened local residents, and imbalance of economic 
development among districts in the city.50 As to the Olympic venues, the article 
contended that over-emphasized national sports led to underused conditions among 
Olympic facilities in Beijing, which meant that certain venues might not be used by the 
public. Also, some suggestions were proposed to better utilize the venues.51 Wang 
proposed suggestions regarding how to further make use of the venues, such as 
converting sport functions to commercial or cultural functions for specific venues like the 
Water Cube and the National Indoor Stadium.52 Li, Wang, and Wan reviewed recent 
studies on the Beijing Olympics and analyzed the relationship between mega-events and 
host cites and the former’s impacts on the latter.53  
Lei contended that Olympic venues must be considered a public product,54 
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providing service functions for the public in host cities.55 Lei also analyzed potential 
reasons that adversely affected public functions during the post-Games period.56 Tian 
analyzed the characteristics of Olympic venues in terms of the differences between public 
product and private product and provided different operating modes dependent on their 
different characters.57 Putting aside the debate regarding whether they belong to public o
private product, Chen and Dong investigated general conditions of several Olympic 
venues in Beijing two years after the Games.
r 
                                                                                                                                                                    
58 They concluded that there were some 
well-operated venues, such as the National Stadium (Bird’s Nest) and the National 
Aquatic Centre (Water Cube), as well as some poorly-operated ones, such as the Tennis 
Facility in the Olympic Green and the Gymnasium at Peking University.59 Liu found 
similar results in his article published in 2009. According to Liu, the Water Cube was full 
of tourists all the time, so that people had to wait in line to visit it, and the Bird’s Nest 
made a profit (more than US$40 million within one year, including 70% coming from 
admission tickets).60 However, Zimbalist stated just a couple of months later that the 
Water Cube was severely underused.61 Matheson also pointed out that the Water Cube 
would have little use as a state-of-the-art swimming facility.62 Further, the Associated 
Press predicted that it was quite hard to believe that the Bird’s Nest’s own revenue could 
 
public transportation system that serves the public in general. 
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59 Ibid. 
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offset the at least 19 million dollar annual maintenance cost and debt payments.63 Wang 
and Zhao expressed their concern in 2010 that after the first step, the Bird’s Nest and the 
Water Cube faced considerable operating pressures.64 
No matter what the situation after the Olympic Games, the IOC and the OCOGs 
always make their profits from the Games. Beijing is no exception. Predictably, based on 
a national audit report, Shi and Feng indicated that the IOC and BOCOG made profits 
from the Beijing Games much higher than that experienced relative to Athens in 2004.65 
In contrast, Zhou examined the phenomenon of Olympic economy decrease and stated 
that Beijing should have learned from previous lessons.66 In terms of venue distribution 
and geographical layout, Hu and Zhou suggested that Beijing should learn from the 
experiences the Australians had for the 2000 Sydney Games.67 Meanwhile, Liu discussed 
the models of both Sydney and Athens and pointed out respective advantages and 
disadvantages, based on which suggestions in terms of cost reduction and venue function 
conversion were proposed.68 Liu and Li stated that Beijing’s Olympic venues, especially 
the famous ones such as the Bird’s Nest and the Water Cube within the Olympic Park, 
could be developed to interface with the tourism industry of the city.69 
Some scholars examined the relationship between Olympic legacies and 
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post-Games utilization and management of Beijing’s Olympic venues. Although Li stated 
that the most precious legacy the Olympics left to Beijing was the change in people’s 
minds,70 other scholars thought tangible legacies, such as tourism destinations, sport 
venues, public transportation, and Olympic archives, were more important.71 Depending 
on different venue zones in Beijing, Sun proposed various solutions for public use of 
facilities and, as well, their purpose as major tourist destinations.72 By analyzing pe
experiences in Seoul, Sydney, and Athens, as well as Beijing’s current conditions
Gao stated that Post-Games utilization and management of Beijing Olympic venues 
necessarily needed certain supportive policies from multi-level governments in C
Otherwise, precious Olympic legacies would be difficult to manage.
rvious 
, Li and 
hina.73 
d 
l 
                                                       
74 In addition to 
supportive policies, Liu stated that certain structural reform regarding management an
administration systems for the venues should be carried out before the management 
model might be changed.75 In terms of the most expensive venue in Beijing, the National 
Stadium, or Bird’s Nest, some scholars examined its management and operating model 
after the Games. Zhu, Zhang and Duan analyzed the management model, the 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, and the planned rights separated between 
ownership and rights of management for the Stadium proposed by Beijing municipa
government prior to the Games.76 Wang discussed the issue of naming rights for the 
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Bird’s Nest and contended that the Stadium should better serve professional sports in 
China.77 Zhang stated that the national stadium faced embarrassing situations because of 
the negative Post-Olympic effect and the contradiction between its public character and
private character.
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
78  
Specifically, some scholars investigated current utilization conditions of the 
venues located in the universities. There were six competition venues in the universities. 
Zhang and Zhang made a general examination of all six.79 Guo, Shu and Liu realized that 
companies targeted university students as their marketing target group; the venues 
became a platform on which marketing strategies were based.80 They contended that 
sport venues in the universities should be put into market-making profit, maximizing 
their commercial value instead of only serving students.81 Also, a specific venues 
management team should be built up to better organize and operate the venues for their 
marketing activities.82 In addition, the Olympic venues in the universities should serve 
national-level elite athletes for the Olympic gold medal strategy in China and hold more 
commercial sports events because of their high quality conditions.83 
Actually, well before the 2008 Olympic Games commenced, some scholars had 
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already paid attention to sport venues in Beijing and the issue regarding post-Games 
utilization. As early as 2003, Zhao pointed out that both the condition and the number of 
sport venues in Beijing were far below the level experienced in certain developed 
counties.84 On the other hand, some sport venues were underused, especially some of 
those built for Beijing’s Asian Games in 1990.85 Shi compared the conditions between 
Sydney and Beijing regarding sport venue construction and contended that the 
construction of Beijing Olympic venues must follow the principle of sustainable 
development of the city so that post-Games utilization of them could be successfully 
handled.86 Zhang reviewed the conditions of post-Games utilizations from previous 
Olympic Games such as Seoul, Sydney, Los Angeles and Athens, and concluded that 
intangible and symbolic values of Olympic sport venues should be emphasized along 
with their practical planning for post-Games utilization.87 Lin also introduced previous 
cases of Olympic venue types and their geographical distribution and provided readers 
with some kinds of functions with respect to post-Games utilization of Olympic venues, 
such as alternative function, multi-function and sport function.88 Wang and Guo 
examined both strengths and weaknesses of authorities’ decisions regarding management 
of Beijing Olympic venues and concluded that the conditions of venue management and 
utilizations depended on reform of Chinese sport policies in general, both for national 
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elite sport and mass sport after the 2008 Olympic Games.89 Cui questioned the opinion 
that Olympic venues would be precious legacies to the city and doubted if it was 
necessary to invest so much money on sport facilities for only two-week events like the 
Olympic Games. The author also contended that commercialism might be the most 
important solution to post-Games utilization of Beijing Olympic venues no matter how 
the venues could be defined, public product or private product.90 From an historical 
perspective, Chen and Ren reviewed the characteristics of Olympic sport venues and their 
physical distribution and planning, by which the trajectory of the development of 
Olympic facilities and how the Olympic built environment evolved during the last 
century were examined.91 
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Chapter 3. Findings 
1. An Overview of the Olympic Venues in Beijing 
Among thirty-one Olympic sport venues in Beijing used as competition sites 
during the 2008 Olympic Games, twelve of them were newly-built specifically for the 
Games. Regarding these twelve, four of them are located at the Beijing Olympic Central 
Area, which is currently supervised by certain enterprises owned by the municipal 
government or district government: the National Stadium (also known as the Bird’s Nest), 
the National Indoor Stadium, the National Aquatics Center (also known as the Water 
Cube), and the Olympic Green Tennis Center (also known as the Lotus Tennis Court).1 
Located in the Olympic Central Region, these venues are generally considered both 
sport-related facilities and major tourism destinations of the city. Another four, built on 
campuses, are being used by students and local communities currently supervised by 
universities: Peking University (PKU), China Agriculture University (CAU), University 
of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB), and Beijing University of Technology 
(BJUT).2 Another two, the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and the Lao Shan Velodrome, 
authorized by General Administration of Sport of China (GASC), are only used by 
Chinese national sports teams. Of the last two, the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park (also 
known as Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park), located at the North Scenic Area 
and authorized by Shun Yi district government, has been open to the public with an 
admission fee since May 2009.3 The MasterCard Center (MCC, also known as the Wu 
                                                        
1 Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, Beijing Olympic Venues and Related Facilities, 
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Ke Song Arena or the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium), is the only Olympic 
venue among all of them in Beijing that is owned by private enterprise.4   
In terms of the pre-existing venues, there were five out of eleven of them 
authorized by GASC and thus largely utilized by Chinese national sports teams: the 
NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, the Capital Indoor 
Stadium (CIS), and the Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field. Although mainly used 
by Chinese elite athletes, these GASC-owned venues, to some degree, are also open to 
the public for either their sport functions or non sport-related events with public 
assembly.5 Two other renovated venues were also located on campus: Beijing Institute of 
Technology (BIT) and Beihang University (BUAA), which largely have the similar 
utilization condition and status as the other four newly-built university-owned venues.6 
The Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’ Gymnasium are another two pre-existing venues 
renovated for the Games; and they are the oldest among Beijing Olympic sport venues: 
the Stadium was built in 1959 and the Gymnasium was built in 1961.7 These two venues, 
also called the Beijing Workers’ Complex, are owned by the Beijing Federation of Trade 
Unions, one of the governmental departments on the municipal level.8 Although the Lao 
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Shan Mountain Bike Course, another pre-existing venue for the Beijing Games, is quite 
close to the Lao Shan Velodrome, the course is not owned by GASC, the owner of the 
Velodrome, but the Shi Jing Shan District Government who also owns the Mountain Bike 
Course as a public park with free entrance.9 The last pre-existing venue, according to 
BOCOG, is the Feng Tai Softball Field located at Feng Tai Sport Center and owned by 
the Feng Tai District Government. The field, closed to the public since the 2008 Games, 
was planned before the Games to be modified in the future as a multi-sports complex 
with tennis courts, basketball fields, shooting range and a football training field.10 
Because of its underused situation, in June 2010, the authority of the field, the Sport 
Bureau of Feng Tai District, made an attempt to build a shopping mall-like recreation and 
leisure center on the site of the softball field; however, the project has not been carried 
out since then.11 
There were eight temporarily-built venues for the Olympic Games in the city, 
which, based on the statement made by the Beijing 2008 Project Construction 
Headquarters Office, were supposed to be dismantled right after the Games in 2008,12 
while actually some of them have not yet been so, three and a half years later as this 
research was conducted. Only three out of eight temporary venues were dismantled after 
the Games: (1) the road cycling course, through which the race route occupied urban 
roads that were restored to regular roads right after the Games; (2) the fencing Hall in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21, 2012). 
9 Junyan Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 19, 2011. Wang is the Director of General Office of 
the Cycling and Fencing Administrative Center, GASC. The facts are also based on the researcher’s 
observation on-site. 
10 Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, Beijing Olympic Venues and Related Facilities, 
(2006), pp. 44-49. 
11 Official Website of Sport Bureau of Feng Tai District, “The Projects Report Review for the First Half of 
Year 2010,” http://www.ftsports.gov.cn/news.asp?news_id=852 (accessed February 21, 2012). 
12 Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, Beijing Olympic Venues and Related Facilities, 
(2006), pp. 44-49. 
 
44 
China National Convention Center (CNCC), which was dismantled in 2009 and 
renovated as a convention and exhibition hall as planned prior to the Games;13 and (3) th
Olympic Baseball Field, which was dismantled right after the Games; the site has been
empty since then.
e 
 
                                                       
14 The Olympic Hockey Field and Archery Field have not been 
dismantled yet. Instead, partial facilities and auxiliary space around the two venues are 
being used as football and basketball fields for the public with admission fees. The Beach 
Volleyball Ground in the Chao Yang Park is still standing there empty, while beside the 
venue, a beach theme park was built for the public with extra admission fees applied.15 
The triathlon venue at the Ming Dynasty Tomb Reservoir, a temporary Olympic venue 
that was supposed to be dismantled after the Games, is still in use as a triathlon 
competition course where the Dextro Energy Triathlon ITU (International Triathlon 
Union) World Championship Series Grand Final was held in September 2011.16 Further, 
the venue was renovated and redesigned for future use in 2011.17 The Lao Shan BMX 
(Bicycle Motocross) Course still exists but is not open to the public since the Games 
finished.18 
 
1-1. Geographical Distribution: A New Look  
In terms of the geographical distribution of the Olympic venues in Beijing, in 
January 2001, it was addressed in the Candidature File of Beijing’s Bidding that all the 
 
13 Tony Xu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 9, 2011. Xu is the director of marketing of CNCC. 
14 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation in August 2011. 
15 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation in September 2011. 
16 Official Website of ITU World Championship Grand Final Beijing, http://beijing.triathlon.org/ (accessed 
February 22, 2012). 
17 Official Website of ITU World Championship Grand Final Beijing, “An Interview of Yan Fang, Deputy 
of Chang Ping District, regarding the World Triathlon Championship in Beijing,” 
http://www.beijingos.com/triathlon2011/tabid/102/InfoID/776/frtid/82/Default.aspx (accessed February 22, 
2012). 
18 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation in August 2011. 
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Olympic sport venues (thirty-two venues) would be located in four areas of Beijing: the 
Olympic Green (the central area), the Western Community Area, the North Scenic Area 
and the University Area.19 At the time, one more sport event was planned to be held in 
Beijing, the equestrian competitions, which were later removed from the northern 
outskirts of Beijing to Hong Kong. In terms of the reason for the location change, Jiadong 
Gao, the director of the marketing department of the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park, 
contributed his point of view. According to Gao, when bidding for the 2008 Olympics, 
there were two Olympic projects planning to be built in the North Scenic Area in Shun Yi 
District: an aquatic park for rowing and canoeing and an equestrian park. However, if the 
equestrian park was to be built in Beijing, the biggest problem would be the issue of 
EDFZ (equine disease-free zone), making it highly difficult to build EDFZ around the 
competition site in Shun Yi District where a rural population was the majority. In contrast, 
Hong Kong had already met the requirement at the time.20  
As a result, the Beijing Games had seen thirty-one venues located in the city. In 
September 2003, the Beijing Municipal Government and BOCOG jointly announced the 
Beijing Olympic Action Plan, which, in terms of venues’ locations, stated that the venues 
distribution can be described as “one center plus three areas.”21 The description was the 
same as the one in the Candidature File.  
Moreover, two years after the Games, in the Official Report of the Beijing 2008 
Olympic Games (hereafter “the Report”), published in August 2010, it also followed the 
original venues distribution description mentioned above. In the report, it still stated that 
                                                        
19 The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001. 
20 Jiadong Gao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 25, 2011. 
21 Official Website of BOCOG, “Beijing Olympic Action Plan: Development of Olympic Venues and 
Related Facilities: Principles, Status and Locations,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/14/93/article211929314.shtml 
(accessed February 22, 2012). 
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the Olympic Green consisted of thirteen sport venues, which was incorrect because after 
the adjustment, in fact, there were ten sport venues within the area of the Olympic 
Green.22 In terms of the West Community Area, the report indicated that there were nine 
venues; however, in fact, there were eight venues instead.23 The report further stated that 
the University Area consisted of four venues; but the truth is that there were six venues 
located within the area.24 As to the fourth area, the report indicated that the North Scenic 
Area consisted of two venues: the Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park and the Shun 
Yi Country Race Course, which was not the Olympic competition site since the 
Equestrian events’ location changed.25 According to this geographical distribution 
category, there are five Beijing Olympic competition venues that cannot be grouped into 
any of the categories: the Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium, the BJUT (Beijing 
University of Technology) Gymnasium, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, 
and the Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Venue, which, to some degree, could confuse 
people when they try to get a comprehensive picture of Olympic venues in Beijing.   
Therefore, under such conditions, to make a clearer map of the venues, based on 
the examination of the documents and on-site observation, the researcher developed a 
new geographical distribution category for the venues trying to put all the venues through 
the entire venue line into relevant groups. Except for the road race cycling route, all thirty 
venues are grouped into five geographical areas.  
                                                        
22 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38. The ten venues are: the 
Bird’s Nest, the Water Cube, NIS, Fencing Hall (dismantled), Tennis Court, Hockey Field, Archery Field, 
NOSC Stadium, NOSC Gymnasium, and NOSC Ying Tung Natatorium. 
23 Ibid. The eight venues are: Shooting Range Hall, Clay Target Field, Lao Shan Velodrome, Mountain 
Bike Course, BMX Venue, MasterCard Center, Wu Ke Song Baseball Field, and Feng Tai Sport Center 
Softball Field. 
24 Ibid. The six venues are: PKU Gymnasium, CAU Gymnasium, BIT Gymnasium, BUAA Gymnasium, 
UTSB Gymnasium, and CIS. 
25 Ibid. The Report put “originally planned venue for equestrian events of the Games” followed the Shun 
Yi Country Race Course as an explanation.  
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The first is the Olympic Central Area that includes the Olympic Park, the Olympic 
Forest Park, and the National Olympic Sport Center that was established in 1990 for the 
Beijing Asian Games. In this area, there were ten Olympic Venues: the National Stadium, 
the National Aquatic Center, the National Indoor Stadium, the Olympic Tennis Court, the 
Olympic Hockey Field, the Olympic Archery Field, the fencing hall in China National 
Convention Center, the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, and the Ying Tung 
Natatorium (see the table in Appendix E and the map in Appendix G for details).  
The second is the West Community Area where eight Olympic venues were 
located: the Beijing Shooting Range Hall, the Clay Target Field, the Lao Shan Velodrome, 
the Lao Shan BMX Field, the Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course, the Feng Tai Sport 
Center Softball Field, the MasterCard Center, and the Wu Ke Song Baseball Field (see 
the table in Appendix E and the map in Appendix H for details).  
The third is University Area where six venues were located: the CAU Gymnasium, 
the USTB Gymnasium, the BUAA Gymnasium, the BIT Gymnasium, the PKU 
Gymnasium, and CIS (Capital Indoor Stadium) (see the table in Appendix E and the map 
in Appendix I for details). In this area, all the venues were built on university campuses 
except CIS, but because it was located within the area, it was thus grouped into this 
category. It was consistent with how it was grouped in the Official Report of the Beijing 
2008 Olympic Games.  
The fourth is the East Community Area where four venues were located: the 
Workers’ Stadium, the Workers’ Gymnasium, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball 
Ground, and the BJUT Gymnasium (see the table in Appendix E and the map in 
Appendix J for details).  
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And the last is the North Scenic Area where two venues were located: the Ming 
Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Venue and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park (see the table in 
Appendix E and the map in Appendix K for details).    
By categorizing the venues into these five areas geographically, a panoramic 
picture of Beijing’s Olympic venues can be clearly seen, especially those that were prone 
to be overlooked, such as the venues on the east side of the city and the triathlon venue at 
Chang Ping District, a northern district of Beijing.    
 
1-2. Focusing on the Olympic Central Area 
Among various areas, the Olympic Central Area, also known as the Olympic 
Functional Region, is usually the one put under the spotlight frequently as long as the 
topics and issues regarding Beijing Olympic sport venues are addressed. It contains the 
greatest number of Olympic-related facilities, including not only ten sport venues, but 
also the Olympic Village, the Olympic Forest Park, hotels, convention center, and 
shopping center built specifically for the Olympic Games. Three and a half years after the 
Games, it has become one of the famous landmarks in Beijing as a tourism destination, a 
recreation and leisure location for the public, and an assembly place for mega-events (see 
the map in Appendix L). As a tangible Olympic legacy, the Olympic Central Area has 
been acting as a stage on which the national image and city image of Beijing continue to 
be shown in the post-Games period. 
As one of six government-appointed, high-end industrial functional regions in 
Beijing, the Olympic Central Area showcases its symbolic significance representing 
Beijing as an Olympic host city in its socio-cultural context, which is the major reason 
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that the Beijing Municipal Government has been paying considerable attention to this 
area.26 As the director of the Beijing Olympic Park Administration Committee (BOPAC), 
Chun Wang stated, the Beijing Municipal Government had been trying to rebrand the 
Olympic Green as a global tourism destination, such as the Great Wall or the Forbidden 
City.27 However, the rebranding project also meant an expensive price tag. Wang 
admitted that the yearly maintenance fees for the Park were around CNY 600 million 
(USD 92 million) in 2009, which were paid by both the Beijing Municipal Government 
(50%) and the Chao Yang District Government (50%).28 Despite the high maintenance 
cost, it seems that the government will keep financially supporting the development of 
the Park. Huiguang Zhang, the director of the Beijing Tourism Administration, stated that 
the Beijing Municipal Government would invest CNY 65 billion (USD 10 billion) 
towards developing tourism at the Park by 2015.29 
Undoubtedly all the investment made for the Olympic Park comes and will come 
from public money. Compared to the huge maintenance cost, on the other hand, the 
Olympic Green as well as the Olympic Forest Park is opened to the public for free, which 
means that there is no “revenue return” to offset the cost directly.30 Some venues such as 
the National Stadium and the National Aquatic Center within the Park apply entrance 
admission (CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the former and CNY 30 (USD 4.6) for the latter), 
                                                        
26 Caifeng Long, “To Create New Social Managing System of Beijing Olympic Park,” Beijing Olympic 
Park , no. 2 (April 2011), pp. 68-69. Long is vice-Party Committee Secretary of Beijing Olympic Park 
Administration Committee (BAPAC).  
27 Chun Wang, the Keynote Speech at the 2010 Beijing Olympic Park Cultural Development Forum, 
August 2010. 
28 Chun Wang, interviewed by Xuelian Song, a journalist of China Economic Weekly, China Economic 
Weekly no. 32 (August 16, 2010). 
29 Huiguang Zhang, conference presentation at the 2010 Beijing Olympic Park Cultural Development 
Forum, August 2010. 
30 Chun Wang, interviewed by Xuelian Song, a journalist of China Economic Weekly, China Economic 
Weekly no. 32 (August 16, 2010). 
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which could generate tax revenue for the government indirectly. However, booming 
tourism raised another issue, the revenue of the venues (the National Stadium and the 
National Aquatic Center) heavily relied on the entrance admissions from the tourists, 
which was not what the authorities of the Park expected. According to the official website 
of the Park, by May 2011, the number of tourists of the Park reached 100 million.31 For 
the two venues, the revenue from the entrance admissions produces 70% to 90% of the 
total revenues they earned, according to Aiqing Li, the board chairman of the Beijing 
State-owned Assets Management Co. Ltd. (BSAM), the owner of the two venues.32 
Lianyuan Cheng, the governor of Chao Yang District, said during an interview that the 
authority of the Olympic Park, both the Beijing Municipal Government and the Chao 
Yang District Government, expected to create the Park as a stage on which Chinese 
culture and national image could be showcased and to stimulate sport, exhibition, and 
culture industries by carrying forward the Olympic elements around the Park, rather than 
merely supporting the venues in order to earn revenue from entrance admissions.33  
However, with time passing by, the number of tourists at the Park dramatically 
declined. According to Ping Yang, the deputy director of BOPAC, the number of visitors 
to the National Stadium decreased by 50% every year since 2009.34 The researcher’s 
on-site observation witnessed a declining trend in tourists. During August 2011, there 
were not too many tourists in the Park as the Chinese media usually described unless 
certain events were held in the national stadium such as the Italy Super Cup football 
                                                        
31 Official Website of the BOPAC, “The Number of Tourists Entering the Olympic Park Reached 100 
Million,” http://www.bopac.gov.cn/newscenter/mediafocusing/2c998460300456c8013005f55b940002.html 
(accessed February 24, 2012). 
32 Aiqing Li, conference presentation at 2010 Beijing Olympic Park Culture Development Forum, August 
2010.  
33 Lianyuan Cheng, interviewed by Peng Gao, Beijing Olympic Park , no. 2 (April 2011), pp. 35-37. 
34 Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
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match or famous singers’ concerts. Among the tourists within the Olympic Park were 
those who entered the National Stadium even less, as they were reluctant to spend CNY 
50 for merely entering a stadium, even though it was the “Bird’s Nest.” The Xin Ao 
Shopping Center, located in the Olympic Park, as large as 400,000 square meters, was 
labeled the biggest shopping park in the world.35A new shopping center inside the Park, 
elaborately renovated, had nothing inside but a movie theater and three restaurants: 
McDonald’s, Yoshinoya and Sevenana, in October 2011. It can be predicted that adding 
more stores would not guarantee an increase in the number of customers.36  
Despite the existence of certain issues regarding the Park, the government still 
feels confident about its future. As the most important Olympic legacy left to Beijing, the 
Olympic Park is still attracting the attention of the governments. Since 2009, the Beijing 
Olympic Park Development Forum has been held annually. As District Governor Cheng 
stated in August 2011, by 2020, aside from being a tourism destination, the Olympic Park 
would be an exhibition zone for the innovation of culture and sport, a stage for 
international communication of culture and sport, and a public service area bearing 
Olympic elements as well as sport and recreation functions.37 As its symbolic 
significance to the city and quite huge investment the governments put on it, the 
governor’s grand ambition regarding the Olympic Park may be realized in the future. It 
remains a priority. 
 
                                                        
35 Yunfei Xing, “The Biggest Shopping Park in the World,” Beijing Olympic Park, no. 3 (July 2011), p. 79. 
36 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation during the summer of 2011. 
37 Lianyuan Cheng, Keynote speech at 2011 Beijing Olympic Park Culture Development Forum, August 
2011. 
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1-2-1. Selection of Location 
Being one of the most significant landmarks of the city, the Olympic Central Area 
is an important, indeed strategic part of the city’s post-Olympic development. The 
Municipal Government made the long-term plan for this area prior to the Olympic Games. 
Thus, the question why the city planners selected the location as well as the importance 
of the selection should be firstly examined in the study. In the Official Report of the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, the procedure of site selection of the Olympic Central 
Area was recorded from a perspective of BOCOG. Originally there were a dozen site 
selection plans worked out based on the expertise from professional institutions. And, 
during the second selection step there were five plans focusing on two major suburban 
areas left for further selection: the Northern Area Plan and the Southeast Area Plan.38  
The Northern Area Plan included two adjacent areas: the National Olympic Sports 
Center (NOSC: central area established for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games) and Wali 
Village (at the north of NOSC).39 The Southeast Area Plan contained three site choices. 
The first was within the southeast section of the Fourth Ring Road of Beijing where the 
green land around the area would be the site for major Olympic venues and the Olympic 
Village. The second was beyond the southeast section of the Fourth Ring Road where the 
venues and the Olympic Village would be built in an area of three hundred hectares in 
Fatou Area. The last choice was Yizhuang Area with more than three hundred ecological 
hectares, which used to be the emperors’ hunting park of the Qing Dynasty, currently 
located at the southeast section of the Fifth Ring Road of Beijing.40 The experts and 
                                                        
38 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume I, (2010), pp. 71-73. 
39 Ibid., Wali Village was the same site appointed for the 2000 Olympic Bid of Beijing. 
40 Ibid., In terms of the second and third choices in the Southeast Area Plans, the two locations had been 
already included under the city’s development plan before the site selection for the Olympic Central Area. 
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municipal officials had quite heated debate regarding those potential areas.41 As a result, 
the question became: the north or the south. Certain factors were listed as criteria of the 
selection: overall layout of venues; sports competitions operations; spectators; media 
coverage; investment return; city development and land usage; framework of the city at 
the time; infrastructure; environmental protection; and post-Games utilization.42 Finally, 
in December 1999, the Beijing Municipal Government adopted the Northern Area Plan 
with a clear rationale: the northern area plan had obvious advantages such as existing 
infrastructure and sport venues, which the southern plans did not have, while the southern 
area had obvious disadvantages such as poor environment, long distance from other 
venues and other facilities, and ineffective post-Games use.43 A potential negative side 
for the final choice was also listed: land shortage and excessive reliance on facilities in 
the northern part of Beijing, heavy traffic and ineffective post-Games use plan.44  
Some scholars and officials provided readers with various supplemental points of 
view and reasons regarding the site selection of the Olympic Central Area. According to 
Professor Hai Ren of Beijing Sport University, originally, the government made an 
attempt to balance the development between the north and south of the city with the 
opportunity of the Olympics, because it was a problem for Beijing that city-north had 
been more developed than city-south for a relatively long time. However, the attempt 
failed when the government realized that there would be much more financial burden 
                                                        
41 Xundong Wan, “The Inspiration on the Site Selection and Project Management of Beijing Olympic 
Venues,” Beijing Planning Review, no. 2 (2009), pp. 45-48. According to the author, some experts even 
proposed that the Olympic Venues should be built out of Beijing so that the whole Great Beijing Area could 
benefit from the Olympic economy. 
42 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume I, (2010), p. 72. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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borne if the Olympic venues and facilities were built at the south side of the city.45 
Strategically, it was different from certain Olympic host cities in western countries, which 
used Olympic opportunities to regenerate old or degenerated city areas to balance the 
whole city’s development, such as what London has recently done. Ren stated that this 
different Olympic strategy regarding city growth plans came from the difference between 
the developed countries and the developing countries.46 Moreover, Ren indicated that d
to the time limit for infrastructure and venue constructions, the site selection caused 
potential problems regarding too many sport venues concentrated within one area, namely, 
the Olympic Central Area, though at the time the government could do little about it, 
which was probably the only choice left to the governments under that circumstance.
ue 
riginal 
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Ping Yang, an official of BOPAC, contributed his point of view regarding the site 
selection. Yang stated that the venues legacy of the 1990 Beijing Asian Games was the 
key factor of the site selection.48 NOSC and the reserved lands around it were the o
location for the plan of the Olympic Green’s site. The government did consider the 
southern area of Beijing, however the projects would be too huge and too many, and the 
investment would be four to five times higher than that of the north area plan. There was 
at least a thirty-year difference between city-north and city-south of Beijing in terms of 
economy, infrastructure and urban civilization. General evaluation of the condition of 
city-south indicated that there was no sport venue there that could be considered an 
existing venue for Olympic use.49 Apparently, balancing city development would be a 
correct way for the Olympic-involved urban strategic plan processing; however, 
 
45 Hai Ren, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, October 23, 2011. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
49 Ibid. 
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realistically, Beijing chose another way to realize its Olympic dream, and that turned out 
the best way suitable for its own circumstances.50 Otherwise, the government would h
spent too much on such projects as road building to connect to the new airport and urban 
infrastructure to meet the requirement of the Games. Thus, Yang stated that the 
government’s decision about this was a wise choice for the city.
ave 
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Xinxin Zhou, the manager of the Beijing Guoao Investment & Development Co. 
Ltd., also confirmed that the decision of the site selection was made as early as the 1990s 
when the Chinese sport authority made an attempt to bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. 
The location was the combination of Wali village and NOSC on the north side of the 
city.52 According to Zhou’s idea on this, the decision was made before 1993, the year 
Beijing lost its first bid to Sydney. Zhou also mentioned the idea regarding the plan of 
“city-south,” while she admitted that tremendous works of infrastructure and local 
residents’ relocation, which meant huge public money invested, was the key reason that 
forced the government to finally give up the Southern Area Plan.53 
Weiguo Zhao, Manager of the NOSC Stadium, posed different ideas about the site 
selection. According to Zhao, as early as the 1990s, the current location of the Olympic 
Central Area, Wali Village at the north of NOSC was not reserved as a future Olympic 
Games. Instead, in 1993, before Beijing’s first bid, the other half circle at the south of 
NOSC, which, when combined with NOSC, could compose an entire circle, was reserved 
for future Olympic Games.54 Zhao was reluctant to explain the reason why the 
government changed its mind later, implying that it could be a result of high speed 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Xinxin Zhou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 20, 2011. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Weiguo Zhao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 26, 2011. 
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increase in China’s economy at the time.55 In 2011, the Beijing Municipal Commission o
Urban Planning announced that three national cultural organizations selected another half
circle at south side of NOSC, which Zhao mentioned as unselected for the Games, as 
their new locations three year after the Beijing Olympics.
f 
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Another scholar contributed different reasons why the Southern Area Plan was 
abandoned. According to Xudong Wan, environmental reasons potentially influenced the 
decision of site selection. Because of the contamination of soil in the over-industrialized 
area around the southeast region of the city, the cost for solving this problem would be as 
high as CNY 50 billion (USD 7.7 billion).57 Further, it would take two years to 
completely solve the issue, which was not acceptable due to the time limit at the time.58 
Thus, the North Area Plan was finally chosen by the government.     
 
1-2-2. BOPAC 
  The Beijing Olympic Park Administration Committee, the governmental 
authority of the Olympic Central Area, is the direct government of the area, delegated by 
the Beijing Municipal Government and operated under the control of the Chao Yang 
District Government.59 BOPAC has been administering its governing functions over the 
Olympic Park since its establishment in November 2008 such as monitoring, supervising, 
executing the law, collaborating among the business within the Park, planning and 
 
55 Ibid., Zhao also mentioned that if the south circle was used for the Olympics, the price of the land at the 
time could be unbelievably high. 
56 Official Website of Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, “Three National Cultural 
Organizations Located at the Olympic Central Area,” 
http://www.bjghw.gov.cn/web/dynamic/site/homepage/sdgjw.html (accessed February 27, 2012). 
57 Xudong Wan, “The Inspiration on the Site Selection and Project Management of Beijing Olympic 
Venues,” Beijing Planning Review, no. 2 (2009), pp. 45-48. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Official Website of BOPAC, “The Responsibility of BOPAC,” http://www.bopac.gov.cn/parkmc/ 
(accessed February 28, 2012). 
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organizing events, security protection, and attracting potential corporate investment.60 
The venues within the area that are administered under BOPAC include the National 
Stadium, the National Aquatic Center, the China National Convention Center, the 
Olympic Tennis Center, the Olympic Hockey Field, and the Olympic Archery Field, 
while the venues in NOSC are administered by GASC. As generally accepted, both in 
China and abroad, due to China’s one party political system, government is always the 
leader or “boss” in every single region throughout the country, although it keeps infusing 
and advocating its service function for the public and corporate sectors. BOPAC, as the 
government of the Park, is not an exception. In January 2010, BOPAC initiated the 
Olympic Functional Area Development Alliance in an effort to better share and integrate 
the social resources and integrate all the business, non-governmental organizations, banks, 
hotels, and venue owners within the Park.61 According to Jun Ding, an official of B
the venues in the Park need to submit proposal applications to BOPAC before they plan 
to organize or hold any events (sport or culture-related, commercial or non-comm
in their own venues; and BOPAC then evaluates those proposals based on certain internal
complex criteria to decide if the applications could be approved.
OPAC, 
ercial) 
 
s, the 
                                                       
62 This function is 
obviously beyond the service function the government usually emphasized. Thu
relationships between BOPAC and the owners of the venues under its authority, which is 
a kind of typical relationship between governments and enterprises (especially 
state-owned enterprises) throughout the country, has become one of the key points on 
which the venues’ various development trajectories and current statuses depend.  
 
60 Official Website of BOPAC, “The Functions of BOPAC,” http://www.bopac.gov.cn/parkmc/functions/ 
(accessed February 28, 2012). 
61 Beijing Olympic Park Administration Committee, Beijing Olympic Park, no. 1 (January 2011), p. 1 and 
no. 6 (January 2012), p. 75. 
62 Jun Ding, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 26, 2011. 
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Shaofeng Chen, a scholar from Peking University, contributed his point of view 
regarding the Olympic Park and BOPAC. According to Chen, the Park needed an 
authority to generally administer.63 The functions such as service and coordination were 
necessarily needed by the business inside the Park. BOPAC was supposed to be a 
platform of service for the business within the Park rather than government 
administrative intervention. Furthermore, Chen also pointed out that BOPAC should pay 
more attention to the future strategy planning of the Park so that all business initiatives in 
the Park would develop together.64 In terms of future development, BOPAC Official Y
stated that the Olympic Functional Region was officially recognized as a National 5A 
Scenic Spot of China.
ang 
sm, 
                                                       
65 BOPAC targeted four major industries for this region: touri
sport events, culture events, and conventions; the core task of BOPAC, based on Yang, 
would be to secure that the Park could develop following this direction.66  
 
1-2-3. BODA 
The Beijing Olympic City Development Association (BODA), a successive 
organization of BOCOG, was officially established in August 2009, one year after the 
Beijing Games.67 BODA was announced as a non-governmental and non-profit 
organization of which the Mayor of the Beijing Municipality was selected as the 
Executive Chairman, and the Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Government was 
 
63 Shaofeng Chen, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 9, 2011. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. Some other National 5A Scenic Spots in 
Beijing are the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, and the Summer Palace, etc.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Official Website of Beijing Olympic City Development Association, “Beijing Olympic City 
Development Association Established,” 
http://www.beijing2008.cn/English/SpecialReport/Thebodaisfounded/20110704/1213.shtml (accessed 
February 28, 2012). 
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selected as the Chairman.68 According to its Chairman, Qi Liu, the main goal of BODA is
to carry forward Olympic spiritual, cultural, education, and material legacies the Be
Games left to the city; meanwhile, BODA will expand sustainable development of the 
Olympic movement in China on a wide social basis.
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69 Moreover, since there are financia
surpluses from the Beijing Olympic Games and donations from certain organizati
BODA also has the function of assets management.70 Yang also pointed out that assets 
management was one of the major tasks of BODA, while it was also responsible for
youth Olympic education and international communication with other Olympic host ci
and sport organizations.71 Moreover, Nan Liu, an office staffer at BODA told the 
researcher that the major part of BODA’s regular task was Olympic-related
organizing, event and forum holding, and having exhibitions regarding Olympic culture. 
There were few academic activities carried out by BODA, though a research department 
existed in BODA since its establishment.72 
In terms of post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues, Xiaoyu Jiang, the 
vice chairman of BODA stated that BODA made a report on this issue and communicated 
with other Olympic host cities.73 Jinghong Li, an Official of BODA, stated that for le
governmental leaders better know what post-Games utilization of Olympic venues looked 
 
68 Official Website of People’s Daily, “Xiaoyu Jiang: BODA is Passing on the Olympic Legacy in Beijing,” 
http://sports.people.com.cn/GB/31928/224278/15451159.html (accessed February 28, 2012); Official 
Website of Beijing Olympic City Development Association, “Brief Introduction of Beijing Olympic City 
Development Association,” http://www.beijing2008.cn/English/BODA/20110719/1318.shtml (accessed 
February 28, 2012). 
69 Official Website of Beijing Olympic City Development Association, “Message from Chairman Qi Liu,” 
http://www.beijing2008.cn/English/BODA/20110719/1316.shtml (accessed February 28, 2012). 
70 Official Website of Beijing Olympic City Development Association, “Beijing Olympic City 
Development Association Established,” 
http://www.beijing2008.cn/English/SpecialReport/Thebodaisfounded/20110704/1213.shtml (accessed 
February 28, 2012). 
71 Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
72 Nan Liu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 10, 2011. 
73 Official Website of People’s Daily, “Xiaoyu Jiang: BODA is Passing on the Olympic Legacy in Beijing,” 
http://sports.people.com.cn/GB/31928/224278/15451159.html (Accessed February 28, 2012). 
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like, BODA attempted to conduct an examination of Beijing’s Olympic venues in 2009. 
However, due to a lack of research capability, BODA asked some scholars from Beijing
Sport University (BSU) to assist them to complete it.
 
                                                       
74 Some researchers from BSU led 
the project at the time, as asserted by Professor Lin of BSU.75 According to Li, BODA 
held a conference gathering the directors and managers of the Olympic venues in Beijing 
by which BODA expected to collect the data regarding post-utilization status of the 
venues. Following the conference, BSU started the follow-up investigation.76 BSU’s 
project team faxed questionnaires to the venues to collect detailed information regarding 
venues’ utilization conditions; however, the result was not too positive. According to Li, 
the data collected had some problems: first, the team did not receive feedback from all 
the venues; second, although there was feedback from some of the venues, certain critical 
information was missing; and third, the team found that certain data they received was 
manipulated, especially the financial information. Considering it was not what BODA 
originally expected, Li stated that the result of the investigation was not reported to upper 
authorities.77 BSU’s Professor Xianpeng Lin, the leader of the project at the time, 
authenticated what Li stated. According to Lin, it was difficult for the team to collect 
financial information from the venues, which were highly reluctant to expose such data to 
an academic organization.78 Most of what the team got was something like venues’ 
organizational structure, the record of events at venues, and the procedure of events 
organizing.79  
 
 
74 Jinghong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
75 Xianpeng Lin, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 12, 2011. 
76 Jinghong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Xianpeng Lin, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 12, 2011. 
79 Ibid. 
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2. Government-Owned Venues 
In this section, there are sixteen venues grouped into four sub-categories: 
“state-owned enterprise,” “municipal level authority,” “district level government,” and 
“transferred ownership.” All these venues are owned by municipal authorities, various 
district governments, or certain enterprises that are owned by municipal or district 
governments, namely, so-called “state-owned enterprise.” Aside from the first three 
groups, there is the fourth group, titled “transferred ownerships,” by which it categorized 
those whose ownerships had been transferred from one state-owned enterprise to another 
or from the Beijing Municipal Government to certain district governments during the 
three and a half year post-Games period. 
 
2-1. By State-Owned Enterprise  
2-1-1. China National Convention Center (The Fencing Hall) 
As a temporary Olympic venue, the Fencing Hall was built in the China National 
Convention Center (CNCC) located at the Olympic Green. During the Beijing Games, the 
plenary hall on CNCC’s fourth floor was the competition site for Olympic Fencing events, 
Modern Pentathlon events (Fencing and Shooting); the exhibition space on the ground 
floor was the Olympic International Broadcasting Center (IBC) and the Main Press 
Center (MPC).80 In addition, the Paralympic Games utilized the Ballroom section in 
CNCC as the competition site for Wheelchair Fencing and Bocce.81 Following the G
all the competition sites were removed from CNCC; presently, there is no trace by which
any Olympic marks can be found in CNCC. It looks like the building had nothing to 
ames, 
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with the Olympics except its location is in the Olympic Green.82  
At the 2011 Beijing Olympic City Development Forum in August, Tony Xu, the 
marketing director of CNCC, accepted an interview request from the researcher. 
Although CNCC is no longer used as a sports venue or Olympic-related facility, Xu 
continued to discuss the status and the brief history of the building. The owner of CNCC 
is the Beijing North Star Industrial Group, a state-owned enterprise supervised by the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s 
Government of the Beijing Municipality.83 When the Beijing North Star Group won the 
bid for the CNCC project in 2004, according to Xu, it was written into the agreement that 
the temporary functions as competition sites, as well as the IBC and the MPC projects, 
would be the responsibility of the owner. Establishing a clear function for post-Games 
use, namely, a convention center, the construction design was quite specified and future 
functioning oriented. The design and construction had to meet not only the requirement 
from municipal government and BOCOG in terms of sports events’ specification, but also 
the requirement for future convention center functions. Thus, despite CNCC being used 
as a temporary Olympic competition site, the Beijing North Star Group built it as an 
international convention center for the future.84 
According to Xu, most Olympic facilities in Beijing were built by state-owned 
enterprises, which was a must. The negotiations between the government and state-owned 
enterprises were usually easier than those between the government and private enterprises 
in China, especially for mega-events like the Olympic Games. If private enterprise took 
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83 Official Website of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of People’s 
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the project, for their own group interests and profit they would not accept certain 
requirements demanded by the government because they would not be a fair deal 
typically existing in a free market, which would definitely undermine economic benefits. 
Under such condition, cooperation could not proceed. Usually, private enterprise 
considered an Olympic project a one time deal, which meant they had to secure a 
maximum profit from the deal. However, for state-owned enterprises in China, since their 
relationship with the government was something like a family, namely, the latter 
belonged to the former, state-owned enterprises did not consider the Olympic projects as 
one time deals, which meant if you lost money at one occasion, you would earn it back 
and more the next time. The principle is that state-owned enterprises must contribute to 
the country, not specifically individuals or private enterprise. The government almost 
always acts following this principle. It could ask state-owned enterprises to do whatever 
it needed them to do, irrespective of free market rules. In return, state-owned enterprises 
would be considered the priority choices when there were mega projects appearing for 
this high speed developing country, which would offer potentially huge opportunities for 
state-owned enterprises. This was probably the reason why most of the Olympic projects 
in Beijing were under the jurisdiction of and built by state-owned enterprises.85    
During the Games, in terms of the rental of space for IBC and MPC, Xu had no 
idea if a fee was paid or the facility used for free, which was the secret part in the 
agreement. But BOCOG paid for the technical equipment and logistics as well as the 
security and cleaning. Also, if BOCOG asked CNCC’s staffers to work for it, BOCOG 
paid for them. When the Games finished in September, BOCOG was supposed to remove 
all the Olympic-related equipment and supplies used in CNCC. However, due to the 
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global financial crisis occurring at the time, BOCOG postponed the removal plan because 
it wanted to hold the material for a longer time so that it could sell at a better price. The 
delay negatively affected the renovation plan for CNCC. CNCC had to wait until all the 
material was removed to start their reconstruction project. They could not require the 
government to remove the material as promised, although CNCC had signed a contract 
for their own convention business. The delay meant more cost had to be paid if CNCC 
wanted to finish the reconstruction project on time. All the cost incurred for post-Games 
reconstruction was paid by CNCC based on the agreement with the government.86 
In terms of business operation after the Games, CNCC was fortunate because the 
ownership of the facility was consistent, compared with what happened to the National 
Stadium and the National Indoor Stadium, where the ownership transfer, to some degree, 
influenced the regular daily operations after the Games. In general, Xu was satisfied with 
the current status of CNCC’s convention business. The location, apparently, was a 
positive factor; according to Xu, a detailed and a function-oriented plan was also a 
positive. In addition, consistent and stable ownership should be another positive. Xu 
emphasized that function-oriented design and marketing prior to the Games was the key 
point for post-Games utilization. This turned out well for CNCC. In terms of the 
operation’s profit, Xu stated that the Center was reopened in November 2009, and the 
first complete business year was 2010, during which the revenues were more than CNY 
10 million (USD 1.54 million). Xu felt that intervention from the government was slight 
throughout the business operation, while the independence of CNCC was secured 
generally. Most of time, BOPAC carried out support and service functions to CNCC, 
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instead of initiating and monitoring.87  
As to current weakness, Xu stated that relatively small usable business space 
within the Center was a factor that might limit future development. Haiying Liu, Board 
Chairman of CNCC, expressed the same concern. Liu stated that the [convention and 
exhibition] market developed so fast in China, that current space in CNCC would become 
a limitation for its growth in the market.88 Moreover, both Liu and Xu considered that a 
lack of professional practitioners in management and convention business was a concern 
for current conditions and also challenges in the future.89 As to the challenge in the f
Xu also stated that increasingly intensified competitions in the convention business
market was forcing CNCC to be alert and adaptive as quickly as possible; the competitio
not only came from other convention centers in Beijing or other cities in China, but als
from certain international competitors, especially those around the Asian-Pacific re
such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and Seoul. But the good thing was that the mark
had been greatly expanding. For future development, Chairman Liu stated that as 
state-owned enterprises, CNCC needed more support priority policies and less 
intervention in the business from the government at the same time.
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2-1-2. “Water Cube” 
The National Aquatic Center, also known as the Water Cube, hosted the 
swimming, diving and synchronized swimming events during the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
 
87 Ibid. 
88 Haiying Liu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 9, 2011. 
89 Haiying Liu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 9, 2011; Tony Xu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 
9, 2011. 
90 Haiying Liu, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 9, 2011. 
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Games. At the time the Water Cube witnessed twenty-one world records.91 This 
record-breaking tide was considered a miracle in the history of international swimming 
competition. The Water Cube has become a model for modern swimming pools in the 
world, and was called the “Magic Water Palace.”92   
On 27 December 2011, at a national working conference for directors of sport 
bureaus nationwide in China, Qiyong Yang, Deputy General Manager of the National 
Aquatic Center, reported that in the year 2011 the Water Cube’s business revenue was 
CNY 88 million (USD 13.54 million), while the total operational expense was CNY 99.3 
million (USD 15.28 million); thus, the Water Cube had to seek financial support from the 
relevant department in the government to cover the deficit.93 This is the first instance that 
an official of the Water Cube publicly admitted that the venue could not balance the 
financial sheet by its own efforts and had to seek the government help to continue 
operation. Yang explained that for the last three years (2009-2011), the Water Cube had 
been experiencing an “exploring period” and a “market cultivating period,” during which 
the Water Cube experienced few sports events. They were sporadic instead of regular. 
However, an extremely high maintenance and operation cost had to be paid to properly 
run the venue.94 The expenses included energy cost, facilities maintenance cost, 
management cost, sale and service cost, depreciation of fixed assets, financial cost, and 
human resource expenses, of which 58% of the total cost came from energy, maintenance, 
and human resource expense (there are more than 1, 200 individuals working for the 
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Water Cube).95 To solve the issue and secure proper daily operation of the venue, the 
Beijing Municipal Government appropriated CNY 9.6 million (USD 1.48 million) as the 
Beijing Sport Industry Development Funds Contribution to the Water Cube in 2011.96  
The future of the Water Cube projects pessimism. For 2011, the number of tourists 
in the Water Cube was more than 20 million, which was a reduction of 30% compared 
with 2010.97 Yang stated that as visiting enthusiasm to the Olympic venues declined, the 
number of “Cube” visitors would further reduce, leading to the financial pressure getting 
worse.98  
However, on 31 October 2011, on the contrary, the Water Cube, as a Beijing 
landmark, was considered an excellent example of post-Games utilization of Olympic 
venues. This statement was made at the National Working Conference on Sport Industry 
held in Nanjing, in which the post-Games operation of the Water Cube, as a praised 
exemplar, was described as exploratory, brand-new, multidimensional operation mode.99 
This was a dramatic and inconsistent description of the venue’s status from Yang’s 
evaluation two months later. But still, Yang at the end of 2011, felt confident about the 
venue’s future. He said that with the government’s financial support and employees’ 
effort, the Water Cube could achieve a good balance on the financial sheet.100  
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Confused by what was reported publicly, particularly in contradiction of Yang’s 
statement, some practitioners’ opinions and points of view might provide the reader with 
a wider picture regarding the Water Cube during the last three and a half years. Haitao 
Shi, manager of the Department of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Water 
Cube, made a comment on post-Games operation of the venue. Shi stated that generating 
revenue was not the only criterion to evaluate the Water Cube’s operation condition. The 
Water Cube was the only Olympic venue in Beijing that all the investment for the project 
came from donations from overseas Chinese.101 The donations were made to the Beijing 
Municipal Government that later appointed the Beijing State-owned Assets Management 
Co. Ltd. (BSAM) to supervise the design and construction of the venue. BSAM became 
the owner of the Water Cube since 2003.102 BSAM established a branch company in 
2004 to specifically focus on the business of the Water Cube’s operation. Later, in August 
2007, BSAM registered a wholly-funded subsidiary, the National Aquatics Center Co., 
Ltd., to supervise post-Games operation of the Water Cube.103 Therefore, as an Olympic 
venue, owned by the government and constructed with the donations from overseas 
Chinese, according to Shi, its social service functions must be continued and it must 
contribute to public benefits; thus, embodiment of social responsibility was a major 
functional part of the venue.104   
According to Chen Sun, former marketing manager of the Water Cube, there were 
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detailed post-Games operation and management plans written for both the Water Cube 
and the National Stadium (also known as the “Bird’s Nest”).105 First, in 2005, in an effort 
to exploit intangible legacies, the marketing team designed a platform for future 
partnership of the Water Cube, in which three levels of potential partners would be 
categorized: the top level was the “naming rights” partner; the middle level signified 
sponsors; and the bottom level defined suppliers. Then, the Water Cube signed a contract 
with China Sports Industry International, a consulting company in sport industry in China, 
commissioning them to initiate an evaluation and analysis report regarding feasibility of 
post-Games operation of the Water Cube.106 As a result, three solution reports were 
submitted to the Water Cube: The Report on Water Cube’s Post-Olympic Function 
Positioning and Commercial Distribution Planning, The Report on Water Cube’s 
Post-Olympic Management Mode, and The Report on Water Cube’s Post-Olympic 
Management and Operation Evaluation and Analysis.107 Following the Games, a
to Sun, AC Neilson, a marketing survey company, was engaged to conduct a marketing 
survey on customers’ expectancy regarding the Water Cube’s naming rights sale, the 
value of intangible legacy of the Water Cube, and kinds of potential partnersh
Based on the results of the study, Sun’s team submitted a detailed post-Olympic ope
and management solution report to the director of the venue. Although the solution 
recommendations were highly detailed, offering items for partnership and comme
development specifically for the Water Cube, the solution recommendations were not 
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adopted. No reasons were forthcoming.109  
Frank Bi, Manager of the China National Sports Venue Management Co., Ltd., 
(CNSVM) reiterated what Sun offered regarding the fruitless post-Olympic operation 
solution recommendations. CNSVM was the consulting company for the Water Cube; 
and Bi was the project manager for CNSVM working on reconstruction planning for the 
Water Cube, helping the owner to initiate post-Olympic reconstruction solutions in 2007. 
Bi stated that the Water Cube was one of the venues that seriously considered 
post-Games utilization, which was recognized as a kind of strength at the time. However, 
very few suggestions were adopted after the Games. For example, the competition pool, 
which was a key factor in commercial development ended up as merely a rest area, where 
tourists congregated and watched Olympic video clips on the big screen.110 Bi stated that 
the reason for this was the low level of management, in other words, a lack of 
professional practitioners was a glaring weakness of the venue’s management.111 
In terms of “naming rights” for the Water Cube, Sun stated that based on the 
result of the study conducted by AG Neilson, the public did not want to see the venue’s 
name attached to a commercial logo; thus, the director cancelled the original plan about 
selling the “naming rights” to commercial companies. The term “national” in the title of 
the venue was also a main limitation, because the government thought that a commercial 
logo added before “national” would undermine the national image.112 The same issue 
about naming rights sales also occurred when the National Stadium wanted the same 
thing. Moreover, according to Bi, Arena, a sportswear company, attempted but failed to 
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gain naming rights for the 08 Pathway (a main pathway in the Water Cube) as ARENA 08 
Pathway. Arena was willing to pay a fee of CNY 400 million (USD 61.54 million) per 
year.113 Since venues such as the National Aquatic Center and the National Stadium were 
actually controlled by the government, according to Shi, it was exceedingly difficult to 
introduce marketing strategies into the post-Games operation and management plans of 
venues. If the government relaxed its control, generating revenue might well be 
enhanced.114   
The Water Cube did carry out reconstruction projects between October 2009 and 
July 2010. More than 11,000 seats on the spectator stands were removed around the main 
competition hall. On the upper floor, an exhibition hall was established, around which 
business stores (gift shops) and restaurants were built. The reconstruction expense was 
covered by BSAM, its chief owner. After the reconstruction, an indoor water park for 
amusement and swimming pool (warm up area) were opened to the public with entrance 
admission (CNY 200 (USD 31) for the Water Park and CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the pool 
for two hours). In addition, on the third floor, a museum about the history of Olympic 
swimming and Chinese swimmers was opened to the public. A Water Cube Theater 
presented a continual video clip about the evolution of the venue.115  
In terms of current condition, Shi stated that the entire operation team had been 
trying their best over the last three and a half years to strive towards creating a balance 
between economic profit and social benefits. For example, considering the advanced 
equipment and physical environment, the admission price for swimming was lower than 
the average in other aquatic facilities in Beijing, making it more affordable; this was 
                                                        
113 Frank Bi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
114 Haitao Shi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 16, 2011. 
115 Ibid. 
 
72 
considered a social benefit for the public, although with the lowered rate, Water Cube 
revenue from this business was negligible.116 Moreover, hosting international or national 
swimming events did not make a profit for the venue. Unlike certain western countries, 
where the TV rights fees and sponsor fees might be the main parts of the revenue for 
hosting sports events, in China, there were generally no TV rights fees for the organizers, 
and sponsorship for the events was difficult to engage. Even though there was some 
sponsorship for the events, the beneficiaries were the organizers and sports federations 
such as FINA, instead of the venue provider.117 In contrast, the Water Cube sponsored a 
synchronized swimming team in Beijing Sport Training School, which was considered as 
another kind of contribution to social benefit.118  
In the first year after the Games, according to Sun, both economic profit and 
social benefit reached a good balance. The total revenue reached more than CNY 100 
million (USD 15.4 million), which included four parts: venue sponsors, tourism, holding 
commercial events, and licensed products selling. Among these businesses, licensed 
product selling earned almost CNY 30 million (USD 4.6 million) for the year. The 
maximum number of daily tourists reached 30 thousand; and the average in 2009 was 
roughly 20 thousand. However, for the next two years, partially due to the closure for 
reconstruction that lasted some ten months, the number of tourists dramatically declined. 
In 2011, according to Sun, the daily tourists were about one thousand;119 although Sun 
indicated that despite tourism’s decline, the other three parts of revenue generating 
maintained the same level as the year 2009. It was hard to believe, because when tourism 
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of the venue declined, the other business in the venue, such as gift shops and licensed 
goods stores, would certainly decline; the two factors, tourism and sales are linked. 
Moreover, a link also existed between tourism and sponsorship of the venue, namely, the 
sponsorship of the venue might correspondingly decline when tourism declined. Sun also 
addressed the matter of the timing of reconstruction. The Water Cube closed for 
reconstruction at the time when business almost reached the peak of the unprecedented 
enthusiasm for the Olympics in China. The Water Cube disappeared from the public’s 
sight at a most critical moment.120  
Furthermore, the plan for reconstruction, according to Sun, was proposed almost 
five years ago. The five-year plan needed detailed revision based on new environments 
and circumstances, or even a brand new plan if the changes caused too many 
shortcomings to overcome. Unfortunately, the Water Cube did not re-design the 
reconstruction plan when they carried it out in 2009.121 In terms of the possible reasons 
for this inaction, risk avoidance was one of the main factors. Officials were reluctant to 
change the plan, because any responsibility for potential mistakes would be borne by 
those who made the changes, while if no change at all occurred, then any mistakes would 
be the original planners’ fault since the original one had been approved by relevant 
governmental departments.122       
The managers or directors of the Olympic venues in the Olympic Park usually 
played dual roles; they were originally government officials and became venue 
supervisors during or before the Olympic Games. As a result, they maintained original 
appointments in the government; on the other hand, they were titled as Directors of the 
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Venues. This dual identity sometimes caused conflicts when they faced particular 
situations in venue operation and management. The conflicts embodied the contradiction 
between governmental behaviors and free market strategies, between corporate economic 
profits and corporate social responsibility, and between the point of view from the public 
and society in general and the point of view from the perspective of profit maximizing. 
This could be one limitation on the operation of the Olympic venues, which were owned 
by state-owned enterprises in China.123  
In addition, Bi stated that the distribution and structure of human resources of the 
Water Cube were not appropriate for post-Games operation and management. The 
qualifications of management needed to be improved and more professional practitioners 
were needed to assure duties during post-Games operation. Some of the employees were 
originally professionals in venue construction and sports competition operation. Some 
remained in place after the Olympic Games. However, the duties and content of 
post-Games operation and management were significantly transformed; updated 
professional training to meet new needs was not initiated in time. For example, the 
cleaning department needed to hire a professional company to regularly clean the Water 
Cube’s outer coating; but due to new technology and new materials of the coating, they 
did not know what cleanser they should use. In fact, neither did any of the bidding 
cleaning companies. When a German company suggested a sample of the coating to 
conduct experiments related to what product might be effective, the Water Cube was 
reluctant to release a sample because they thought it was supposed to be a secret of the 
venue’s construction character.124 On 22 September 2011, during a tour around the 
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Olympic Park organized by the Sport For All World Conference, a tour guide in the Water 
Cube told the researcher that the outer coating was cleaned twice per year simply by tap 
water rinsing, and admitted that for now the outer coating looked dirty at day time but at 
night when the lights were on it looked much better.125 
Shi told the researcher that the operation of the swimming pool was handled by a 
professional company hired by the Water Cube. The Company was responsible for all the 
business focused around the pool, such as marketing, ticketing, and membership 
management. Also, for the Water Park inside the venue, the Water Cube merely leased the 
spot; all the associated businesses were handled by the lessee, a professional company.126 
Although Shi mentioned that there were many commercial events held in the Water Cube, 
actually the Water Cube simply leased its space to event organizers. As a result, the 
businesses that the Water Cube operated on its own were the entrance admission, 
Exhibition Hall, 3D Theater, Swimming Museum and some gift shops; for the rest, the 
Water Cube could be considered a landlord which leased out both the physical space and 
its intangible legacy, its brand. In terms of the brand, Shi stated that “Water Cube” was an 
invaluable intangible asset, which would be an excellent potential opportunity for the 
future: First, licensed products would keep earning profits for the Company; second, the 
state of the art venue and its symbolic status in China would attract more customers to 
hold commercial events there; and third, potential sponsors would be attracted to the 
venue.127 The Deputy General Manager of the Water Cube, Qiyong Yang, also expressed 
confidence about the future of the venue. Yang projected that in 2012 the number of 
tourists would remain the same as 2011, the main competition hall would be open in 2012 
                                                        
125 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation.  
126 Haitao Shi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 16, 2011. 
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to the public, and with the government’s financial support, the Water Cube would 
maintain a favorable balance on the financial sheet.128  
In terms of challenges the Water Cube faces, Shi stated that the government’s 
strict control in terms of marketing policies, venue image, and social benefit function, 
could be a limitation for the development of the venue. However, Shi also admitted that 
the authority sometimes could bring opportunities, which other venues with different 
ownerships could not obtain, such as the opportunity to hold international sports events 
and attain governmental financial support.129 Sun stated that certain tactics of BOPAC’s 
management in the Olympic Park, to some degree, constrained the progress of the Water 
Venue; however, the Beijing Municipal Government and BSAM, the owner of the Water 
Cube, would definitely assist (or direct) the venue regarding its future development, 
because the Water Cube as well as the Bird’s Nest were extensions of government 
function and behavior.130 Bi addressed another challenge of the future. He stated that in 
China there were not too many sports events on a regular basis, especially aquatic sports. 
The basic function of the venue was supposed to be the sport function. However, if there 
were not enough events held in the venue, it would hardly meet its basic function, leading, 
in time, to a waste of this state of the art, world-applauded venue.131       
 
2-2. By Municipal Level Authorities  
2-2-1. Beijing Gong Ti Center  
The Beijing Gong Ti Center, also known as the Beijing Workers’ Sports Complex, 
                                                        
128 Official Website of Xin Hua News Agency, “Water Cube: Financial Balance will Achieve in 2012,” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2011-12/30/c_122510702.htm?anchor=1 (accessed March 1, 2012). 
129 Haitao Shi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 16, 2011. 
130 Chen Sun, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
131 Frank Bi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
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including the Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’ Gymnasium, belongs to the Beijing 
Federation of Trade Unions, a governmental division authorized by the Beijing Municipal 
Government.132 During the Beijing Olympic Games, soccer events were held in the 
Stadium and boxing events were held in the Gymnasium. Both venues were adjacent to 
the downtown east section of Beijing and pre-existing sport facilities for the Olympic 
Games. Respectively, the Stadium was built in 1959, which was the first large-scale sport 
venue built in the People’s Republic of China. It held the first Chinese National Games in 
the same year. The Gymnasium was built in 1961; and in the same year, the 26th World 
Table Tennis Championships were held there.133 The Gong Ti Center has the longest 
history and tradition regarding sport among all the Olympic venues in the city. The 
Workers’ Stadium was the main stadium for the 1990 Asian Games, the 2001 21st World 
University Games, and the China National Games on five occasions. Thus, the Stadium 
witnessed the development of national sport in China.134 Before the “Bird’s Nest” was 
built in 2008, the Workers’ Stadium had been considered the “National Stadium.”135 The 
two venues were selected as Olympic competition sites in 2005, and in April 2006, to 
meet Olympic demands, the transformation projects started to update the venues. 
Following the Olympic Games, as Shiwei Shao, the deputy general director of the Press 
and Publicity Department of GASC commented, the pre-existing venues like the 
Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium were basically restored to their original operation 
                                                        
132 Official Website of Beijing Gong Ti Center, “Introduction of the Center,” 
http://www.gongti.com.cn/Corporation/infoDetail.asp?cInfoId=176&dInfoId=141 (accessed March 3, 
2012). 
133 Official Website of Beijing Gong Ti Center, “History of Gong Ti Sport Center,” 
http://www.gongti.com.cn/Corporation/infoDetail.asp?cInfoId=176&dInfoId=140 (accessed March 3, 
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135 Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, “Workers’ Stadium Prepared to Meet Olympic 
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status, while the Olympic renovation plan could assist them to explore new opportunities 
beyond their original business.136 
The Gong Ti Center was also named the Beijing Workers Sport Service Center, 
which was a governmental subdivision of the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions.137 
Zhihong Zhang, the supervisor of the operation department of the Center, provided the 
researcher with the information on the two venues from the perspective of the 
government. The Workers’ Stadium and Gymnasium were the two oldest among Beijing 
Olympic facilities, which was an obvious disadvantage; but it was also a strength in terms 
of post-Games utilization because its original functions and operation mode had been 
fixed for a relatively long time prior to the Olympics. Before the “Bird’s Nest,” this was 
the National Stadium for years, namely, it was a “state-owned” stadium. Staffers in the 
Center, Zhang admitted, did not need to think too much about marketing strategies, 
customer positioning and targeting, and the financial balance of regular operation of the 
venues, since all these issues were controlled and handled by the government, particularly 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. The venues were an extension of the government, under the 
authority of governmental endeavors such as the National Games, political propaganda 
events, and public assemblies. The government built the venues, owned them, and 
decided on how to operate them. This was different from venues built by private 
enterprise, though there were not too many in China. Thus, the Gong Ti Center 
previously served the government, which meant the public, indirectly. Unlike sport 
venues usually associated with professional sport teams or sports associations and 
                                                        
136 Shiwei Shao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 5, 2011. 
137 Official Website of Beijing Gong Ti Center, “Introduction of the Center,” 
http://www.gongti.com.cn/Corporation/infoDetail.asp?cInfoId=176&dInfoId=141 (accessed March 3, 
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organizations in western countries, sport venues in China usually have a close 
relationship with government.138  
However, there could be some changes, according to Zhang, in terms of the 
management mode of sport venues and their relationships with governments, which was a 
part of national political structure reforms in China. By 2015, those 
government-controlled sport venues could be transformed to private enterprise-like 
administration modes or semi private enterprise-like modes. Also, the relationship 
between venues and governments might be switched to the point that government would 
make sport venues in China operate independently without governmental financial 
support. Meanwhile, governments would not interfere in a sport venue’s daily operation 
and marketing strategies. This would be a trend of future development of sport venues in 
China; further, it would be opportunities not only for sport venues themselves, but also 
for professional venue management companies both in China and abroad. This would be 
an open market in China with enough sport space resources and huge potential customer 
base because of the large population in China.139 
Actually, in terms of venue management and operation, the Gong Ti Center was 
transformed in the 1990s. As a major business partner, the Beijing Sportswindow 
Development Co., Ltd. has cooperated with the Gong Ti Center since 2001.140 James Xie, 
the general manager of the Company provided the researcher with background 
information on the Center. In the middle 1990s, the Center leased out the rooms under the 
spectator stands around the Stadium as business space to certain sport product companies 
                                                        
138 Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Official Website of Beijing Sportswindow Development Co., Ltd., “Venues’ Operation and Consulting 
Service,” http://www.sportswindow.com.cn/html/hezuo/changguan/ (accessed March 4, 2012). 
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and some small sport clubs; the Center also operated a hotel located under the spectator 
stands named the Gong Ti Hotel. Sportswindow signed a contract with the Center in 2001 
by which the Center authorized Sportswindow to operate the business space around the 
outer circle as well as the hotel.141 Sportswindow adjusted the target customers, 
re-positioning the theme of the business circle, and implementing a series of marketing 
promotions to attract potential businesses.142 Although the theme was still sport-related, 
the content and style of the businesses introduced into the Gong Ti Center were diverse, 
which dramatically improved the operation condition of the Center. The leader of the 
Center gradually agreed with this change at the time, since the improvement was seen 
soon after Sportswindow became involved.143 From a different perspective, Zhang stated 
that Sportswindow was a lessee who leased the business space from the Center and then 
sub-leased it to its clients, thereby acquiring the rate difference from the deal.144 
Sportswindow signed the basic contract with the Center for 7-8 years, but signed the 
sub-lease contracts with its business clients for 3-4 years. Further, Sportswindow was not 
the operations supervisor of the Stadium. Rather, the Center was, which meant that if 
potential customers would like to use the main field of the Stadium to host events, they 
would have to apply to directors of the Center instead of to Sportswindow.145  
Furthermore, according to Xie, Sportswindow also renovated and upgraded the 
Gong Ti Hotel, renaming it the Gong Ti Sport Hotel, which served as the Official Hotel 
of the Olympic Games. Sportswindow redesigned and reconstructed the hotel, then 
improved the management level in order to create a fashionable commercial facility, a 
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change to match the theme and style of the entire business circle.146 According to Vivian 
Cao, Director of the Product Marketing Department of Sportswindow, following the 
Olympic Games the hotel was upgraded again and its name changed to the “A Hotel.” 
More than half of the hotel’s customers were from abroad, since nearby were located 
several entertainment businesses serving customers who would prefer to stay there rather 
than to go a great distance to find a place to stay overnight.147  
Actually, arranging the Gong Ti Center as an Olympic competition site influenced 
the operation of its regular business.148 When the Olympic designation was announced in 
2005 by the Beijing Municipal Government, some clients leased business space around 
the Stadium circle through contracts signed with Sportswindow. However, needing the 
“stadium circle” space for the Games, the lessees were ordered by the government to 
vacate within six months, regardless of the contracts. Due to the governmental decision 
that all the businesses must move out during the period of venue reconstruction for the 
Games, Sportswindow had to do the unpleasant task of persuading all businesses to 
vacate, despite contracts in effect at the time.149 Fortunately, most of the clients e
understanding toward the situation. The Olympic Games were a state task in China that 
had top priority; there was no possibility to negotiate. As a result, in 2006, all the 
businesses vacated, among them some had been operating since 2001. When 
Sportswindow reopened the business circle after the Games in 2009, only 30% were old 
clients, and the remaining 70% were all new clients attracted by Sportswindow’s new 
xpressed 
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marketing promotions.150 The good thing, Xie stated, was that the governments, both the 
Municipal Government and the Federation of Trade Unions, were responsible for most of 
the cost incurred during the Olympic-related reconstruction. Sportswindow also invested 
in the project, because, according to Xie, as a business partner, Sportswindow hoped that 
through its financial involvement “paid in advance”, the Company might have a voice 
when discussing the reconstruction plan for the venues, especially the plan for 
post-Games development. The result turned out to be a worthwhile investment, because 
the adjustment of the plan was made based on Sportswindow’s suggestion, while the 
premise was that the requirement of the Olympic Games must be met unconditionally.  
From the perspective of the Gong Ti Center, Zhang also commented on the 
influence of the Olympic Games on the venues. The original function of the Stadium and 
the Gymnasium did not change due to Olympic reconstruction. The Stadium remained a 
soccer field. The Gymnasium was used as an Olympic boxing site, which needed little 
reconstruction. The total investment for the reconstruction was approximately CNY 40 
million (USD 6.15 million) from the government. Given the fact that they were quite old 
venues, most of the investment was directed toward renovating and upgrading rather than 
core venue structure change151  
The Workers’ Stadium was the home of the Beijing Guo An Soccer Club, a 
professional team. It was the only venue among all the Olympic venues in Beijing in 
which a professional sport team remained as a main tenant. The Olympic Games did not 
change this. The Guo An Soccer Club had been using the Stadium as its home field since 
the early 1990s when the Chinese Professional Soccer League was established. According 
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to Zhang, the rent revenue accrued from the Guo An Club did not compensate for the 
expense incurred in the facility operation. The Center needed to take care of basic 
security and the Stadium and field maintenance. Despite the deficit, the Center did not 
abandon the business, because the Guo An Club’s continued presence would indirectly 
bring potential client opportunities and enhance the image and reputation of the venue 
among soccer fans. In addition, the rental business could also increase in value if the 
Club stayed. Thus, in terms of venue management, decision-makers had to consider the 
entire picture rather than one specific project.152 
In terms of Olympic influence on the current status of the venues, Zhang admitted 
that there remained little impact of the Olympics on the venues at the Gong Ti Center.153 
Cao agreed with this opinion by stating that it did not matter what the venue director 
thought, but rather what the market indicated. If the market did not need the concept of 
the Olympics anymore, it would be inappropriate for the marketers to continue with that 
ploy. The fact was that Chinese people to some degree considered the Olympic Games a 
political movement, a campaign enveloped with the enthusiasm of nationalism. However, 
when the Games were over, this feeling disappeared. For a host city, the Olympic 
economy was neither a constant economic model nor an ideal way that could change 
people’s lives. Olympic-involved marketing was not appropriate for people’s routine life 
on a regular basis in China. As a marketer, Cao had to be guided by what people really 
wanted and felt well with. Based on Cao’s opinion, the Olympics were over; it was time 
to “move on.”154    
In general, the operation and management of the Center were restored to their 
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original status. However, indirectly, certain influences could be felt regarding the 
competition from other Olympic venues, either newly-built ones such as the MasterCard 
Center, or renovated ones such as the NOSC Stadium and Gymnasium and the Capital 
Indoor Stadium. Due to the significantly increasing number of large-scale sport venues 
existing in the city after the Olympic Games, the Center felt pressure from its competitors. 
To deal with the situation, the Center prepared a series of reform plans after the Games. 
In terms of the Gymnasium, the Center decided to change the name of it from 
Workers’ Gymnasium to Workers’ Gymnasium Theater. The difference of a word in the 
title could have impact. According to Weidong Li, Manager of the NOSC Gymnasium, if 
a venue was named “gymnasium,” when the number of spectators at an event exceeded 
one thousand, the venue had to submit an application regarding the event to the Public 
Security Bureau (PSB) for their approval and paid an extra CNY 100,000 (USD 15,385) 
to provide relevant services such as ambulances, firefighting trucks, and equipment such 
as security scanning machines. In contrast, if the venue was named “theater,” then the 
venue did not need to submit the application and could save the CNY 100,000. “Theater” 
people gathering at such events were considered a regular operational condition. 
Meanwhile, to meet other regulations about “theater,” the Center reduced the seats in the 
Gymnasium from 12,000 to 3,000 and hung large curtains over one side of the spectator 
stands. By making these changes, although the scale of events was reduced, costs were 
also reduced.155  
In addition, according to Zhang, the Center also contemplated a title change for 
the Stadium. To give prominence to professional soccer, a new name for the Stadium was 
                                                        
155 Weidong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. The NOSC Gymnasium is one of the major 
competitors of the Workers’ Gymnasium. When Li, as the manager of the venue, said about it, he was 
thinking how his venue should react to deal with this change.  
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proposed, the “National Soccer Stadium.” The proposal has been submitted to the 
government and still awaits approval. By doing this, the Stadium would be differentiated 
from the National Stadium in the Beijing Olympic Park. The Center planned to cover the 
running track around the soccer field with artificial grass and add seats close to the field, 
making the venue particularly suited for soccer games. Further, luxury boxes were 
envisioned for sale to meet the demand from high-end customers. Due to the intervention 
from the government, the sale of naming rights would not be completed in the near future, 
but according to Zhang, the possibility of “naming rights” still existed, which meant the 
government could make it happen in the future.156 
 Even before the Chinese National Professional Soccer League was established, 
major matches of the Beijing Soccer Team, as well as national team matches, were 
usually held in this stadium. Soccer formed an important tradition of the venue. In 
Beijing, the soccer team of the city was always associated with the Workers’ Stadium, a 
tradition that was strengthened when it became the home stadium of the Guo An Club. 
Thus, the Center tried to take advantage of the tradition by transforming the management 
and operation to a soccer-related mode, which meant that factors such as marketing focus, 
venue positioning, theme of venue, and all the services needed to give prominence to 
soccer would be considered. In a word, soccer was to be the main focus for the Stadium’s 
future development.157        
Cao also confirmed that the great advantage of the Workers’ Stadium was its 
historical tradition and its symbolic status in the city’s soccer development. However, she 
also stated that it was a two-edged sword. Due to the Stadium’s symbolic status, when 
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Sportswindow planned its business projects, it had to be quite careful to maintain the 
image of the Stadium, because it was not only considered a business, but also an icon 
with graceful reputation that must not be impaired. In addition, its geographical location 
was also a two-edged sword for its business development. On one hand, it was close to 
the Downtown area, which would be convenient for people to reach, thus providing a 
large customer base; on the other hand, there remained limited physical space for new 
business exploitation.158 The soccer theme and tradition of the Stadium also were 
opportunities for Sportswindow to initiate soccer-related commercial events utilizing both 
the main field and the business square adjacent to attract fans and potential business 
customers. However, the soccer theme was also problematic for Sportswindow’s 
marketing planning. Because the Soccer League schedule was tight and constant, and 
basically occupied the best weather period of the year for an outdoor stadium, namely, 
from April to November, meant that the Guo An Soccer Team would use the main field as 
its League Home Stadium from spring to fall. The period left for commercial events in 
the Stadium was quite limited. Moreover, a priority for using the Stadium required by the 
government or with events for the public, further infringed on the best season for Stadium 
use.159 But in general, Cao remained confident about her company’s future in the S
and believed that with further marketing promotions, necessary social networkin
the reputation of the Stadium, more business partners would be introduced into th
commercial complex and a positive circle for its business would be finally established.
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stadium. Soccer games require a high quality of grass, while commercial events 
sometimes ravaged the grass. Although the Center tried to avoid or reduce the da
such as separating the two kinds of events as long as possible so that the grass could be 
sufficiently reestablished, the issue persisted. In securing soccer matches with their 
demand for top grass conditions, commercial events often had to be reduced or even
cancelled.
mage, 
 
ent in 
the future of the Gong Ti Center, Zhang stated that it depended on 
govern hip 
rnment 
                                                       
161 Zhang doubted that the business mode of Sportswindow was worthy of 
being generalized. According to Zhang, the reason that Sportswindow expanded its 
business mode at the Gong Ti Center was because the Center was the home stadium of 
the Guo An Club, a key factor for attracting both businesses and customers. However, 
this particular condition was seldom met among venues throughout the city, even the 
entire country.162 Besides, Zhang stated that the staff at Sportswindow lacked the 
experience of venue management, thus did not expect too much about its developm
the Center.163    
In terms of 
ment reform regarding organizational structure, management mode and owners
of sport venues. After all, the biggest investment of Olympic venues in Beijing was made 
by the government. So it was reasonable that social benefits should be first met; but that 
economic benefits should not be neglected at the same time. The two principles 
sometimes conflicted with each other in the context of the Gong Ti Center. Gove
reform was urgently needed in terms of the separation of marketing function from 
governmental function.164  
 
161 Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
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2-2-2. Urban Road Cycling Course 
The Urban Road Cycling Course for the Beijing Olympic Games, one of the eight 
tempor
strict, 
G. 
d 
2-3. By District Governments 
section were owned by different district governments 
in the c
Shan 
tball 
 
ary Olympic venues in Beijing, passed through eight districts in the City of 
Beijing: Chong Wen District, Xuan Wu District, Dong Cheng District, Xi Cheng Di
Chao Yang District, Hai Dian District, Chang Ping District, and Yan Qing District.165 
During the Olympic Games, the course was authorized and supervised by the Beijing 
Municipal Government in partnership with eight district governments as well as BOCO
The course was restored to its original function as an urban road for regular traffic right 
after the Games; thus there was no specific post-Games utilization needed to be examine
in this study (see Appendix M for the map of the route). 
 
The venues described in this 
ity. District level governments in Beijing are under the authority of the Beijing 
Municipal Government.166 Five districts in Beijing were involved in the Olympic 
competition venue projects: Shun Yi District (the Olympic Aquatic Park), Shi Jing 
District (the Lao Shan BMX Field and Mountain Bike Course), Chao Yang District (the 
Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground), Chang Ping District (the Ming Tomb 
Reservoir Triathlon Course), and Feng Tai District (the Feng Tai Sports Center Sof
Field). 
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2-3-1. Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park: Shun Yi District 
The Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park, also known as the Shun Yi 
Olympic ea of Beijing. The 
Park, b ing the 
s 
 the 
 
facilitie  
ater 
ark 
                                                       
 Aquatic Park, was located at Ma Po Village, a north rural ar
uilt on the Chao Bai River’s dry riverbed, was completed in July 2007. Dur
Games, the rowing, canoe/kayak (flat-water and slalom), and marathon swimming event
were held in the Park.167 The venue was built and owned by the Shun Yi District 
Government. The Shun Yi Olympic Venues Administration Committee, a governmental 
division, has supervised the venue since it was completed. In 2007, the government 
allowed the committee to register a company, the Shun Yi Aquatic Park Investment and 
Development Center, to specifically operate and manage post-Olympic utilization of
Park.168 In fact, the two organizations (the committee and the Center) were supervised, 
administered, and operated by the same personnel. For example, the deputy director of 
the committee, Fenghui Yang, was also the deputy general manager of the Center.169  
According to Yang, the Park was the largest newly-built Olympic sport facility in
Beijing. What made it really unique was its combination of Slalom and Flat-water 
s, the only one of its kind in the world.170 After the Olympic Games, the Park held
several international and national aquatic competitions, such as sailing, canoeing, w
skiing, and rowing; meanwhile, there were some high-end sports clubs opened in the P
 
167 Official Website of Shun Yi District Government, “Brief Introduction of Shun Yi Olympic 
Rowing-Canoeing Park,” http://www.bjshy.gov.cn/english/OlympicShunyi1-1.htm (accessed March 5, 
2012). 
168 Official Website of Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park, “Introduction of Beijing Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic 
Park Investment and Development Center,” 
http://www.shunyi2008.cn/info.aspx?m=20090810111545590870 (accessed March 5, 2012).  
169 Haiyan Hu, “Ready for the Long Haul,” China Daily, October 7, 2011, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-10/07/content_13843675.htm (accessed March 5, 2012). 
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for water skiing, rowing, sailing, and canoeing enthusiasts.171 Although the Park was als
a tourism destination after the Games, Yang admitted that the tourists in the Park during 
the last three years were not plentiful enough that the maintenance and operation cost 
could be compensated by the tourism revenue.
o 
 
 
nother 
 
he researcher interviewed the marketing director of the Shun Yi Olympic 
Aquatic ore 
ould 
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172 Yang also complained that the Park was
not directly connected to any major subway line or bus route to Downtown Beijing, 
which was a major issue for potential tourists.173 In fact, there was only one bus route
connecting the Park to Ma Po Village in every 30 minutes during day time everyday.174 In 
addition, according to Yang, catering service in the Park was lacking, which was a
major concern that the committee would try to solve in the near future.175 
In addition to the published information from online newspapers and official
websites, t
 Park Investment and Development Center, Jiadong Gao, in an effort to find m
detailed information. The interview appointment was arranged at 3:00 pm in the 
afternoon. The researcher set out from the Bird’s Nest right after lunch time by public 
transportation; and was almost late when he arrived at the Park, which meant it w
take tourists about three hours to reach the Park from the Olympic central area, if publi
 
171 Official Website of Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park, “2011 International Universities Rowing 
Competition Held in the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park,” 
http://www.shunyi2008.cn/info.aspx?n=20110624112258607615 (accessed March 5, 2012); “2010 Sino-US 
Water Skiing Competitions Held in the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park,” 
http://www.shunyi2008.cn/info.aspx?n=20100429082547383290 (accessed March 5, 2012); “2010 
National Rowing Championship in the Park,” 
http://www.shunyi2008.cn/info.aspx?n=20101103190733510382 (accessed March 5, 2012); “Rowing Club 
in the Park,” http://www.shunyi2008.cn/info.aspx?n=20120214085719937779 (accessed March 5, 2012), 
172 Haiyan Hu, “Ready for the Long Haul,” China Daily, October 7, 2011, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-10/07/content_13843675.htm (accessed March 5, 2012). 
173 Ibid. 
174 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
175 Haiyan Hu, “Ready for the Long Haul,” China Daily, October 7, 2011, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-10/07/content_13843675.htm (accessed March 5, 2012). 
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transportation was the choice.176   
In terms of the Park’s location, Gao stated that the site was chosen by GASC and 
the Bei . 
ance, 
 
Y 449.3 million (USD 69.1 million), of 
which o
nd 
a 
                                                       
jing Municipal Government when Beijing first bid for the Olympic Games in 1993
At the time, the location for the venue was called “Bai Fa Red Line” named after the 
former Mayor, Baifa Zhang, who decided to reserve the land for future Olympic 
Games.177 There were opposition voices regarding the location selection. For inst
according to Shan Jin, the supervisor of the Sport and Culture Research Center at the 
Beijing Academy of Social Science, the location of the Park was a section of dry riverbed. 
To build the Park, 3.5 million cubic meters of underground water had to be pumped “up 
and out” in order to fill in the race course. This was considered a waste for the city where
a lack of water was one of the major issues.178 Jin also estimated for maintaining the Park 
after the Games, 0.8 million cubic meters water had to be consumed every year.179 
Despite the opposition voices, the venue was completed on time in 2007 and has been 
well maintained since the Games finished. 
The investment in the venue was CN
ne half was from the Beijing Municipal Government and the other half from the 
Shun Yi District Government. Originally, the governments asked certain enterprises to 
invest in the project; one of them was the Tian Hong Group, a state-owned enterprise 
authorized by the Shun Yi District Government. Due to the large amount of needed 
investment and the venue’s limited post-Games function, the government failed to fi
private investors for the project. In 2003, instead of an investor, the governments found 
 
176 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. It proved what Yang complained 
regarding a lack of direct transportation to the park. 
177 Jiadong Gao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 25, 2011. 
178 Shan Jin, “If the Post-Olympic could Happen in Beijing,” Tong Zhou Gong Jin, no. 4 (2008): pp. 12-13. 
179 Ibid. 
 
92 
cooperation partner, the Tian Hong Group Consortium,180 and promised that the 
governments would offer a piece of land as a compensatory condition (balancing 
for its partial investment to the Olympic project. However, in 2004, the Central 
Government of China started to advocate the “frugal Olympics.” To respond to t
change, the Shun Yi District Government reduced the project’s budget. Correspondin
the promised compensation land was withdrawn, which caused arguments between the 
government and the consortium. As a result, the consortium quit the project leaving the 
governments alone to deal with the project. Lacking the necessary investment capital 
after the consortium withdrew, the governments shaved the project by cutting off plans
designed for post-Games use. In fact, except for the function of holding specific sports 
events based on the Olympic demands, most other functions were eliminated from the 
project. However, Gao also stated that shrinking the project could have its positive side
the less facilities in the Park, the less cost for maintenance. Moreover, as a rural park, too
many artificial sights might not be appropriate, while natural landscapes might attract 
more tourists especially those from urban areas.
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182 
After the Games, BOCOG had to remove th
ary seats and tents. This process lasted until April 2009. The Park was reopened to
the public (with entrance admission CNY 20 (USD 3)) in May 2009. Some tourists 
complained that the Park was supposed to be free to the public. According to Gao, 
although named with the term “Park,” it was actually a sport venue rather than a pu
 
180 Official Website of the People Daily, “Signing Ceremony of the Project of Olympic Aquatic Park Held 
in Beijing,” http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22180/22193/2178949.html (accessed March 6, 2012). 
181 A term is specifically used in China meaning that offering land as compensation.  
182 Jiadong Gao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 25, 2011. 
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park, thus tourists had to pay for visiting the venue.183  
In the summer of 2009, the Beijing Tourism Bureau initiated the Beijing 
Olympic-theme Tour, of which the Olympic Aquatic Park was one of the stops. This 
brought some tourists to the Park. Considering that mere tourism visits could not generate 
enough revenue, the Center decided to develop new projects for entertainment such as 
swimming, water skiing, whitewater slalom, and motor boating by using the existing 
facilities. Despite the new business, the result was not as good as what the planners 
expected. In terms of the reasons, Gao stated that first, the tourists came to the Park for 
sightseeing instead of experiencing aquatic sports; second, the aquatic sports operating in 
the Park was not popular enough in China; third, public transportation was lacking; fourth, 
marketing was weak; and fifth, as an outdoor aquatic park, water sports entertainment 
could only be opened in the summer, which significantly constrained the Park’s best 
operating season.184 
Realizing that tourism did not bring enough revenue for the Park, the Center 
changed its strategy to attract high-end customers by establishing aquatic sports clubs and 
providing potential customers with professional sports services. According to Gao, the 
Park’s entertainment business would include five sports in the future: sailing, rowing, 
dragon boat, kayak, and water skiing, for which relevant clubs would be established by 
hiring professional athletes as trainers and coaches. Of these sports, the most popular one 
was dragon boat, a traditional Chinese sport. Many organizations and corporations carried 
out team building projects for their employees in the Park, which usually included dragon 
boat competition. However, Gao admitted that this strategy would take time to flower. 
                                                        
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
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The size of the customer base was still an issue. Due to the reduced budget before the 
Games, a lack of auxiliary facilities such as storage for sporting equipment, locker rooms, 
and shower rooms, became a problem. In addition, it was not easy to hire qualified 
practitioners at this point.185    
Following the Games, the Shun Yi District Government had been providing the 
Park with special funds to aid its operation and maintenance cost. The revenue the Park 
made could not support its own expense (Gao was reluctant to disclose the amount of the 
government grant). Furthermore, the government had to continue investing in the Park for 
its further development, such as those potential high-end sport clubs. For instance, some 
auxiliary facilities such as multifunction service areas had to be built in the Park.186 As a 
result, the government is facing a dilemma. On one hand, it cannot give up this Olympic 
legacy because it is an iconic landmark showcasing a great image for the local 
government. On the other hand, however, if the government keeps it well maintained and 
even further developed, it will have to keep investing large amounts of public money into 
it because there is not enough revenue made in the Park. Further, the Park’s public service 
functions seem to be underused, except for sightseeing of the Olympic facilities in the 
Park by paid tourists. It seems strange to the researcher that the government pays a large 
amount of public money for the Park each year to support so-called high-end clubs 
serving those who are affluent enough to be there, but for sure, those are not the majority 
in China.      
 
                                                        
185 Ibid. 
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2-3-2. BMX Course and Mountain Bike Course: Shi Jing Shan District   
There were three Olympic venues clustered close to the Lao Shan area in Shi Jing 
Shan District.187 The Velodrome, a newly-built Olympic venue, was owned and operated 
by GASC; the mountain bike course, a pre-existing venue, and the bicycle motocross 
(BMX) course, a temporary Olympic venue, were owned by the Shi Jing Shan District 
Government. Although the ownerships were different, during the preparation and staging 
period of the Beijing Games, BOCOG supervised and coordinated the three venues 
together with relevant officials from both GASC and the Shi Jing Shan District 
Government. The director of the general office in the Cycling and Fencing Administrative 
Center under GASC, Junyan Wang, as the coordinator of BOCOG’s supervision of the 
three venues during the Games, described the current status of both venues. 
The mountain bike course was established in the 1990s and had been maintained 
by the district government since then. When selecting the site for the 2008 Games, the 
course was the priority for BOCOG because its physical condition and geographical 
environment met the requirements of the International Cycling Union (UCI). Moreover, 
since the course was close to GASC’s cycling training base, the other two venues (the 
BMX course and the Velodrome) were built there. The course reconstruction did not cost 
substantially because the major part of the course had already been in good shape. The 
only tasks were to add some obstacles to increase difficulty level and build protective 
fences to separate spectators and athletes. Under the instructions from UCI’s technical 
representatives, the reconstruction work was completed by local construction workers. 
But BOCOG controlled the process of the project.188    
                                                        
187 The term “Lao Shan” in Chinese means “Old Mountain.” 
188 Junyan Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 19, 2011. 
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The Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course was directly supervised by the Bureau of 
Parks and Woods of Shi Jing Shan District. After the Games, BOCOG removed all the 
equipment and fences quickly and the course became a public park. Tourists and bike 
enthusiasts could enter the Park freely. According to Wang, the government would not 
sell the Park to any organizations, thus, GASC would not expect to own the course for 
national cycling teams, though it was in perfect condition in terms of natural 
environment.189 There have been no competitions (at any level) held on the course since 
2008; the only use was for those cycling enthusiasts in the city, without supervision and 
security.190 The course was supposed to be maintained by the Bureau of Parks and W
However, a lack of maintenance could be noticed around the Park. In 2011, the Online 
Portal of the Beijing Municipal Government reported that some aspects of public 
facilities, such as night lights in the Park, were damaged.
oods. 
                                                       
191 Although the problems were 
solved by the bureau later, the issue of lack of maintenance was evident. Moreover, Wang 
also indicated that the lack of maintenance caused potential safety issues for cycling 
enthusiasts.192 Despite the maintenance issue, the Park was opened to the public for its 
sport and recreation purposes. As an Olympic facility in Beijing, the course was still 
functioning in its original sport purpose for the public after the Games, which might be 
considered an positive acknowledgement of an Olympic legacy. 
The Olympic BMX Course built as a temporary venue was neither dismantled nor 
maintained after the Games. All the entrances were locked and weeds grew everywhere. 
The gatekeeper told the researcher that the venue had been empty and secured since the 
 
189 Ibid. 
190 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
191 Online Portal of Beijing Municipal Government, “Re: Lao Shan Rural Park’s Public Facilities,” 
http://www.beijing.gov.cn/zfhf/zjhf/t1161060.htm (March 6, 2012).  
192 Junyan Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 19, 2011. 
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Games finished in 2008; nobody was allowed to enter. For the last three and a half years, 
the gatekeeper and his dog have been the only ones witnessing the venue’s gradual 
deterioration.193 According to Wang, BMX was considered a new sport in China, which 
meant that its popularity and Chinese athletes’ performances were low. The Olympic 
BMX Course in Beijing was built based on the highest UCI standards for world elite 
athletes. For instance, the “start stage” was 11 meters high.194 The venue belonged to the 
district government, although GASC attempted to negotiate to buy the venue. According 
to Wang, the situation over ownership of the land on which the venue was built was 
complicated; negotiations proved fruitless. As a result, the BMX course was not 
dismantled, not used for any purposes whatsoever, and not transferred to GASC; it simply 
remained there locked up.195  
Although the BMX course was officially categorized as a temporary venue, the 
Shi Jing Shan District Government spent around CNY 400 million (USD 61.5 million) to 
build it. Unlike those BMX courses in some western countries where they were usually 
built temporarily in parks and dismantled after the competitions, the Lao Shan BMX 
Course was built on the top of a “wildness hill” with permanent seats around it. In 
addition, for the competition track, certain chemicals were used to solidify the surface. 
There was no relevant expert in China who could build such a course, so the owner had to 
hire a professional company from abroad (recommended by UCI) to complete the design 
and construction. Obviously, if the government was called upon to dismantle the venue, 
they would have to spend another large amount of money. Currently, there is no plan for 
the facility. According to Wang, perhaps in the future, when negotiations between the 
                                                        
193 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
194 Junyan Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 19, 2011. 
195 Ibid. 
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district government and GASC continue, the venue might be used in some positive 
ways.196 However, for now, the most economical way for the government might be to 
keep the venue secured to save its operation and maintenance cost.      
 
2-3-3. Beach Volleyball Ground: Chao Yang District 
The Beach Volleyball Ground located in Chao Yang Park was built as a temporary 
Olympic venue. It was supposed to be dismantled after the Olympic Games, based on the 
Candidature File of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid.197 According to a former official 
of BOCOG, without criteria and specifications for constructing such temporary sport 
venues in China at the time, the design of the venue became one based on the criteria and 
specifications for permanent buildings.198 As a result, the beach volleyball venue was 
actually built as a permanent sport facility. This might be one of the reasons that the 
venue has not been dismantled three and a half years after the Games.  
The Beach Volleyball Ground was supervised by the Chao Yang Park 
Administration Committee that was under the leadership of the Chao Yang District 
Government.199 In 2009, a beach-theme park and a swimming pool were established 
beside the venue; it embraced three function areas: a swimming area, a beach recreation 
area, and a beach volleyball area.200 In June 2011, the FIVB Beach Volleyball Swatch 
World Tour - 2011 Beijing Grand Slam was held in the venue, which was the first time 
                                                        
196 Ibid. 
197 The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001. 
198 The official who released this information to the researcher asked not to disclose the identity in the 
study. 
199 There was also a management company controlled by the Committee being responsible for the 
marketing activities of the Beach Volleyball Ground in the Chao Yang Park. 
200 Official Website of Chao Yang Park, “Beach Theme Park,” 
http://www.sun-park.com/ztgy/stztly/?pagename=stztly; “Beach Park Opened in Chao Yang Park,” 
http://www.sun-park.com/ztgy/stztly/?pagename=stztly (accessed March 7, 2012). 
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after the Olympic Games that the venue held an international beach volleyball 
competition.201  
The researcher was unable to interview any official from the Chao Yang District 
Government or the Chao Yang Park Administration Committee. All the officials the 
researcher contacted were reluctant to accept the interview request. According to the 
Beijing Olympic Venues Contact List, the researcher telephoned the committee asking for 
an interview and was told that any interview requests regarding the Beach Volleyball 
Ground must be approved by the Propaganda Department of the Chao Yang District 
Government. Based on this regulation, the researcher went to the Chao Yang District 
Government and asked the Propaganda Department for an approval. However, the 
researcher was told that the department was only responsible for interview requests from 
the media, and interviews for academic purpose were not in their purview. Then, the 
researcher telephoned the committee again telling them what the department indicated 
and was told that the supervisor was busy without any explanations regarding “approval.” 
Also, the researcher was told that the request would be considered carefully when the 
supervisor had time. For the next few weeks, the researcher kept calling the committee, 
but all the responses were the same: “the boss was still busy.” Finally, the researcher gave 
up due to the tight research schedule.202 
 
2-3-4. Triathlon Course: Chang Ping District 
The Olympic Triathlon Course was a temporary venue, located at the Ming Tomb 
                                                        
201 Official Website of Chao Yang Park, “2011 FIVB Beach Volleyball Swatch World Tour-Beijing Grand 
Slam Finished,” http://www.sun-park.com/zxzx/allnews.php?firstpage=iframezxzx.php (accessed March 7, 
2012). 
202 The description is based on the researcher’s personal experience during the investigation in Beijing. 
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Reservoir in the northern outskirts of the city.203 The venue was owned and supervised b
the Chang Ping District Government. The facility was not dismantled after the games and
has been utilized for triathlon competitions during the last three years. In July 2009, the 
inaugural Red Bull Beijing International Triathlon Competition was held there. One year
later, the “Red Bull Competition” was held again; and in September 2011, the ITU World
Championship Grand Final Beijing was held, which was recorded as the biggest event 
held in the course after the Games.
y 
 
 
 
                                                       
204 The competition course along the reservoir was 
upgraded after the Olympics.205 The running route of the course was built on the dam 
with removable PVC running track, which insured that the temporary competition 
facilities could be installed and removed in five hours.206 Like the urban cycling road 
race, the cycling route for triathlon competitions around the reservoir could be restored to 
regular roads for routine traffic after events. The swimming route was still in the reservoir, 
as it was during the 2008 Olympics. Thus, the major facilities around the course for the 
competitions were temporary and could be restored to regular conditions rapidly, which 
would not incur large amounts of cost for operation and maintenance on a regular daily 
basis.207    
 
203 Official Website of BOCOG, “Triathlon Venue,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/trv/n214076038.shtml; 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/trv/index.shtml (accessed March 7, 2012). 
204 Official Website of Chang Ping District Government, “2009 Red Bull International Triathlon 
Competitions Held in Our District,” 
http://www.bjchp.gov.cn/tabid/260/InfoID/21988/frtid/186/Default.aspx (accessed March 7, 2012); “2010 
Red Bull Beijing International Triathlon Competitions Finished,” 
http://www.bjchp.gov.cn/tabid/260/InfoID/42037/frtid/186/Default.aspx (accessed March 7, 2012); and 
Official Website of ITU World Championship – Grand Final Beijing, http://beijing.triathlon.org/ (accessed 
March 7, 2012). 
205 Official Website of ITU World Championship – Grand Final Beijing, http://beijing.triathlon.org/ 
(accessed March 7, 2012). 
206 Online Portal of Beijing Municipal Government, “Design of Triathlon Venue Approved,” 
http://2008.beijing.cn/news/luckybj/s214044803/n214044894.shtml (accessed March 7, 2012). 
207 Due to the fact that no official from a relevant authority of the Triathlon Course accepted the 
researcher’s interview request, the statement regarding the cost incurred for operation and maintenance of 
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2-3-5. Softball Field: Feng Tai District 
The Olympic Softball Field, officially categorized as a pre-existing sports venue 
(or renovated venue), was located in the Feng Tai Sports Center, Feng Tai District, on the 
west side of Beijing.208 The venue was owned by the Feng Tai District Government and 
was supervised by the Feng Tai District Sport Bureau, as authorized by the district 
government. The original site for the venue was a baseball field, which was built in 1990 
for the Beijing Asian Games. After being selected to be the Olympic softball field, 
according to the China IPPR International Engineering Corporation, the Company 
re-designed the venue; the original baseball field could not be upgraded to meet the 
Olympic demands. Based on its valuation, building a new field facility on the site was the 
only solution for the project.209 As a result, the original field facility was demolished and 
a brand-new venue built on the site, which, based on the new design, could transform to a 
baseball field when necessary.210 Therefore, the venue should be categorized as a 
newly-built venue specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
The venue construction was completed in 2006 for hosting the XI ISF Women’s 
World Championship in August.211 After the competition, temporary seats were removed 
and then re-installed in May 2008 for the Olympics. When the Olympic Games 
concluded, the rented temporary seats were removed again and only 3,000 permanent 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the course was deducted from certain information the researcher found on those official websites related to 
the Course. Therefore, the accuracy of it still needs to be further improved by future research. 
208 Official Website of BOCOG, “Renovation on Feng Tai Softball Field Starts,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/fts/headlines/n214079171.shtml (March 7, 2012). 
209 Official Website of China Association of Construction Enterprise Management, “Home Run of 
Scientific Olympic: Introduction of Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field,” 
http://www.cacem.com.cn/News/open.asp?ID=294762&Sort_ID=296 (accessed March 7, 2012). 
210 Ibid. 
211 Official Website of BOCOG,, “Softball Venue to be Ready in July,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/fts/headlines/n214079102.shtml (accessed March 7, 2012). 
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seats were retained in the venue. In November 2008, an official from the Feng Tai Sports 
Center stated that there was no post-Games operation and utilization plan for the venue 
because softball was not popular in Beijing and the equipment for softball games was too 
expensive for those who might want to try it.212 Moreover, an official from GASC 
expressed that softball was no longer an Olympic sport. Further, it was not popular 
throughout the world, which made it difficult to popularize in China.213 Thus, the venue 
had not been opened to the public since 2008, although it had been well maintained.214 
There was a baseball school located in the Feng Tai Sports Center. Most of the members 
in the school were teenagers, trained by professional coaches; the goal of the school was 
to deliver elite baseball players for the Chinese national team.215 Registered softball 
players in China dramatically decreased after softball was excluded from the Olympics. 
Because of the Olympic gold medal strategy, the top priority for Chinese national sport 
was certainly not softball. In 2009, there were only 8 teams in China with around 200 
registered players.216 Obviously, the sport authority in China had little interest in softball 
in Olympic context. In 2010, the Feng Tai Sport Bureau announced that they would 
demolish the warm-up softball field just beside the main field and build a shopping center 
on the site.217 The main field of the venue has been saved for the time being, however, 
with no sufficient use either from the public or professional teams, it can be imagined 
                                                        
212 Official Website of Chinese Softball Association, “Softball Excluded from Olympics, The Future of 
Feng Tai Softball Field Unsettled,” http://softball.sport.org.cn/chinateam/player/2008-11-21/222922.html 
(accessed March 7, 2012). 
213 Ibid. 
214 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. There are two softball fields, one 
main field and one warm-up field. 
215 Official Website of Feng Tai District Sport Bureau, “Feng Tai Baseball and Softball Training School,” 
http://www.ftsports.gov.cn/bqxx.asp (accessed March 7, 2012). 
216 Official Website of Chinese Softball Association, “One Year after the Olympics, Only 8Teams 200 
Players Left in China,” http://softball.sport.org.cn/chinateam/player/2010-10-09/329450.html (accessed 
March 7, 2012). 
217 Official Website of Feng Tai Sport Bureau, “Feng Tai Sport Bureau Working Report for the First Half 
Year 2010,” http://www.ftsports.gov.cn/news.asp?news_id=852 (accessed March 7, 2012). 
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what kind of future awaits the facility.   
 
2-4. Transferred Ownerships 
The venues in this sub-category were distinguished under “transferred 
ownerships,” which meant that during the last three and a half years, the ownerships of 
the venues, because of various reasons, were transferred from one of the three types of 
ownerships described in the last three sub-categories to the other, while they were still 
“government-owned” venues. The ownership of the National Stadium was transferred 
from the CITIC Consortium Stadium Operating Company to the National Stadium Co. 
Ltd., authorized and supervised by BSAM. The ownership of the National Indoor 
Stadium (NIS) was transferred from the Guo Ao Investment & Development Co. Ltd. to 
the Beijing Performance & Arts Group (BPA), authorized and supervised by BSAM. And, 
the ownership of the Olympic Sports Park (including the Olympic Tennis Court, the 
Olympic Archery Field, and the Olympic Hockey Field) in the Olympic Forest Park was 
transferred from BSAM to the Chao Yang District Government.218  
 
2-4-1. “Birds’ Nest” 
The National Stadium with the popular name “Bird’s Nest,” the main stadium of 
the Beijing Olympic Games, is consistently put under the spotlight when Beijing’s 
Olympic venues are discussed. It is considered a significant landmark of Beijing, because 
of its famous iconic status and symbolic meaning to the city, as well as the entire country. 
As Cheng Yang, the deputy general manager of the National Stadium Co. Ltd., stated, the 
                                                        
218 The statement made here was based on the data the researcher collected from the interviews that was 
reported in detail in the following three sub-sections. 
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National Stadium was representative of the national image, a facility showcasing the new 
China, and a symbolic place where a Chinese national dream might come true; or, as 
Michael Wines, a journalist of the New York Times, reported, it was a barely disguised 
metaphor for China’s rise to worldwide importance.219 No matter what the Stadium 
meant spiritually, focused under a spotlight as it has always been, the significance and 
elegant image of it guaranteed that certain controversial issues would be raised, as indeed 
they have over the last three and a half years.  
To completely depict the controversies, the investment mode of the Stadium, 
praised by the government and the media in China before the Games, must be mentioned. 
The investment mode was called the “PPP” model, that is, Private-Public-Partnership (or 
Private-Public-Project), a cooperation mode between governmental organizations and 
private enterprises for construction, management and operation of public projects.220 T
mode was considered a marketing innovation made by the Beijing Municipal 
Government for construction and post-Games operation of the Olympic venues in Beijing 
as well as other large-scale public construction projects.
his 
                                                       
221 During the process of the bid 
for the design and construction of venues such as the National Stadium and the National 
Indoor Stadium, as well as the construction period following, the PPP mode was 
implemented properly based on its Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) procedure, which 
meant that for a public project, private enterprise would be responsible for construction 
and operation for a specified number of years according to an agreement signed with the 
 
219 Cheng Yang, “Bird’s Nest Realizing Dreams,” Global Sport Market, no. 1 (February 2010), p. 53; 
Michael Wines, “After Summer Olympics, Empty Shells in Beijing,” The New York Times, February 6, 
2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/weekinreview/07wines.html?_r=1 (accessed March 8, 2012).  
220 Jiawei Li, “Gene Controlled Bird’s Nest,” China Weekly, (June 2010), 
http://www.chinaweekly.cn/bencandy.php?fid=45&id=4894 (accessed March 8, 2012). 
221 Official Website of National Stadium, “Company Introduction,” 
http://www.n-s.cn/en/test/n214619930.shtml (accessed March 8, 2012). 
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government. At the end of the specified period, the project would be returned to the 
government.222  
Specific to the National Stadium, following the qualification evaluation in terms 
of design, construction, financing, and operation, the Beijing Municipal Government 
finally selected the China International Trust and Investment Corporation  Group 
(CITIC) Consortium as the owner and manager of the Stadium.223 The CITIC consortium 
consisted of the CITIC Group, the Beijing Urban Construction Group, the CITIC Group 
Affiliate Guan Elstrong from Hong Kong, and the Golden State Holding Group from the 
United States.224 According to the National Audit Office of China, the total investment 
attached to the venue was CNY 3.6 billion (USD 554 million) of which the CITIC 
consortium was responsible for 42% and BSAM for 58%.225 In August 2003, the 
agreements with respect to the Stadium were officially signed. The CITIC consortium, 
the winner of the bid, signed the “Chartered Rights Agreement” with the Beijing 
Municipal Government, in which the CITIC consortium was granted 30-year chartered 
management rights to the Stadium after which the management privileges would return to 
the representative of the government, BSAM.226 Moreover, the CITIC consortium also 
                                                        
222 Jingsheng Liu, Keynote at the International Advanced Forum of BOT/PPP Projects Investment, March, 
2005. Liu was the supervisor of the Olympic Project Office in Beijing Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform. 
223 Official Website of National Stadium, “Company Introduction,” 
http://www.n-s.cn/en/test/n214619930.shtml (accessed March 8, 2012). The CITIC Group is a state-owned 
enterprise in China. 
224 Ibid. 
225 National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Audit Result Announcement: Financial 
Balance Conditions of the Beijing Olympic Games and the Auditing Result of the Olympic Venues 
Construction Projects,” June 19, 2009, www.audit.gov.cn/n1057/n1072/n1282/1831561.html (accessed 
March 8, 2012); Zheng Shi, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 16, 2011; Official Website of National 
Stadium, “Company Introduction,” http://www.n-s.cn/en/organizations/intro/ (accessed March 8, 2012). 
226 Official Website of National Stadium, “Company Introduction,” 
http://www.n-s.cn/en/organizations/intro/ (accessed March 8, 2012). 
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signed relevant agreements with BOCOG and BASM regarding the Stadium.227 As a 
result, the CITIC consortium and BSAM jointly registered a company, the National 
Stadium Co., Ltd., by which the CITIC consortium held the management and operation 
rights to the Stadium for 30 years after the Olympic Games.228 However, the agreement 
led to controversy in terms of post-Games utilization of the venue, because the 
government’s strategy regarding the development of the Stadium, which focused more on 
political and symbolic meanings and significances, was different from that of the CITIC 
consortium, which focused more on economic value and revenue generating.229  
Following the Games, controversies gradually appeared. According to Yang, the 
government was reluctant to see that profit-making became the priority of post-Games 
operation for the “Bird’s Nest” stadium.230 Meanwhile, criticism began to appear in the 
media. The People’s Daily, one of the most important newspapers for the Chinese Central 
Government as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), complained in July 2009 
that the managers of the Stadium overpriced products sold in the Stadium, maximizing 
the profit motif. It also contended that as an iconic stadium, and titled with the term 
“national,” such immoral business behaviors should be criticized and stopped.231 The 
China Sports Review reported that local residents complained that the Stadium’s entrance 
admission was too expensive compared to other sites and attractions in Beijing, and 
stated that as a public place used for the Olympic Games, it was supposed to be open to 
the public for free.232 Sport Media, a local sports newspaper, commented that CITIC 
                                                        
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Chen Sun, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
230 Ping Yang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 11, 2011. 
231 Official Website of People’s Daily, “Is It Right for Bird’s Nest Earning Money Like This?” 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/9696576.html (accessed March 8, 2012). 
232 Official Website of China Sports Review, “Public or Private? National Sport Stadium Accused of 
 
107 
should not designate the National Stadium as the home of its own professional soccer 
team without paying any rental to the government.233 An official of the Beijing Sport 
Bureau questioned how the National Stadium, as an Olympic sport facility, could attract 
tourists in the  long term, and how long the Olympic enthusiasm would last, if the 
operation company only cared about its own revenue making.234 The conflict between 
commercial profit-earning and social responsibility became a heated issue, not only 
among the media, but also in public and government perspective in 2009. The operation 
company was consistently criticized that it should be focused on the Stadium’s public 
service function to serve the residents, rather than its “profit motif.”  
From the operation company’s perspective, there were other explanations 
regarding the commercial actions of the Stadium. The Company was required to pay 
CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) per year for operation, maintenance, and interest 
payments, which was a burden on the CITIC consortium, not the government.235 Former 
deputy general manager of the Company, Hengli Zhang, stated in 2009 that the Stadium’s 
revenue usually included space rental, entrance admission, commercial advertisement, 
and souvenir selling, while the major prospect was aimed at the sale of naming rights for 
the Stadium.236 However, the government did not approve the Company’s proposal 
regarding the naming rights sale, although the relevant approval had been given when the 
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agreement was signed between the CITIC consortium and the government.237 Zhang 
explained that the public might not applaud the naming rights sale of the National 
Stadium, which was a possible reason why the government refrained from giving final 
approval.238 In 2009, the major part of the revenue came from tourists; however, Zhang 
was concerned that the enthusiasm for visiting the Olympic venue would not be sustained 
with time passing by.239 In addition, in terms of commercial events, the progress was also 
not smooth in 2009. Due to the high maintenance expense, the rent for commercial events 
was quite expensive, which deterred numerous potential clients. Moreover, due to the 
safety concern around the Olympic Park, the government rejected certain commercial 
event proposals the Company submitted.240 What the Company tried to do for the 
Stadium was always limited by the government. After the Games, in 2009, the Company 
proposed a series of business plans regarding the commercial development of the 
Stadium; however, most of them were not approved by the Beijing Municipal 
Government.241 The conflict between the high operation cost and the lack of resources f
revenue generation caused tourism revenue to be heavily depended on. In fact, the 
in-depth reason for this continued to be the different visions for the Stadium after the 
Olympic Games held by the government and the Company, in other words, which kinds 
of value - commercial value or symbolic value – should be pursued in order to embody 
or 
                                                        
237 Official Website of People’s Daily, “New Beijing Newspaper: Bird’s Nest Waiting for Money in 
Post-Olympic Period,” http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/9696815.html (accessed March 9, 2012); Wuyi 
Guo, Jingyi Wan, and Feng Ding, “Some Thoughts on Naming Rights of the Olympic Venues in China,” 
Sport Culture Guide, (2008), pp. 61-63. 
238 Official Website of People’s Daily, “New Beijing Newspaper: Bird’s Nest Waiting for Money in 
Post-Olympic Period,” http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/9696815.html (accessed March 9, 2012). 
239 Ibid. 
240 Online Portal of Chinese Central Government, “Bird’s Nest Facing Post-Olympic Effect, Visitors 
Dramatically declined,” http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-08/23/content_23261149_2.htm 
(accessed March 9, 2012). 
241 Ibid. 
 
109 
Olympic legacy for the government as well as the public. 
Of the issues regarding the post-Games operation of the Stadium, the naming 
rights sale was the most debated issue by the media, the public and the governments. 
Although approval for the naming rights sale had been outlined in the agreement in 2003, 
the government quickly changed its mind after the Games.242 Some enterprises, both 
from China and abroad, expressed huge interests regarding naming the Stadium with their 
corporate names, such as Adidas, Coca-Cola, Lenovo, and the Guo Mei Group.243 For 
instance, the negotiation with the Guo Mei Group had progressed smoothly with a price 
of about CNY 70 million (USD 10.8 million) per year for at least five years being 
entertained, but failed at the last moment because of the government’s intervention.244 
There were different opinions expressed regarding the naming rights sale for the 
Stadium. Cheng Yang, the deputy general manager of the Bird’s Nest, told the researcher 
that the naming rights sale for the Stadium would not progress in the near future, because 
the national image was always the top priority of what the government considered when 
the contradiction occurred between social responsibility and commercial benefit.245 
According to Jizhong Wei, the director of the Chinese Olympic Economy Research 
Association, the naming rights could be sold only if the title of the Stadium was changed, 
that is, the term “National” be removed from the title.246 Nianguo Cao, the director of the 
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Investment Department of DTZ, stated that the “Bird’s Nest” represented the national 
image and the government placed this above the need for money gained from its naming 
rights sale; thus, the government would not approve a naming rights sales deal.247 
Guoping Li, the board chairman of the Beijing Topconsult Real Estate Consulting Co. 
Ltd., pointed out that the Olympics should not be politicized; the Bird’s Nest belonged to 
a corporation to which the naming rights sale was within its legal rights; if there was a 
great value, then selling the naming rights would be a win-win strategy both for the 
Company and the government. In addition, a naming rights sale was merely a commercial 
activity, and it would be the major revenue resource of the Stadium.248 Hong Yao, an 
official of the Beijing Sport Venue Association, stated that the naming rights sale 
depended on various factors such as the venue’s reputation, use frequency, and type of the 
use, rather than only the matter of money.249 Xianpeng Lin, a professor at Beijing Sport 
University (BSU), pointed out that it was quite difficult for the Stadium to balance its 
financial sheet without selling naming rights, because the last couple of years had seen 
that the revenue from tourism and commercial events could not compensate for the 
Stadium’s high operating cost.250 Lin also commented that the naming rights and the 
Stadium’s luxury boxes should be for sale as is the practice in North America, as long as 
there were needs in the market.251 Moreover, the Xin Ming Evening News stated that 
commercialization of the Stadium’s naming rights was correct; the function of the 
Stadium that served the Olympics was finished and its commercial function should be 
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started as soon as possible.252 No matter where the debate goes, the fact is that so far the 
government has not approved the naming rights sale for the Stadium, and with time 
passing by, apparently, the possibility of it, if any, will be decreasing toward zero. 
Under such a controversial situation surrounding the Stadium, in August 2009, six 
years after the CITIC Consortium was granted 30-year chartered management rights to 
the Bird’s Nest, the Beijing Municipal Government elected to take over the Stadium’s 
ownership. The government and the CITIC consortium signed a new agreement on 
regulating the operation and management mode. The “shareholding status” of the original 
agreement remained unchanged.253 According to the new agreement, the National 
Stadium Co. Ltd. would still be in charge of the operation and daily maintenance of the 
Stadium, while under the leadership of the Beijing Municipal Government, which meant 
that the CITIC consortium had finished its management missions at the Stadium. But, as 
a shareholder, CITIC would still benefit from the Stadium in the future.254 In addition, all 
the employees in the National Stadium Co., Ltd. voluntarily stayed in the Company 
retaining their original working positions. Of the profit made, the Company left CNY 50 
million (USD 7.7 million) in the treasury for future development; and the balance of the 
profit was distributed to the shareholders.255 Eventually, the first PPP project in China 
culminated with the “private partner” quitting the project.256 One interesting detail should 
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be mentioned. On the same day the new agreement on the transfer was signed, a new 
operation and management proposal was released and approved right away by releva
governmental departments.
nt 
ent 
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the development of the National Stadium. Shiwei Shao, an official of GASC, pointed out 
that certain previous investment issues existed that led to the situation after the Games.259 
For instance, the public money invested was a significant percentage of the total 
investment, probably because the government was overly optimistic regarding the 
Stadium’s post-Games operation and revenue return, which led to the controversial 
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situation in 2009 and the eventual ownership transition.260 Despite some enterprises 
involved in the investment of the venue, Cao stated that the Stadium’s political and iconic 
meanings were over-emphasized by the government, which adversely affected the 
Stadium’s post-Games commercial exploitation.261 Also, Shao commented that the 
National Stadium was too large to be utilized for medium size sports events or mass 
sports activities, which consequentially caused the underuse issue.262 Wei agreed, and 
stated that the huge size of the Stadium seriously confined its commercial development; 
only extra-large events might fit in the venue, with huge organizing costs.263 Jun Ding, an
official of BOPAC, stated that after the ownership transition occurred, the relationship 
between the Stadium and BOPAC improved, by which the collaboration between the 
committee and the Stadium became smoother and more coordinated than before. 
However, Ding also admitted that the Stadium had not balanced the financial sheet yet.
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In terms of the Stadium’s operation, Ping Yang, an official of BOPAC, witnessed 
its development after the Games. In 2009, the number of paid visitors in the Stadium was 
amazing, reaching around several millions; however, for the next two years, it decreased 
every year by 50%. Despite the decrease, it was still the first time in Olympic history that 
such a considerable number of tourists visited an Olympic stadium in such a short period 
of time. As a result, for the first two years, the Stadium’s revenue was mainly derived 
from entrance admission sales. However, in 2011, the Stadium started to deal with the 
interest payments to the banks, which caused the total expense of the Stadium to reach 
around CNY 300 million (USD 46.2 million) per year. The total annual revenue was 
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estimated at CNY 180 million (USD 27.7 million), leaving a deficit of about CNY 120 
million (USD 18.5 million) for the Stadium.265 Although Yang did not speak directly 
about who would pay for this deficit, considering the new ownership, BSAM might be 
the one who would take it in hand under the authority of the Beijing Municipal 
Government. Yang also pointed out that the Stadium had started to exploit new business, 
expecting to attract more tourists. For the first two years, the large number of tourists 
brought great value to the venue. When the tourism business in the venue declined, it was 
suddenly found that there was nothing inside but an empty stadium. Therefore, the 
situation pushed the managers of the Stadium to exploit new business opportunities.266    
Zheng Shi, a manager of the National Stadium Co. Ltd., shared his opinion with 
the researcher. The sales of naming rights and luxury boxes were stopped by the 
government. The commercial strategy of the Stadium was completely controlled by the 
government, which had nothing to do with the market. From the very beginning, in terms 
of the venue’s design, there were little thoughts put on its post-Games utilization. For 
instance, the passages under the spectator stands were all open space (prompting safety 
issues during the Games) rather than blocked as in standard stadiums such as the Beijing 
Workers’ Stadium. This fact led to much more human resource cost incurred than regular 
stadiums when hosting events. For a commercial event, the Workers’ Stadium would need 
around 500 security guards, while for the Bird’s Nest it could be around 5000. Another 
example would be the retractable roof, which was discarded during the design adjustment 
in 2003. Without a roof, the best season for stadium use was limited, dramatically 
confining its commercial development. In addition, all vehicles entering the Olympic 
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Park needed to be checked for security, potentially inhibiting customers who might want 
to be there for leisure purposes. BOPAC fenced the Olympic Park and installed security 
stations, making the Park more like a tourist destination; however, the function of the 
individual venues inside as a place for sports or commercial events would be adversely 
affected.267     
In terms of current conditions, Shi admitted that the tourism business declined 
dramatically in the venue. The golden time was over. Actually, the big bucks earned from 
tourism during the first year after the games was beyond expectation. It was 
unprecedented in terms of any previous Olympic main stadium visitation. During the first 
three months after the Games, the highest daily revenue reached around CNY 5 million 
(USD 0.77 million), while in 2011 for the first eight months, the total revenue of the 
Stadium was around CNY 50 million (USD 7.7 million). On the other hand, with time 
passing by, maintenance costs increased. As long as the Stadium was opened to the public, 
the operation and maintenance expense would cost more than CNY 170 million (USD 
26.2 million) per year. Thus, commercial profit had to be emphasized in the Stadium’s 
development strategy, although corporate social responsibility was always emphasized by 
the government. All the business plans for the Stadium had to be submitted to the 
government for approval; only those approved could be carried out. For instance, the 
government approved the building of a “cauldron square” at the north side of the Stadium, 
but did not approve selling its naming rights to the Hyundai Auto Group. The Hyundai 
group offered to pay CNY 20 million (USD 3.1 million) for the naming rights of the 
square and another CNY 80 million (USD 12.3 million) for establishing a demonstration 
hall in the Stadium. Despite Hyundai’s offer, the government did not approve it. The 
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government did not like the Stadium to be branded commercially. In a word, after the 
ownership transfer, the government had become the only decision maker for the Stadium; 
it controlled the direction of stadium development; at the same time it was responsible for 
all potential financial risks.268    
In terms of future plans for the venue, a Bird’s Nest Hotel will be opened inside 
the Stadium using the empty space at the north end. In addition, an observation archway 
will be built over the venue for sightseeing purposes. All the money for these projects 
will come from commercial loans. Besides, the tourism business will be continuing by 
adding new attractions to the venue. Meanwhile the Stadium was contemplating 
eventually removing entrance fees. The managers had been trying to make the Stadium a 
tourism destination with unique experiences that only the Bird’s Nest could offer. Also, 
some basic service functions such as rest areas, information desks, and catering services, 
might be added, not only in the Stadium but also in the Olympic Park in an effort to keep 
tourists staying longer than before. In terms of the Stadium’s function as a commercial 
events location, its future development would heavily depend on the government’s will. If 
the government would loosen its current strict regulations and demands for organizing 
commercial events inside Olympic Park, that might provide opportunities for the venues 
in the Park to further explore “the market” in the city. After all, as the venues were 
located in the Olympic Central Area, there were lots of positives present in terms of 
geographical location, “symbol” of the city, Olympic related reputation, and advanced 
architecture and technical conditions.269 However, as a window to showcase the 
government’s political image, the Stadium has become a stage to embody the 
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government’s will. As Jun Xiang, the assistant general manager of the Stadium, stated, 
the Stadium had been completely led by the government, which meant that it must follow 
the government’s direction and carry out what the government wanted it to do; in a word, 
the government was the dictator of all.270 Under such a principle for operation and 
management of the Stadium, it is hard to imagine what the future of the Olympic main 
stadium in Beijing will look like, but, a good guess might be that it will remain a political 
symbol of the government standing there alone occasionally reminding its visitors of its  
magnificence in the year 2008. 
 
2-4-2. National Indoor Stadium (NIS) 
The National Indoor Stadium (NIS), next to the Bird’s Nest and the Water Cube, 
is located in the Beijing Olympic Park. NIS was the competition site during the Olympic 
Games for artistic gymnastics, trampoline, and handball events.271 As one of the three 
newly-built venues in the Olympic Park, NIS is always overshadowed by the other two 
iconic Olympic venues beside it, which leads to the fact that NIS has seldom been 
focused on when discussing post-Games utilization of the Olympic venues in Beijing. 
But, in fact, as still another Olympic venue experiencing ownership transition, the case of 
NIS’s post-Games development was complicated, and might even be considered a 
“peculiar circumstance” in China. 
In November 2003, the Beijing Municipal Government selected the Beijing Urban 
Construction Investment & Development Co., Ltd., (BUCID) Consortium as the owner of 
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two Olympic projects - the National Indoor Stadium and the Olympic Village. The 
Consortium would be responsible for the full investment, architectural design and 
construction of the two projects; meanwhile the Consortium was granted 30-year 
chartered management rights for NIS.272 In 2005, the BUCID Consortium registered the 
Guo Ao Investment & Development Co., Ltd., (Guo Ao Investment) to manage and 
operate the two projects. The duties for the Company included investment, venue design, 
construction, as well as post-Games management, operation and maintenance.273 Guo Ao 
fully funded the two projects; while the government paid nothing.274 The two projects 
progressed smoothly until the Olympic Games finished. At the beginning of 2009, the 
government started to renege on the 30-year chartered management rights granted to Guo 
Ao and attempted to transfer the ownership of NIS to a different government-owned 
company.275  
Bo Zhang, director of the general office of the Beijing Guo Ao Five-Rings 
National Indoor Stadium Commerce Manager Co., Ltd., a sub-company of Guo Ao 
Investment, narrated the development of NIS, particularly after the Games. Guo Ao 
Investment won the bid for the combination project of NIS and the Olympic Village with 
the PPP mode under the direction of the government. For the Olympic Village, the 
Company operated the project as a real estate venture, selling portions as residential units 
even before the Olympic Games commenced. Due to the impact of the Olympics on the 
local housing market, the price of the apartments in the Olympic Village rose to become 
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among the most expensive in Beijing. In terms of NIS, although the municipal 
government granted Guo Ao Investment a 30-year chartered management rights, directly 
after the Olympic Games the government adjusted its policy on the venue.276 In May 
2009, the Beijing Municipal Government registered and directly supervised a company 
named the Beijing Performance & Arts Group (BPA). The board chairman of BPA was 
also the deputy general manager of BSAM, the current owner of both the Bird’s Nest and 
the Water Cube.277 Although the operation team of Guo Ao Investment remained in the 
venue, the supervision rights were transferred to the new company, which took over the 
responsibility for organizing activities and holding events in NIS. The dispute has existed 
since 2009 regarding the ownership of NIS, but the government’s will and behavior have 
prevailed throughout the entire scenario.278 
According to Xinxin Zhou, the general manager of the Guo Ao Investment, 
operation of NIS under the leadership of Guo Ao endured for only three months after the 
Games closed. During that period, NIS held 17 commercial events, including fashion 
shows, auto shows, and commercial receptions for corporations. The venue was also 
opened to the public with entrance admission (CNY 20 (USD 3.1)); this was later stopped 
by the government.279 Zhou stated that after the ownership transition, there were not 
many changes in terms of holding commercial events in NIS. Currently, both companies 
remain in NIS. They are responsible for different duties. Under the leadership of BPA, the 
new owner of NIS, an operations company, the Beijing BPA Cultural Facilities 
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Investment Co., Ltd., was established specifically for operating NIS. Yue Wang, the 
engineering service director of the new company, stated that the process of the ownership 
transition between BPA and Guo Ao Investment has not been completed yet in 2011, 
despite two and a half years having passed. The situation was complicated because of the 
intertwined relationships between the government and the state-owned enterprises.280 T
two companies controlling NIS needed to collaborate in order to coordinate the Stadiu
function as an assembly place, which seemed not to be the case, because at times the 
duties were not defined clearly for each company, which made the team members f
both functions feel confused about their responsibilities.
he 
m’s 
rom 
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After the Games, there were few sports competition events held in NIS. 
According to Zhang, because of high costs incurred in energy, maintenance, human 
resources, and security, holding commercial events was much more profitable for the 
venue’s revenue production than holding sports events. Sports events in China were 
always organized by governmental departments; government never reimbursed the venue 
the normal rental rate. Then, too, the sports industry in China was lagging. Most sports 
competitions, the basis of the sports industry, were controlled by the various levels of 
government in China. Thus, most sport-related events were considered political tasks that 
the venues’ owners must carry out.282 Wang also commented on the relationship between 
sports competitions and sport venues in China. The venues in China hardly made a profit 
by merely holding sports competitions. There were few professional sports leagues in 
China; thus, there was no large sponsor and commercial opportunity for the venues. Even 
though some sports events attracted a limited number of sponsors and commercial 
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partners, the money would be earned by the organizers and relevant sports associations 
instead of the venues, they being only the site providers. Since NIS was not a tourism 
destination, there was no tourism revenue after the venue was closed to the public in 2009. 
As a result, the revenue from holding commercial events had become the only money the 
venue made since then. After the ownership transition, BPA held some art performances 
such as acrobat shows and concerts, which generated ticket sales revenue for the 
venue.283 Wang also pointed out that NIS did reduce the cost of daily maintenance and 
energy consumption because it was not a tourism destination. If the commercial events 
revenue could reach CNY 20 million (USD 3.1 million) per year, according to Wang, it 
would compensate the yearly operation cost, which did not include the depreciation of 
fixed assets of the venue.284 
Because of the Olympic impact that could temporarily influence the venues’ 
business opportunities in a positive way, during the first year after the Games, there were 
companies from various fields engaging Olympic venues to hold their business events, 
especially those in the Olympic Park. However, when the Olympic aura declined, the 
venues’ attractions decreased. According to Wang, the three venues (the Water Cube, the 
Bird’s Nest and NIS) in the Olympic Park have faced the same situation over the past two 
years. In addition, high rent was another factor that kept potential clients away from the 
venues. After the Olympic Games, the number of large scale sports venues significantly 
increased in the city, which intensified the competitions among the venues; thus, potential 
users had more choices to hold their events. Obviously, the high rent of the venues was a 
critical weakness when they were in such a competitive market. In particular, as the focus 
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shifted to the next edition of the Olympic Games four years hence in London, inevitably 
decreasing the attraction of Olympic venues in Beijing, it would aggravate the marketing 
process.285  
Putting aside these potential risks regarding NIS’s future development, the dispute 
about the ownership had produced a reasonable solution that could satisfy both sides of 
the controversy. In terms of the reason the government revoked its decision and took back 
the venue, Xinxin Zhou had this to say. During the first three months after the Games, the 
operation of NIS was under the complete marketing control of Guo Ao Investment. 
According to Zhou, Guo Ao Investment signed its agreement with the government and 
fully funded NIS, which definitely gave the Company the right to operate the venue 
independently. The resulting record of the three-month experience proved that NIS was 
on the right track and would make profit keeping things as they were. Zhou contended 
that the duty of a general manager was to keep maximizing profit for the Company rather 
than to achieve a balance between commercial benefit and social benefit. However, 
officials in the government were more interested in the venue’s public service functions 
and how much social benefits the venue could achieve. Therefore, when the government 
realized that Guo Ao Investment’s priority was in creating a profit, it endeavored to 
change the situation.286Actually, after the government proposed the ownership transition, 
Guo Ao Investment did host a series of events for some governmental departments based 
on the government’s will to change the situation. They held a Beijing PSB Meeting with 
16,000 attendees, a Beijing Traffic Police Annual Meeting, and some campaigns for the 
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“Whole People Fitness Movement.”287 Even though NIS was a large scale sport arena, its 
condition was not suitable for a large amount of local senior people and young children to 
do morning exercise. These Guo Ao initiatives were not enough to satisfy the government. 
During the last three years, the process of the ownership transition has never ceased. In 
the government’s mind, according to Zhou, NIS should not position itself as a facility 
concentrating on high-end, expensive events, with admission prices that those with 
regular salaries could not afford. Zhou felt this would be unfair because the Company had 
also tried its best to realize the public service function of the venue.288  
In terms of the ownership transition, Ping Yang stated that NIS had not been 
opened regularly during the last three and a half years because the ownership transition 
had not yet been completed. The ownership decision the government made was not based 
on one specific sport venue but based on the strategy of the city’s culture development in 
the next fifteen years. The government attempted to integrate a series of culture and arts 
performance companies and organizations in the city and to put all of them under the 
control of the municipal government, thereby sufficiently utilizing its resources for the 
cultural development of the city.289 As for NIS, it was only one step of the entire strategy. 
The ownership of NIS was transferred to BPA, a new government-owned company linked 
to Beijing’s culture industry expansion. The new owner now owned a central gathering 
location for its various cultural events. Because NIS’s ultimate supervision belonged to 
the municipal government, which also supervised other cultural organizations in the city, 
the government might well prompt NIS to “book” cultural events from all over the city 
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and even other cities in China, thus conflicting with Guo Ao Investment’s marketing 
strategy. The ideal condition that the government pictured was that NIS, as a perfect 
location, could stage the city’s cultural events at any time the government wanted.290 
Based on this explanation, it can be understood that Guo Ao Investment was sacrificed to 
the strategy of the city’s culture industry expansion. 
In addition, Zhihong Zhang shared his opinion with the researcher regarding 
NIS’s ownership transition. The major reason for this was the conflict between the 
marketing strategy of Guo Ao Investment and the government’s idea with respect to the 
Olympic venue’s development after the Games. Guo Ao Investment contended that the 
marketing strategy of the venue should be formulated by the investor instead of the 
government. However, Guo Ao ignored the entire investment the government made for 
the Olympic Games, such as the infrastructure around NIS, the Olympic Park where NIS 
is located, and the public transportation system that connected NIS to the city. From this 
perspective, NIS was neither an isolated venue, nor an independent company carrying out 
its own marketing strategy without considering what the government considered.291 
Zhang also pointed out that the pressure on the government to finally make the decision 
to take over NIS’s ownership was prompted by the fact that even though the facility was a 
non-tourism destination, NIS sold entrance admission tickets to visitors. This action, 
provoked criticism from the media, especially from foreign media, criticism that 
infringed on the image of the government and the Olympic movement in China. The 
issue of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues was one which the worldwide media 
belabored. Selling entrance admissions was considered to be a basic component of venue 
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operation, which showed that Beijing’s Olympic venue management was in a relatively 
low level.292 Xinxin Zhou expressed a different point of view regarding ticket sales. 
According to Zhou, the entrance admission sale at NIS lasted only fifteen days and then 
Guo Ao Investment peremptorily closed the venue to visitors in order to prepare the 
facility for commercial events. Managers thought that visitors in the venue disturbed 
staffers’ preparation for commercial events.293 In terms of “high-end” commercial events 
that Zhou mentioned, Zhang stated that it was not the major reason for the transition. No 
matter what kinds of events the Company organized, according to Zhang, it should be 
remembered that the venue was an Olympic legacy, a national symbolic venue, not a 
location for purely commercial activities.294  
After ownership transition, NIS was no longer an independent venue with its own 
development strategy, but associated with other companies and organizations in the city’s 
culture industry. When the government considered the venue’s business, it prioritized the 
city’s culture industry, which, according to Zhang, improved the government’s working 
efficiency because certain conflicts would be solved inside BPA. However, Zhang also 
stated that the establishment of BPA was just the first step of the government’s strategy 
for the city’s culture industry expansion.295 Though the government has created a 
framework for the strategy, it has to keep exploring other potentially promising endeavors 
in order to achieve its goals of the city’s culture development. Furthermore, with NIS’s 
ownership transition, the Beijing Municipal Government now controls the three major 
Olympic venues in the Olympic Park, the Water Cube, the Bird’s Nest and NIS. All three 
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venues are directly or indirectly supervised by BSAM, which can be considered a typical 
condition of venue management in China in which the government has the highest 
priority and is the strongest power for operation and utilization of Olympic venues after 
the Games.   
 
2-4-3. Olympic Forest Park: Tennis, Hockey and Archery Facilities 
The Olympic Tennis Court, the Olympic Hockey Field, and the Olympic Archery 
Field, were built together within the Olympic Sport Park at the west side of the Olympic 
Forest Park that was located in the region of the Beijing Olympic Central Area. The 
hockey and archery fields were temporary Olympic venues that were supposed to be 
dismantled after the Games.296 Three and a half years after the Games, the hockey field is
still operated for public use, gathering membership fees and facility rent.
 
                                                       
297 One of the 
two archery fields was dismantled in 2009, not because it was a temporary facility, but 
because the site had to be emptied and then re-occupied for the construction of a new 
tennis court. The other archery field has been closed completely since the Games 
concluded.298 The tennis court, a permanent Olympic venue, has been used for the China 
Open competitions since 2009.299 In addition, a new tennis stadium with a retractable 
roof, titled the National Tennis Center, was completed in 2011, replacing the Olympic 
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Tennis Court as the main stadium for the China Open events in the future.300 According 
to Jinxian Tian, the manager of the Olympic Forest Park, although the estimated use 
duration of temporary sports venues is usually five years, the venues in the Olympic 
Forest Park could be used for ten years, because of its high quality construction. Thus, the 
Chao Yang District Government decided to keep utilizing the two venues and their 
auxiliary function rooms as recreation facilities for the public. Tian also pointed out that 
dismantling the two venues would cost more than CNY 10 million (USD 1.54 million), 
while the renovation work cost approximately CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million). 
Furthermore, by operating sport-related business in these facilities, according to Tian, the 
renovation cost would be recovered in three years.301  
In terms of the ownership of the three venues, ownership has been transferred 
twice since 2006. Before 2006 the owner/investor of the three venues was the Beijing 
2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, a governmental division that supervised 
and monitored Olympic construction projects in Beijing.302 A bribery scandal changed 
the government’s plan for these three venues. In June 2006, former vice-mayor of Beijing, 
Zhihua Liu, who was in charge of the construction of the Olympic venues at the time, 
was ousted for alleged corruption and a notorious life style.303 Liu was sacked in June 
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2006 and expelled from the Communist Party of China in December.304 Liu used to be 
the leader of the Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, the decision 
maker regarding the contracts of the construction and the owner of the three venues. 
Based on the Xin Hua News Agency’s report, before Liu’s scandal was exposed, he had 
already appointed the rights of construction and operation of the three venues to a 
construction company that was owned by Jianrui Wang, one of his mistresses.305 After 
the scandal, in 2007, the Beijing Municipal Government withdrew the chartered 
construction and management rights and authorized BSAM to take over the ownership of 
the three venues.306   
A former official of BOCOG told the researcher that the three venues were 
originally planned to be built as temporary facilities funded by the Beijing Municipal 
Government; thus, the temporary owner would be the Beijing 2008 Project Construction 
Headquarters Office until the facilities were dismantled after the Games. There seems to 
be no paper record that links Liu’s scandal situation with the decision to change the three 
venues from temporary facilities to permanent installations. However, the BOCOG 
official stated that the government assumed ownership of the venues because of the 
scandal. As a result, after the scandal, the appointed construction contractor was fired; the 
government took over the projects, and BSAM became the new owner of the three 
venues. Meanwhile, the basic design of the structures was changed from temporary to 
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permanent. After this transition, BSAM, as the new owner, fully funded the three venues, 
supervised and monitored the construction work, and then operated and maintained the 
venues during the Olympic Games.307   
After the Games, since the Olympic Sport Park was located geographically in the 
Chao Yang District, BSAM once again transferred the ownership of the three venues to 
the local authority, the Chao Yang District Government.308 Specifically, the Chao Yang 
government registered a company named the Beijing Shi Ao Forest Park Management 
Company to operate and manage the venues as well as the entire Forest Park. In addition, 
the government built another tennis stadium by investing CNY 540 million (USD 83.1 
million); it was named the “National Tennis Center” or the “Diamond Tennis Court.”309 
According to Changsheng Li, the deputy general manager of the Shi Ao Forest Park 
Management Company, the high maintenance cost of the Olympic Tennis Stadium put 
lots of pressure on the Company’s operation. The revenue from the courts’ rental could 
not offset its operation expense, while the strategy for future development was still 
unsettled by the government.310 As to the new tennis stadium, aside from the huge 
amount of the monetary investment, the ongoing maintenance expense is an issue for the 
Company, because it is only used for the China Open competitions held once a year over 
a 10-day period. For the rest of the year it is closed.311 Although the practice courts 
beside the main court were opened to the public in 2010, given the fact that tennis was 
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not popular in China, the courts have been underused since then. Moreover, the 
complicated traffic conditions around Olympic Sport Park, and the relatively high rate for 
using the courts, limit potential users.312 The Beijing Youth reported that the practice 
courts were closed in the winter of 2010 due to severe weather conditions.313 When the 
researcher visited the site in August 2011, the courts were closed; a lone security guard 
stood at the main entrance.   
In terms of the hockey field, before the Olympic Games the field was chosen as 
the new training field for the Chinese national hockey team.314 However, after the Games, 
the national team trained at the NOSC hockey field when they were in Beijing. The only 
elite hockey team which trained in the hockey field was the provincial hockey team of 
Guang Dong Province. They used the field as their training base for five months in 
2009.315 When the team finished training, the field was closed for renovations until 
August 2010.316 Around the precinct of the hockey field, people could pay an hourly fee 
for playing soccer (CNY 30 (USD 4.6)), basketball (CNY 15 (USD 2.3)), and badminton 
(CNY 40 (USD 6.2)). In the future, sports such as yoga, ping pong, fencing and roller 
skating are on tap to be developed, using the auxiliary function rooms as well as 
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peripheral space around the field.317  
Frank Bi, the general manager of the China National Sports Venue Management 
Co., Ltd., shared his opinion regarding the operation and management condition of the 
Olympic Green venues. In general, managing a sport venue required specialized teams 
for each kind of operation duty in the venue. The duties were diverse; thus, the 
requirements for the teams were different. In sport venues in the Olympic Park, there was 
a lack of specialized management teams and supervisors. Low level management was not 
capable of operating such advanced Olympic venues. It could be said that all the venues 
in the Olympic Park needed to be improved in terms of post-Games management and 
operation. Otherwise, there would be no satisfactory future for Olympic legacies. As to 
the hockey field, it was a positive thing to see that the government decided to open the 
venue to the public. However, considering its advanced condition and high quality, it 
should have been opened to elite teams as a training base. The operation company 
assumed only the responsibility of daily operation and maintenance, while due to a lack 
of specialized management teams the Company was hardly able to strategically plan the 
venues’ future development and maximize their post-Games utilization.318  
Bi also stated that venue management was a general issue throughout the country. 
According to Bi, about 97% of the sport venues in China were funded and owned by 
various government structures. Advanced management mechanisms based on a free 
market principle could not be introduced into government-owned facilities because such 
mechanisms and operation modes conflicted with government administration and 
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operation system. Therefore, without in-depth reform in government, it would be 
impossible for Olympic venues in Beijing to improve management conditions in the 
future.319  
 
3. General Administration of Sport China (GASC)-Owned Venues 
There were seven Olympic sport venues in Beijing owned by the General 
Administration of Sport China (GASC): the Lao Shan Velodrome, the Beijing Shooting 
Range Hall and Clay Target Field (both venues were built together), the Capital Indoor 
Stadium, and three venues in the National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC): the NOSC 
Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium and the Ying Tung Natatorium. After the Olympic 
Games, due to their unique features and functions, the Velodrome (newly-built), the clay 
target field (pre-existing), and the shooting range hall (newly-built), were used only by 
Chinese national teams. Post-Games utilization for the other four venues (pre-existing) 
aimed at public recreation and to serve local communities in the same manner they did 
before the Games. 
 
3-1. Lao Shan Velodrome 
The Lao Shan Velodrome, associated with the Olympic BMX Course and the 
Olympic Mountain Bike Course, were located on the west side of the city. Unlike the 
BMX Course and the Mountain Bike Course supervised by the local district government, 
the Velodrome, a newly-built venue, was supervised by GASC, which was in charge of 
Chinese national sport and responsible for China’s Olympic Gold Medal Strategy.320 As 
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the owner of the venue, GASC used the main track as a training site for elite athletes. The 
facility’s hallways, function rooms, and corridors around the track served the public as 
sports and recreation space. 
Junyan Wang, the director of the general office of the Cycling and Fencing 
Administrative Center under GASC, provided the researcher with information on the 
Velodrome.321 GASC’s Cycling Administration Center and the Chinese Cycling 
Association had been located at Lao Shan since the 1980s. There had been no high 
standard indoor cycling track in the Center before the Olympic Games. In terms of the 
location selection, the Center submitted several proposals to GASC as well as UCI for 
evaluating. Finally, after considering the proximity to both the pre-existing mountain bike 
course and the Center and its geographical environment, the unanimous decision was 
made that the new velodrome would be built at the foot of Mount Lao Shan. GASC’s 
total investment in the Velodrome was approximately CNY 100 million (USD 15.4 
million), which was appropriated from the national treasury. The Center supervised the 
construction project, while BOCOG provided the project with relevant technical support. 
The construction consisted of two phases, the basic structure and the cycling track itself. 
For the second part, there was no qualified company in China that could complete the 
project based on the criteria established by UCI and the IOC. A German company was 
hired to finish the job with special technology aiding athletes to achieve better 
performances. Moreover, GASC also hoped that the track would provide the national 
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teams with optimum training conditions after the Games.322 
In terms of post-Games use, the Velodrome was mainly used as a training base for 
national cycling and fencing teams. The athletes trained on the main track (for cyclists) 
and the fencing courses established along the hallways. There were standardized 
apartments reserved for the Games. These were renovated as athletes’ residences after the 
Games. GASC paid for the entire renovation project. As a result, the original athletes’ 
residence building beside the venue was transformed into a commercial hotel, thereby 
generating revenue for the Center. Utilizing function rooms around the venue, the Center 
opened a fencing club targeting young children, which was another way to help the 
Center offset maintenance costs. Then, too, since 1984, the Center operated a driving 
school utilizing the road around Mount Lao Shan. For more than two decades the driving 
school was a constant revenue generator.323   
Moreover, during the last three and a half years the Center organized international 
and national track cycling competitions by which the Center sought to attract event 
sponsors for a rental price tag in the vicinity of CNY 200,000 (USD 30,800). The Center 
had its own marketing department dealing with sponsors. Event sponsors usually 
included bicycle manufacturers, sport apparel companies, and companies in the food 
industry. Though certain sponsors were eager to sponsor events, for the most part, 
marketing people at the Center had to energetically pursue clients. In terms of its 
competition events, on most occasions the Center did not sell tickets to spectators. First, 
cycling was not as popular as soccer and basketball in China. Even though the Center 
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attempted to sell tickets, their effort largely failed. Second, if the Center sold tickets, the 
money earned would be less than that which the Center had to pay for the security 
requirement of PSB. In addition, there were complicated procedures regarding the 
application for spectator events.324  
In terms of operation expense of the venue, GASC had secured special 
government funding for the venue every year, which covered most of the costs incurred 
in the Velodrome. Generating revenue in the venue was not a priority of the Center, 
because it did not need its own revenue to offset the cost. In terms of this, all 
GASC-owned Olympic venues were in the same category. It was not necessary for the 
Center to explore business opportunities. The major task of the Center was to serve the 
national teams and attempt to secure Olympic gold medals.325 
The Center once held commercial events such as exhibition fairs, but realized that 
such events did not “fit” in the Velodrome. The Center also considered, but eventually 
discontinued, pop concerts in the venue, because the condition of the venue had to be 
considerably changed to fit a commercial concert. In addition, in 2009, the Center 
approved a pipeline manufacturer, the Ao Po Pipeline Co., Ltd., in Zhe Jiang Province, to 
become the Velodrome’s official product provider. This allowed the Company to use the 
name and picture of the Velodrome in its commercial advertisements.326 The Center also 
considered changing the title of the venue to the “National Velodrome.” The proposal was 
submitted and is still waiting for approval by GASC.327 
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In terms of future development of the Velodrome, Wang stated that the venue was 
not suitable for initiating mass sports on the main track, while outside the venue there 
was enough space for public recreation and mass sport. At the north end of the Center, 
there is an empty area reserved for future commercial exploitation. According to Wang, 
the Center planned to add some sports for recreation purposes such as roller skating, 
skate boarding, and BMX. A team in the Center has already initiated some preparation 
work for this business plan. The target group of this plan would be those young persons 
who are enthusiasts of extreme sports, especially those cycling-related. Wang stated that 
the Center developed its business plan based on its tradition, that is, it would take 
advantage of the core strength of the Center, cycling. New business would try to attract 
cycling enthusiasts throughout the city. The Center would provide them with the space, 
equipment, instruction (personal trainers), and any necessary services they would need. 
Also based on this principle, the Center would provide bicycle manufacturers throughout 
the country with a testing, demonstration, and sales facility. By doing this, the Center 
would become a venue for manufacturers and distributors to operate their own business 
stores, showcase products, communicate with potential clients and business partners, 
stage commercial events, and sponsor competitions held in the Velodrome. This would be 
a long-term goal for the Velodrome. According to Wang, the current condition of the 
venue does not fit this plan and there would have to be numerous facility renovations and 
changes in management strategy to achieve the goal. Once again, the plan has to be 
approved by GASC before being actually initiated.328 
Speaking of weakness incumbent with the venue’s development, Wang pointed 
out that cycling, because it was not as popular as soccer, basketball, table tennis, and 
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badminton, led to a relatively small population base of potential users. This is especially 
so for sports such as BMX and extreme cycling. Under this situation, the Center planned 
to organize sports performance shows by elite athletes in order to introduce cycling to the 
public and attract those who might be interested.329  
 
3-2. Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field 
The Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field were situated together in 
the West Community Area of the Shi Jing Shan District. The Shooting and Archery 
Administrative Center under GASC, as well as the Chinese Shooting Association and 
Archery Association have been located here since the 1950s.330 The Shooting Range Hall 
was a newly-built venue for the Beijing Olympics, while the Clay Target Field was a 
pre-existing venue in the Center and was re-constructed for the Games. GASC fully 
financed and supervised the design and construction of both venues and owned them after 
the Games. As originally planned, the only occupants of the two venues were the Chinese 
national shooting teams. The Center was not opened to the public, except for a badminton 
gymnasium and a shooting club behind the Shooting Range Hall. The people playing 
badminton or going to the club in the Center had to register with their personal ID card at 
the entrance; otherwise they were not allowed to enter.331 In addition to the Lao Shan 
Velodrome, the Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field were the other two Olympic 
venues under the leadership of GASC whose sole use was a training base for national 
teams. 
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Yuping Ding, the deputy director of the business development department in the 
Shooting and Archery Administrative Center under GASC, provided the researcher with 
relevant information on the venues. Since GASC, as the owner, invested a total of CNY 
400 million (USD 61.54 million) for the venues, the purpose of the venues was quite 
clear: to provide national shooting teams with world-class training conditions and 
services after the Games. Thus, post-Games utilization considered during the design stage 
focused on the facility becoming a national team’s training base. There was no 
multifunctional design considered. A shooting venue’s layout is unique in order to meet 
special competition requirements. But, this limits its general use function, unlike most 
regular gymnasium plans for post-Games use. The demands for Olympic competitions 
and for team training on a regular basis were altogether different. Anticipating the large 
amount of spectators during the Games, a long and spacious grandstand area was built 
behind the shooting lanes, an unnecessary feature for regular training use. Behind the 
spectator stands, a large and spacious area was built that was specifically for spectators 
during the Games. Both large areas remained empty after the Games. Their use for 
non-training purposes dictated reconstruction and renovation. For instance, considering 
safety issues, they had to be separated from the shooting lanes. The fact was that there 
was no special fund from GASC for reconstructing the venue. Separating spectators from 
athletes with weapons was difficult for the Center to realize. There were design issues 
related to mixing spectator routes with those of the athletes. If the Center was to hold 
non-sport events utilizing the function area in the venue, it would have to change the 
layout of the venue to separate the shooting region from the functional region. The work 
was too complicated to be completed. As a result, for the last three and a half years, the 
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venue’s only purpose has been for national team training.332   
Since the priority of GASC’s sport venues was always to serve national teams and 
to secure Olympic gold medals, there was no alternative post-Games utilization plan for 
these two venues. However, the new Shooting Range Hall indirectly helped the Center to 
develop new business utilizing old training venues in the Center. Using a new venue for 
athlete training vacated old training facilities. Hence, the gymnasium was reconstructed 
and appointed for new business purposes. The Center established a commercial hotel in 
the old building in an effort to organize conferences and business meetings. In addition, a 
badminton gym had been opened to the public since 2008. However, safety issues were 
still the Center’s concern because of its compromising features. Due to the layout of the 
buildings in the Center, it could not separate the training area and ammunition storage 
from the area which the public used for recreation or conferences.333  
In terms of the Center’s financial condition, GASC financially supported the 
Center. At the end of each year, the Center reported its operation cost for the year and 
submitted an estimated budget to GASC for the next year. Based on the report, GASC 
funded the Center’s operation costs. Therefore, the Center paid little attention to the costs 
incurred in the venues. The operation funds usually covered all the expenses such as 
energy, regular maintenance, human resources, and security costs. Basically, GASC fully 
paid for the new building and, as well, continued funding maintenance and operation of 
the venues in order to serve national teams. Only one priority existed - securing Olympic 
gold medals for the country.334 
In addition to the training base, the Center also organized international and 
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national shooting competitions in the venue. By holding the competition events, the 
Center could earn revenue for its own use. Operation costs for holding the events was not 
a consideration. They were covered by the operation funds from GASC. The Center also 
attempted to find sponsors for the events; the money from the sponsors could be retained 
by the Center instead of transferring it to GASC. The Shooting Range Hall included two 
areas - the qualification hall and the final hall. The national teams usually trained in the 
qualification hall, while the final hall was only opened for large-scale international 
competition events. Similar to the reasons attached to the Velodrome, such as strict PSB 
(Public Security Bureau) regulations and being an unpopular spectator sport in China, the 
competitions held in the Center were not open to the public. In addition, because weapons 
were involved in the competitions, a highly sensitive issue in the city, PSB would censor 
the application and set ultra-high security levels for the events. As a result, after the 
Games, there were no spectators at the competitions in the venue. There is no plan to 
change this in the future. Moreover, there was also a shooting club in the Center that was 
opened to the public in the 1980s. The club was owned by the Center and operated by 
staffers. The club had no marketing promotions or commercial advertisements, due 
mainly to its weapons-involved sensitivity.335 Thus, the Center did not set revenue goals 
for the club. Obviously, the club was not operated with market mechanisms in mind. 
Furthermore, the Center at one time opened its swimming pool to the public. Though the 
pool was popular with the local people, the recreational swimmers had to cross the 
pathway of the athletes to reach the pool. The athletes always carried guns and bullets 
with them; the safety issue once again produced problematics. Besides, whenever the 
Center organized competitions events, the pool had to be closed for at least two weeks, a 
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situation prompting complaints from those with memberships. Finally, the Center was 
forced to close the pool in 2009.336 
In terms of future development, Ding stated that any possible changes to the 
Center would depend heavily on GASC’s analysis of the future. As a training base for 
national teams, the Center’s operation was fully supported and authorized by GASC. 
Thus, as long as GASC does not change its priority for Chinese national sport, the Center 
will not change its own operation direction and management mode. Securing status as 
national team training site will be the top priority for the Center under the “Whole 
Country System,” the major system and strategy for Chinese national sport.337 According 
to Ding, despite the underused condition of the two Olympic venues, the positive thing 
has been that the Center exploited the old facilities to generate revenue, from which the 
Center could earn approximately CNY 5 million (USD 0.77 million) per year. Plus, 
certain enterprises such as Nike and Lining sponsored the national shooting teams; this 
sponsorship revenue reverted to the Center. However, Ding pointed out that potential 
sponsors were very difficult to find because a sport like shooting was so unpopular in 
China, causing its exposure frequency in the media to be quite low. This kept sponsorship 
enterprises away from the Center.338 
As to GASC and the Center itself, expectations for reforming have appeared. A 
high standard of performance for the Chinese athletes was set during the 2008 Beijing 
Games. For the 2012 London Games, it was predicted that Chinese athletic performance 
could not exceed what was achieved in 2008. Given such a situation, many contended 
                                                        
336 Ibid. 
337 The Whole Country System is the system applied for Chinese national sport by which all the sport 
resources (including financial support, human resources, policy, sport facilities, and athletes training and 
delivery system, etc.) throughout the whole country must serve the national teams in order that these 
national teams can win Olympic gold medals as well as other international championships for the country.  
338 Yuping Ding, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 19, 2011. 
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that GASC should change its administrative and operation system in order to transfer its 
emphasis from national sport and Olympic gold medals to mass sport and school sport. 
Correspondingly, the role of Chinese national sport should be changed from a political 
meaning to a national strategy for improving citizen health conditions. However, no 
action about reform has as yet been initiated. After all, reform probably depends on 
changes in wider Chinese social environment and political circumstances, instead of 
merely within GASC itself. 
 
3-3. Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) 
The Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) held the volleyball tournament during the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. It is located within the University Area. It was the only 
Olympic venue in the University Area not built on a campus. Owned by GASC, CIS was 
built in 1968 and specifically renovated in 2007 for the Olympics.339 CIS was supervised 
by the China Winter Sports Administrative Center under GASC. Within the same location 
precinct, the Center also administered other facilities, including a skating oval, a 
multifunction training gym, and the CIS Hotel. As GASC’s winter sports center, the 
Capital Skating Oval was the major site for national team training, while CIS and the 
multifunction training gym were backup venues for the teams. Both facilities could be 
transformed into ice rinks whenever needed.340 After the Games, CIS was restored to its 
original function as an assembly place for commercial events, job fairs, a clothing market, 
                                                        
339 Official Website of BOCOG, “Capital Indoor Stadium,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/cas/index.shtml 
(accessed March 18, 2012); Official Website of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center, 
“Introduction of Capital Indoor Stadium,” 
http://www.winter-sports.cn/home/backup/2005-07-07/46897.html (accessed March 18, 2012). 
340 Internal Circulated Documents of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center, “The Solution about 
Opening to the Public after the Olympic Games,” pp. 2-4; Haixia Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, 
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and sports competitions.341 GASC invested CNY 150 million (USD 23.1 million) (public 
money directly from the national treasury) to upgrade CIS without significant structure 
change.342 The venue was a relatively old sport facility which needed significant 
upgrading in electronic systems, telecommunication systems, ventilating systems, and 
fire alarm systems. Thus, the Olympic Games were an opportunity for the venue to 
update itself and keep functioning well into the future.343  
Haixia Wang, the director of the business management department in the China 
Winter Sports Administrative Center under GASC, briefly described the condition of CIS 
after the Games. The Center’s first task was to secure national team training, a top 
priority for GASC. Even though CIS was not a major training site for athletes, CIS had to 
follow the GASC’s development plan based on its main priority. In addition to its training 
purpose, as a multifunction sport facility CIS had 17,127 seats (reduced from 18,000 
seats prior to upgrading), which dictated that the venue be mainly used for large scale 
events, such as pop concerts and other cultural extravaganzas. Besides, through the 
corridors surrounding the main hall, the space was suitable to hold clothing markets and 
job fairs (see the pictures in Appendix O).344  
The upgrading work for the Olympic Games also considered the facility’s 
post-Games commercial business. For instance, sixteen luxury boxes were built above the 
spectator stands. In 2010, CIS’s commercial culture business consumed one third of the 
total commercial culture events market in the city. CIS owned a long tradition for culture 
                                                        
341 Haixia Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 15, 2011. 
342 Internal Circulated Documents of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center, “SWOT Analysis of 
CIS and Evaluation Report on Service Quality,” p. 1; Haixia Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 15, 
2011.  
343 Internal Circulated Documents of the China Winter Sports Administrative Center, “SWOT Analysis of 
CIS and Evaluation Report on Service Quality,” p. 1 
344 Haixia Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 15, 2011. The description was also based on the 
researcher’s on-site observation. 
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shows in Beijing. Its chief competitors were the Workers’ Gymnasium and the 
MasterCard Center.345 Therefore, one of the major tasks for CIS was to market 
promotions in order to compete with the competitors in the city. The strength of CIS was 
its long tradition and reputation in the market that secured certain old clients who had 
loyalty to CIS and constantly brought new business to the venue. Besides, CIS’s rent for 
commercial events started at CNY 300,000 (USD 46,154), which was relatively low 
compared to its competitors in Beijing. In addition, the Center was a governmental 
organization. Governmental clients were more easily dealt with compared to those venues 
under private ownerships, such as MCC. Plus, with its long history in the market, the 
Center embraced professional staffers for organizing commercial events. Their 
experience was a strength for CIS. However, weaknesses were also apparent. First, 
physical space around the venue was quite limited, which led to a parking problem for 
spectators. Although public transportation was located rather close to the venue, private 
vehicles had been expanding rapidly in Beijing and more and more people started driving 
their own vehicles to the events. This problem had to be considered by event organizers. 
In contrast, certain new venues, such as MCC, offered quite large parking space for 
spectators. It is a serious issue that the Center continues to face. Second, new venues 
consistently used advanced hardware such as technical equipment and audio-video 
systems. The CIS condition in this regard was an obvious weakness. Finally, Wang stated 
that the financial operation of CIS was funded by GASC. This meant that the Center did 
not need to be concerned by CIS’s costs for holding commercial events. However, if 
GASC reforms its sport venue administrative mode in the future, the financial support 
                                                        
345 The MasterCard Center in Wu Ke Song was used to be the Olympic Basketball Gymnasium during the 
2008 Olympic Games. 
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will be limited and venues like CIS will have to face the market independently. If such a 
situation arises, then CIS’s business in the commercial events market will be a totally 
different story. This is a potential concern for the venue’s future development.346 
In terms of GASC’s support, because the Center was responsible for the Olympic 
Gold Medal Strategy, GASC provided the Center with special support funds, called 
“energy funds.” According to Wang, this was approximately CNY 10 million (USD 1.54 
million) per year. It basically covered all the expenses for the Center.347 However, 
according to an internally-circulated evaluation report on the Center’s operation and 
management, the financial condition of the Center was somewhat different than what 
Wang stated. Based on the report, the Center had to transfer around CNY 3 million (USD 
0.46 million) to GASC for utilizing the three sport venues as well as other facilities 
within the Center; plus, the employee salary cost was around CNY 2.4 million (USD 0.37 
million) per year and the energy cost around CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million) per year. 
In total, the yearly expense for the Center was around CNY 8.4 million (USD 1.3 million), 
while the yearly revenue accrued fluctuated between CNY 6 and 15 million (USD 0.92 
and 2.31 million), based on the Center’s financial sheet.348 The report was completed in 
2005; the researcher interviewed Wang in 2011. Thus, the time difference and relevant 
policy change could be the reason for the different statements between Wang and the 
report. Wang also stated that after the Olympic Games, the operation expense and other 
costs incurred in the Center significantly increased, which led to the Center feeling 
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CIS and Evaluation Report on Service Quality,” p. 4. 
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pressure in terms of the management and operation of the three sport facilities.349 As a 
non-profit organization, the Center was under the leadership of GASC with a balanced 
allocation. This meant that GASC only partially funded the venue. CIS needed to earn 
money for the venue’s operation. No matter which statement was correct or what number 
was “more genuine” than the other, the fact can be seen that GASC basically took care of 
the Center’s operational expense because the Center carried the tasks of winning Olympic 
gold medals. This was always considered the priority of Chinese national sport. As to the 
other business the Center operated, it was not critical. If it could make revenue, then it 
could partially offset its expense; but if it could not, the Center would still fully function 
under the support from GASC.  
GASC would not blame the Center because it did not make money from its 
commercial events business, but blame could be levied if the Center did not carry out its 
prime mission - securing Olympic gold medals. Every year GASC funded the Center, as 
well as the national teams training in the Center. As a return, the Center had to guarantee 
the medals. According to Wang, the supervisor of the Center must sign a contract with 
GASC regarding the number of Olympic medals guaranteed. Currently, a contract has 
been signed in terms of the Sochi Olympic Winter Games, which included the number of 
gold, silver and bronze medals the national teams would (instead of could) win.350 If the 
teams did not achieve what they promised, the supervisor of the Center would probably 
be removed from his/her position, which in GASC, was usually considered a serious 
punishment for a supervisor. Therefore, the supervisor of the Center took the contract and 
the task very seriously. There was a clear priority of task. According to Wang, in the 
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Center, nothing could disturb a national team’s training plan; all schedules for facilities 
followed the plan, which was a principle of the Center. In terms of this factor, CIS’s 
counterparts, the Velodrome and the shooting center, functioned identically.351 
In terms of future development, Wang admitted that as long as GASC would not 
reform its administrative mode, the Center would not change.352 The Center does not 
control its destiny in decision making, which meant that everything about the Center 
absolutely depended on its owner. It is a two-edged sword for the future of the Center. In 
serving the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy, any business plans for CIS have to be 
compromised to national teams training plans; meanwhile, GASC’s financial support 
ensures that the condition of the Center remains comfortable. Intensified marketing 
competition and struggling to survive in the market are not concerns for the Center. A 
venue like CIS will never become a “white elephant” as long as the Olympic Gold Medal 
Strategy exists in China and remains as the top priority of Chinese national sport. But, 
what if it is changed some day in the future? Wang expressed concern about a possible 
policy change. If it does change, there will be no financial support from GASC. If the 
Center is no longer responsible for the national teams, it will need considerable structural 
adjustments.353 If that happens, it will be a big transition, not only for organizations like 
the Center, but also for national teams. 
 
3-4. National Olympic Sport Center (NOSC) 
Together with the Olympic Park, the Olympic Forest Park, and the Olympic 
Village in the Olympic Central Area of Beijing, the National Olympic Sport Center 
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(NOSC) became a significant venue complex. It is located at the south end of the Area. 
Unlike the other Olympic venues in the Area that were owned and supervised by 
municipal or district governments, NOSC had been owned and supervised by GASC 
since its establishment in the 1980s. As one of the main competition sites built for the 
1990 Beijing Asian Games, NOSC consisted of seven sports facilities: the NOSC stadium, 
the NOSC gymnasium, the Ying Tung natatorium, the hockey field, the tennis courts, and 
two multifunction training arenas, of which the first three listed above were used as 
Olympic competition venues during the 2008 Beijing Games. For upgrading these three 
sport facilities to meet the Olympic demands, renovating the auxiliary facilities adjacent, 
and beautifying the perimeter environment, CNY 1.3 billion (USD 0.2 billion) from the 
national treasury was invested.354 During the Games, three events of the modern 
pentathlon (event jumping, cross-country running and swimming), handball, and water 
polo competition events were held in NOSC.355    
NOSC is one of the largest training bases in Beijing for Chinese national teams. 
Eleven national teams have been training in NOSC for judo, wrestling, boxing, hockey, 
soccer, tennis, softball, race walking and handball.356 Ensuring national teams training as 
a precondition and priority, NOSC also opens its sport facilities to the public with fees 
applied. Currently NOSC has been operating sports clubs for swimming, taekwondo, 
                                                        
354 Official Website of NOSC, “Introduction of NOSC,” 
http://www.nosc.net.cn/portal/zxzw/zxjs/A090101index_1.htm (accessed March 19, 2012). 
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356 Official Website of NOSC, “Introduction of NOSC,” 
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fitness, and badminton.357 Basically, NOSC’s sport facilities were restored to their 
respective original functions after the Games.358 The three Olympic venues in NOSC 
have not been used by any national teams since 2008, but served the public or have been 
utilized for assembly events. The manager or supervisor of each venue provided the 
researcher with information about the venues. 
 
3-4-1. NOSC Stadium 
Weiguo Zhao, the supervisor of the NOSC Stadium and the general manager of 
the Beijing Olympic Economy and Technology Corp, shared venue information with the 
researcher. The Stadium was originally completed in April 1990 as the main competition 
stadium for the Beijing Asian Games.359 Originally, there were 18,000 seats in the 
Stadium, while the number increased to 36,000 after upgrading in 2007 for the Olympic 
Games.360 As an auxiliary facility, a warm-up track was also built adjacent to the S
at the time; it was transformed to a golf practice field after the Asian Games. Also, the 
function rooms under the spectator stands such as the anti-doping center, the VIP rooms, 
officials and referees’ preparation rooms, have been leased out for commercial 
since the 1990s. The Stadium became one of the training bases in Beijing for the nation
track and field team. Since a GASC training base was NOSC’s main task during the 
1990s, the Stadium had to be ready for the national teams whenever they appeared. When 
they vacated, the Stadium could be rented to schools and companies nearby that did not 
tadium 
purpose 
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have their own facility for holding sports meetings or other kinds of assembly events. 
Furthermore, the Stadium also organized international and national track and field 
competitions such as the University Games, the Chinese City Games, the National Games 
and the Far East South Pacific Games for Disabled (FESPIC Games).361 The Stadium had
even become the home field for a Chinese professional soccer team since 2002; but tw
years later the team left because of its bad performance and a record of few loyal fans in 
the city.
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362 All the activities in the Center ceased in 2006 to make way for the NOSC’s 
Olympic upgrading projects. The projects included upgrading and reconstructing the old
sport facilities and a newly-built athletes’ accommodation center for future national team
consisting of a hotel, catering halls, fitness centers, and an anti-doping testing center. 
the money invested in the projects came from the national treasury and GASC.363 
In terms of NOS
hat NOSC was an organization with a balanced allocation from GASC. This 
meant that GASC only provided NOSC with partial financial aid for its daily operati
All the facilities in NOSC followed this rule. Under this condition, the sport venues in th
Center such as the Stadium, the Natatorium, and the Gymnasium had to develop their 
own business generating revenue to secure their regular operation. With the opportunit
for Olympic upgrading, the Stadium had more physical space under the spectator stands 
that could be exploited for commercial leasing. Those rooms for-lease had nothing to do 
with national teams training in the Stadium, which meant that the leasing business could 
not be influenced by the training schedules of the Stadium. In terms of the operation cost 
 
361 Weiguo Zhao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 26, 2011. 
362 Official Website of Xin Hua News Agency, “Two A League Teams in Beijing, Liao Ning Team Coming 
into NOSC Stadium,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/nsports/2002-01/25/content_253369.htm (accessed March 
20, 2012). 
363 Weiguo Zhao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 26, 2011. 
 
151 
and the depreciation of fixed assets of the Stadium, Zhao stated that budget management 
was applied instead of target management or indicator management. At the end of each 
year, the Stadium needed to submit a budget plan for its estimated revenue and operation
cost for the subsequent year. Based on the plan, GASC would fund the revenue and 
expense budget for the next year in the Stadium. For the revenue part, the Stadium w
try its best to meet its target. For the expense part, it would have to keep its operation 
costs beneath budget. Due to the financial crisis occurring at the end of 2008, and the 
unstable Consumer Price Index (CPI) since then, the Stadium faced difficulties in 
attempting to stay on budget. In general, though, the Stadium has met its budget go
over the last three and a half years.
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To operate the Stadium more ea
registered a company, the Beijing Olympic Economy and Technology Corp, of 
which Zhao was the general manager. The Company managed the Stadium, especially t
business operation linked to the commercial market. The Company, fully supervised by 
NOSC, attended to consultancy, venue construction, and management matters. In additio
an important function of the Company was to operate the Stadium more like a 
corporation rather than a governmental department under the bureaucratic supe
GASC. Experts associated with the Stadium could deliver their two-decade experience on
venue management to other venues. This was one of the value-added businesses of the 
Company. In addition, the Company organized commercial events in the Stadium, lease
commercial space under the spectator stands, and rented the main field to organizations, 
companies, or institutions for their events. However, there were conflicts between the 
Company and NOSC regarding certain marketing activities, because both sides 
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considered them differently in terms of philosophy. After all, the Stadium was tit
the term “national,” which would always be an issue regarding image. Then, too, the 
Company was owned by NOSC. Compromises were always made in favor of NOSC. 
a result, the bottom line was that the Company could only carry out what NOSC allowed. 
Despite the conflicts, according to Zhao, NOSC and GASC attempted to reform the 
administration mode and operation mechanism of its systems, which, perhaps imperf
for the present, was still a significant step in reform.
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Speaking of the impact of the Olympic Games on 
n to the visible upgrades around the Stadium, intangible influences should not be 
ignored. The most valuable attributes the Olympic Games left to the Stadium, according 
to Zhao, were the management experiences the employees obtained through the Games, 
the regulations and the standardized management methods they learned from on-site 
Olympic venue experts, and advanced concepts regarding sport facility operation. Tho
were invaluable Olympic legacies for the Stadium as well as NOSC. Employee 
qualifications for positions in the venue improved significantly after the Games,
translating into higher quality client service, venue maintenance, and project man
This further translated into more business opportunities for the Stadium. However, in 
terms of the direct Olympic impact on the venue’s business, Zhao admitted that it was 
slight. Potential clients would not engage the Stadium to hold their sports meetings or 
commercial events merely because this was an Olympic venue. When making a decisio
to rent, rates, proximity, accessibility, scale and function, loyal corporation relationship, 
and venue history, were factors considered by clients more than simply Olympic 
reputation. In contrast, the Company’s consultancy business was influenced by Ol
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reputation, which was positive in developing potential clients who would put more trust 
in a venue management consultant with demonstrated Olympic venue management 
experience.366 
In terms of future development, Zhao stated that a flexible rent rate policy was a 
strength
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 of the Stadium. Although there were 36,000 seats in the Stadium, the Company 
had staged sports meetings with attendees ranging between 800 and 10,000. Rental rates 
depended on the size of the event. For instance, for a sports meeting with 2,000 
individuals, the rent for the Stadium was CNY 40,000 to 50,000 (USD 6154 to 7
contrast, for an event in the Bird’s Nest with 50,000 individuals, the rent could reach 
more than CNY 1 million (USD 0.15 million). Therefore, the NOSC Stadium appealed
client groups originally contemplating the Bird’s Nest. Meanwhile, to reduce cost, the 
Stadium did not plan any renovations and upgrade work for several years. The Olympic
upgrades before the Games resulted in a solid basis for the Stadium.367  
The potential threat to future development of the venue still lay in
strative structure of GASC. The management mode of the Stadium cann
changed as long as its supervision department remained in the original administrative
mode, which constrained future development of the venue. But Zhao also pointed out t
applying a commercialized operation mode might be a highly possible trend dictated by 
intensified competition in the market. After the Olympic Games, the number of large 
scale sport venues increased, especially around both the Olympic Central Area and the
University Area in the city. As a result, competition among such venues accelerated. 
Potential clients of these venues also increased with Beijing’s economy booming and
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expansion of the culture industry initiated by the government. This intensified 
competition in the market place after the Games. To dominate the market and k
sustainable development of the venues, NOSC had to transform its administrative sy
towards a marketing-oriented mode, including allocation systems, decision making 
mechanisms and incentive systems. Making this move was the only way to keep NO
sport venues in tune with competitive developments in the city.
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3-4-2. NOSC Gymnasium  
T ally built for the 1990 Asian Games, was upgraded 
and ren
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368 However, according to 
Bo Chu, the supervisor of NOSC, the Center would remain the major training base for 
Chinese national teams to prepare for the London Games and Olympic Games in the 
future. This remains the top priority for NOSC’s future development.369 Based on this
statement, it seems that the conflict between NOSC’s political stance, and the Stadium’s 
necessary marketing initiative, will continue to exist in the future. 
 
he NOSC Gymnasium, origin
ovated for the 2008 Olympic Games, together with the Stadium and the 
Natatorium in NOSC. Because it was a relatively old building, almost everythin
to the venue was upgraded in 2007 except its main structure.370 The expansion 
construction projects included interior decoration of the entire venue, updating al
equipment, warm-up court construction, and grandstand seat installation.371 After t
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.nosc.net.cn/portal/zxzw/xxfb/webinfo/2012/02/1328840649195555.htmhttp://www  (accessed March 20, 
cial Website of Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Municipal 
2012). 
370 Weidong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
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Construction Items of 2007: The NOSC Gymnasium,” 
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/tzgl/zdjs/2007_zdxm/07zdxm/07zd_ay/200706/t180331.htm (accessed Ma
2012). 
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upgrade, the Gymnasium could seat 6,400 spectators for handball competitions and Wu 
Shu (Chinese Martial Arts) demonstration events during the 2008 Olympic Games. The 
Gymnasium also served as a training site during the Paralympics.372 The Gymnasium w
restored to its original functions after the Games, that is, opening the warm-up court to 
the public as a recreation site, leasing rooms for commercial purposes, and holding 
various assembly events in the main competition hall. 
as 
would then be reported to GASC. GASC then paid the bill. Thus, the profit of the venue 
                                           
Weidong Li, the supervisor of the Gymnasium, provided the researcher with 
information on the venue. In terms of financial aid, since 1990, the Gymnasium had 
gradually changed from being fully supported by GASC to being only partially funded. 
This meant that the venue needed to generate revenue on its own. As a result, the 
Gymnasium has been earning revenue for NOSC since the 1990s. The revenue demands 
of NOSC have increased over the last two decades. In the middle of the 1990s, for 
instance, the revenue the Gymnasium turned over to NOSC was less than CNY 1 million 
(USD 0.15 million). In 2011, the revenue target NOSC set for the Gymnasium was CNY 
14 million (USD 2.15 million). This figure was CNY 3 million (USD 0.46 million) higher 
than the revenue the Gymnasium actually earned in 2010. Also in 2011, the expense 
budget for the Gymnasium was CNY 5.52 million (USD 0.85 million), a large proportion 
of which was energy cost, daily maintenance, and human resources expense. It did not 
include major equipment repair or update. Any one-time maintenance or purchase 
expense of more than CNY 50,000 (USD 7,962) must be reported to the Center, which 
             
372 Official Website of NOSC, “Introduction of the Gymnasium,” 
http://www.nosc.net.cn/portal/cgjs/tyg/webinfo/2008/11/1227835132317607.htm (accessed March 21, 
2012); Official Website of BOCOG, “Expansion Project Results in a More Spacious Olympic Sports Center 
Gymnasium,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/osg/headlines/n214156187.shtml (accessed March 
21, 2012). 
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for the year could reach CNY 8.5 million (USD 1.3 million) in 2011. Of the revenue, one
half came from the venue’s commercial space leasing, while the other half came from 
renting the main hall and the warm-up court for public recreation purposes, performanc
shows, and commercial events.
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373  
The Gymnasium’s 2,800-squa
 major sources for generating revenue. Since the Gymnasium was one of the two 
venues in NOSC (the other one being the Ying Tung Natatorium) that was not used as a 
national team training site, the venue could be opened to the public on a daily basis. The 
Gymnasium was the first public badminton ground opened in Beijing. The average 
annual use of the badminton courts reached 100,000 individuals. After the Games, th
wood flooring was upgraded and the interior decoration was updated. This attracted mo
users to the venue. However, given such factors as proximity, rental rate, and an 
increasing number of competitor venues, revenue from this type of business was 
static for each year. The venue also operated a badminton club and organized badminton 
competitions every year. Although enlisting a few sponsors with relatively small amount 
of revenue return, according to Li, hosting such competitions was not for generating 
revenue per se, but rather for providing badminton enthusiasts with opportunities to m
each other and improve skills. The club had professional coaches who paid fees to the 
venue in order to be permitted to teach in the club. The venue was responsible for 
advertising for the coaches. The Gymnasium had not organized large scale competi
for years. Original organizing costs were quite high; few spectators were attracted. It was
a trend in China that many national level sport competitions not be held in Beijing 
because of complicated censor and sanction procedures. Smaller cities offered relat
 
373 Weidong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
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better support. And, there were other venues in Beijing, especially after the Games, where
conditions such as lighting, quality of flooring, and auxiliary facilities, were more 
suitable for badminton matches than the NOSC Gymnasium. These factors relegate
second choice for holding high level, large scale competitions.
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374  
The other major way the Gymnasium generated revenue was
r performance shows and commercial events. At times, the frequency of event
could reach five times in one month. The events included pop concerts, ceremonies, and
anniversary celebrations. The size of the venue dictated the target group in the market. 
Venues like CIS and NIS that contained around 18,000 seats were not particular 
competitors of the NOSC Gymnasium. According to Li, the Gymnasium focused
events having around 4,000 attendees. Thus, the Gymnasium’ major competitor venues in
Beijing were those located on university campuses. The good news was that university 
venues usually did not hold commercial events and performance shows, thus eliminating
NOSC Gymnasium competitors. Obviously, this positioning made the NOSC 
Gymnasium accrue a relatively good market share regarding show business in 
However, Li also mentioned that there was a strong potential competitor, the Workers’ 
Gymnasium, which had changed its name to the “Workers’ Stadium Theater” and reduc
its capacity to 3,000 seats.375 By adding the term “theater” in its title, it significantly 
reduced organizing cost, which would certainly impact on the NOSC Gymnasium in t
market.376  
In term
 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid. 
376 For the detailed reason for why reducing the organizing cost, please see the section of the Beijing Gong 
Ti Sport Center.  
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 Gymnasium was rented to a TV station for filming some of their programs. 
However, since the TV station built its own programming hall, the business complete
disappeared. The venue also attempted but failed to develop venue sponsors. The 
exposure rate of the venue was relatively low and the investment return was uncer
According to Li, the badminton players per year reached a total of 100,000; and the tota
attendees for commercial events per year reached 120,000. Obviously, the grand total of 
220,000 could not satisfy potential sponsors who eventually were unconvinced to invest 
money in the venue. After the Games the NOSC Gymnasium attempted to sell the 
naming rights but this initiative was terminated by the global financial crisis in 200
Recently, according to Li, the Center once again approached the naming rights issue. L
admitted that it was a difficult issue. The price looked awkward. According to Li, CNY 4
to 5 million (USD 0.62 to 0.77 million) per year was the lowest figure the Center would 
accept, which, however, was always considered too high by potential buyers. Moreover, 
the deal only involved the naming rights sale. Management and operation rights to the 
venue would not be part of the deal.377 
After the Games, according to L
 operation and management, except for updated equipment and new furniture lef
behind, which might indirectly increase the leasing rate for the commercial space under 
the spectator stands. Li also mentioned that the Olympic Games did not bring any new or
potential opportunities to the venue. When choosing their event location, potential clients 
would consider more realistic factors than “Olympic mystique,” such as traffic conditions,
parking, and capacity. Though NOSC had a long tradition regarding the Olympics since 
the 1990s, according to Li, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games did not enhance the image 
 
377 Weidong Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
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of the venue. In other words, the reputation of the NOSC Gymnasium had nothing to do 
with the 2008 Olympic Games. As the supervisor of the venue, Li paid more attention to 
develop the facility’s business network in the market and to improve the venue’s quality 
of service to attract clients. He cared little about the Olympic image of the venue.378  
As in the case of the NOSC Stadium, Li pointed out that the conflict between 
NOSC  of 
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T  was originally built in 1990 from a donation by 
the Ho
                                                       
/GASC’s administrative systems and the marketing-oriented management mode
the venue would be a threat for the venue’s future development. For instance, according 
to Li, if NOSC set the revenue goal for the Gymnasium, then it should allow the venue to
achieve the goal by any means as long as the activities were legal. But this was not the 
case. The Center limited venue behavior and controlled decision making in terms of 
financial matters, employment policy, and incentive mechanisms for employees. How
Li admitted that the situation also had a positive side for operating the venue. For 
instance, being a non-profit organization, certain tax exemption policies for the ven
were in place, which significantly reduced operation costs for the venue. In addition, 
GASC was responsible for any major equipment purchase and maintenance. Li conclu
that the current administrative system was a two-edged sword: the Center could retard the 
venue’s development and it could also protect the venue from being trapped into any 
awkward financial situations.   
 
he Ying Tung Natatorium (YTN)
ng Kong entrepreneur, Ying Tung Huo. YTN was named after him. In 2007, 
selected as a competition venue for the Olympic Games, YTN was upgraded and 
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renovated. During the Games, the venue was used for water polo and the modern 
pentathlon (swimming) competitions. After the Games, YTN was restored to its fu
before the Games, serving as a public swimming center and providing commercial space. 
Jian Yue, the supervisor of the Natatorium, and his deputy, Chen, greeted the 
nctions 
researc
NY 
, 
 
, 
e 
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s 
N management and 
operati 94. The 
                                                       
her and jointly shared information regarding the venue. Following the 1990 
Beijing Asian Games, YTN was opened for visitors with an entrance admission of C
2.379 However, in one and a half years the number of visitors dramatically declined. Thus
NOSC decided to open YTN as a public swimming center. It was soon realized that the 
operation cost was too high to be borne solely by NOSC. NOSC simply could not afford
such huge expense. It was opened only during the summer; otherwise few swimmers 
came due to weather conditions. Further, its high admission rate deterred many. 
Especially in the winter time, there were almost no swimmers in the pool. NOSC
however, had to pay the same operation cost to maintain the regular condition of th
venue. According to Chen, between 1992 and 1994, the underuse situation led to 
operation costs much greater than the revenue YTN could generate. In addition, d
lack of a post-Games plan for the venue in the 1980s to meet the demand for post-Game
regular use, NOSC would have had to reconstruct the venue. However, neither GASC nor 
NOSC could afford the investment for a re-build project.380 
Given this state of affairs, NOSC decided to grant YT
on rights to the Beijing New Auto Group for 12.5 years, starting in June 19
New Auto Group invested a total of CNY 21 million (USD 3.23 million) in YTN, 
including re-construction, exploring new business ventures inside the venue, and 
 
379 Jian Yue, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. CNY 2 at the time was roughly equivalent to a 
quarter in CDN$. 
380 Ibid. 
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implementing its own marketing promotion. Based on the agreement signed betwe
New Auto Group and NOSC, for the first year the New Auto Group paid NOSC CNY 1.5 
million (USD 0.23 million), and for the next 11 years, the payment increased 10% every 
year.
en the 
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ho 
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ment 
 
t 
the cooperation between the New Auto Group and NOSC, Yue stated 
                                                       
381 Basically, NOSC did not interfere with the management and the operation of 
YTN, being satisfied with the New Auto Group’s contracted payment every year. As a 
condition in the agreement, 15 days each year were set aside for NOSC’s free use of YT
to organize international/national swimming competitions. Since YTN was operated 
independently from NOSC, the salary of YTN’s employees was different from those w
worked in other venues controlled by NOSC. Over the first two years, the average salary 
level in YTN was higher. But gradually the other venues’ salary levels exceeded YTN’s. 
This led to complaints from YTN’s employees, who felt they should be treated at the 
same level as others. NOSC attempted to negotiate with the New Auto Group on the i
however, the latter resisted increasing salary levels in order to minimize its costs. Thus, 
NOSC had to offer extra salary to balance the difference between the two groups of 
employees. Despite the controversies in NOSC, as well as GASC, regarding manage
and operation rights granted to a private company, the cooperation between both parties 
functioned well until 2005. The agreement terminated in 2005 because YTN was selected
to be an Olympic competition venue for the 2008 Games. The Olympic Games in China 
were always considered a national mission that had top priority. As a result, the New 
Auto Group had to vacate the venue as well as its ongoing business before the contrac
was completed.382 
In terms of 
 
381 Chen, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
382 Chen, and Jian Yue, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011.  
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antages outweighed disadvantages. Through their cooperation, NOSC learned 
practical management experiences from the New Auto Group, gained revenue from the
venue, and developed a number of prospective venue management experts for future 
operation of YTN after the 2008 Olympic Games. Thus, at the very beginning of 
renovation planning for the Olympics, NOSC, based on the experience derived fro
previous operation, focused on post-Games utilization. With post-Games operation a 
priority, the expansion plan for YTN focused on increasing functional space for future
commercial business purposes. The sport facility areas such as the pool and auxiliary 
space needed little work to redesign.383 For instance, if a catering area was planned for
future use, then the design would be function-oriented for catering-suitable purposes.384  
As early as 2007 a hotel management company contacted NOSC in an effort to 
rt of the commercial space in YTN to operate its own business. An “agreement o
intent” for cooperation was signed by both sides before the Olympic Games. Right after 
the Games, both sides signed a formal contract. The Company would be responsible for 
the re-construction of the swimming pool as well as auxiliary facilities and, of course, the
construction of its own hotel inside the venue. As a result, the YTN swimming center was 
re-opened in May 2009. Later, in July 2010, Beijing No.1 International Mansion was 
opened inside the venue. The business of “Beijing No.1” included a classic restaurant, a 
high-end pub, and entertainment shows. As to the rental payment, the Company has paid 
more than CNY 7 million (1.1 million) per year to NOSC since 2010. According to Yue, 
the yearly revenue goal NOSC set for YTN for 2011 was CNY 18.5 million (USD 2.85 
million), while the yearly expense budget was around CNY 11 million (USD 1.7 million
 
383 Jian Yue, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
384 Chen, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
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As a result, YTN had to turn in around CNY 7.5 million (USD 1.15) as the venue’s 
surplus to NOSC at the end of 2011. Like the Stadium and the Gymnasium, YTN’s m
equipment updates and maintenance costs were not included in the expense budget. For 
instance, its water cycling system needed inspection and overhaul every other year, whic
could cost up to CNY 2 million (USD 0.31 million). This was provided by GASC’s 
special support funds.
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385  
YTN’s projected rev
y CNY 7 million (USD 1.1 million) from “Beijing No.1,” and CNY 11.5 m
(USD 1.77 million) from other business in the venue. Since Beijing No.1 occupied more 
than half of the commercial space in the venue, there was little reserved space left for 
exploiting other business ventures. Yue planned to add some new sports such as billiar
and Ping Pong within the limited space. YTN also leases rooms for other business, such 
as swimming clubs, clothing stores, and aquatic performance shows. It rents the pool for 
small-to-medium scale swimming competitions. The major part of the revenue source 
remained the swimming pool for public use on a daily basis, which would generate fixe
revenue of about CNY 10 million (USD 1.54 million) per year. Therefore, according to 
Yue, basically, YTN has accomplished its revenue goal for each year after the Olympic 
Games.386  
Simila
 Olympic impact on YTN’s post-Games operation was minor. The Olympic 
Games in China might influence people’s concepts regarding a positive correlation 
between healthy life style and sports participation, which correspondingly might ma
 
385 Chen, and Jian Yue, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 23, 2011. 
386 Ibid. 
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more people participate in physical activity on a daily basis, but there was no solid 
statistical data that could prove a direct cause and effect correlation existed between
Olympic Games and the condition of a venue’s sport-related business after the Games. 
The fact was that YTN consistently emphasized the enhancement of the public service 
quality of the venue in attracting potential clients. Moreover, in terms of YTN’s 
marketing promotions and advertisements, the Olympic image was seldom used 
selling point to enhance the venue’s brand. Thus, there was no direct relationship betw
YTN’s business and Olympic impact.  
The employment policy of the C
 the 
as a 
een 
enter, according to Yue, was a weakness that 
could t
ation 
or 
 
hreaten the development of the venue. The conflict of employment policies 
between government and corporations led to differences in salary and benefits alloc
for employees in the venue. This caused issues on incentive policy that the venue itself 
could not solve without permission from superior authority. Another problematic issue f
future concern was the conflict between the venue’s sports competition events and other 
functions. Specifically, it meant that the 6,000 seats around the venue occupied too much
space and incurred a significant amount of energy and maintenance cost on a daily basis. 
As a venue without a mission for training national teams and staging major competitions, 
the necessity of reserving such a large number of seats should be questioned. This issue 
could not be solved by YTN itself. Despite all, speaking of future development of YTN, 
Yue did not think that significant changes regarding the administrative system of NOSC 
as well as GASC would occur in the near future. The system was quite complicated and 
there would be too many departments and divisions involved throughout multi-layers of 
government. And, this would not merely apply in sport-related fields. The conundrum is 
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too big to be solved in the short term. Therefore, maintaining the current administrative 
system and operation mode is more realistic and feasible for most of the GASC-owned 
Olympic venues.387 
 
4. University-Owned Venues 
petition venues built on university campuses in 
Beijing es. 
of the 
ues on 
as 
 
h 
                                                       
There were six Olympic com
. They formed 20% of the total number of the competition venues for the Gam
Moreover, there were another nineteen training facilities for the Games located on 
university campuses. Building Olympic venues on campus, according to an official 
Ministry of Education, was a win-win strategy for Olympic host cities. On one hand, the 
city and the OCOG saved a great amount of construction expense as well as costs 
incurred for removal of local residents. On the other hand, after the Games, the ven
campus could be fully utilized by both university students and local communities.388 
Thus, the Olympic Movement should be regarded as a support to education in China. 
Also, the association between Olympic culture and campus culture in China was seen 
ideal.389 The government had already been aware before the Games that locating sport 
venues on campuses was a practical solution for facility post-Games use. However, Jian
Chen, the director of the Beijing Olympic Economy Research Association, stated that 
Beijing’s Olympic venues built on campus, though valuable, were not numerous enoug
to solve the issue of post-Games utilization of Olympic venues.390  
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Of the six competition venues, four were newly-built, respectively, at Peking 
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sity, China Agriculture University, Beijing University of Science and Technolo
and Beijing University of Technology. According to BOCOG, the other two were 
pre-existing facilities, which were located at Beihang University and Beijing Instit
Technology. According to Shiwei Shao, an official of GASC, in general, Olympic venues
on campuses in Beijing were well used by both students and local communities after the 
Games.391 Based on the researcher’s investigation, different conditions existed among 
those venues over the last three and a half years. 
 
The Peking University (PKU) Gym
sium, named after the banker, Khoo Teck Puat, the donor of a major amount of 
money to build the venue, was located on the campus of Peking University. The 
Gymnasium held the table tennis competitions during the Beijing Olympic Game
venue was owned by the University and directly supervised by the Department of Sport 
and Physical Education in PKU. After the Games the venue was used as both a sport 
facility and an assembly place on the campus for students and local communities. As a
table tennis venue, the Gymnasium contained a main competition hall with room for eig
competition tables; in addition, it included a natatorium underneath, which was renovated 
after the Games and opened to students in March 2012.392  
Jie Li, the director of the Gymnasium, provided the re
 
391 Shiwei Shao, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 5, 2011. 
392 Official Website of BOCOG, “Peking University Gymnasium Ready,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/pkg/index.shtml (accessed March 27, 2012); Official Website of the Pekin
University Gy
g 
mnasium, “Introduction of the Gymnasium,” http://www.pkugym.com/Overview.aspx 
ical Education Courses,” (accessed March 27, 2012); “Swimming Pool Opened for Phys
http://www.pkugym.com/Newsl.aspx?id=517 (accessed March 27, 2012). 
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 the Games, Li stated 
that bef
venues would be built on campuses in Beijing, PKU thought it would be a great 
enue. Li had been in charge of the venue since the beginning of its construction 
before the Games.393 In September 2008, after the Games were concluded, the Universit
formally appointed Li as the supervisor of the temporary management team for 
post-Games operation of the venue.394 At the time, Li was associate professor an
supervisor of the Department of Sport and Physical Education at PKU. According to Li, 
the venue was not an independent unit in the University. Rather, it was under the 
leadership of the Department of Sport and Physical Education. Li’s management t
was in charge of daily operation and maintenance as well as carrying out certain 
renovation projects. The Department supervised the venue and had priority for ut
of the venue. In general, then, the University, as the owner of the venue, had ultimate 
rights of decision making with respect to the venue’s development. According to Li, th
University originally had a plan set for the venue as an independent unit, but it changed 
in 2011. No reason was announced.395 As to the Gymnasium’s administrative mode, Min
Wang, a physical education teacher in PKU, summarized that of the six Olympic venues 
on university campuses in Beijing, only the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) and the
China Agriculture University (CAU), operated similar to PKU.396 
In terms of location of the venue and its construction before
ore 2008, PKU, as a top ranking university in China, had for years faced a lack of 
large scale sport facilities on campus. When BOCOG announced that some Olympic 
opportunity for the University to solve the sport facility issue. PKU immediately 
                                                        
393 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
394 Official Website of the Peking University Gymnasium, “The Document on the Appointment for the 
PKU Gymnasium,” http://www.pkugym.com/Agencies.aspx (accessed March 28, 2012). 
395 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
396 Min Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 14, 2011. 
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expressed a positive attitude towards BOCOG’s announcement. Originally, PKU appl
for a wrestling competition site. At the same time, CAU applied for and received
for the Olympic table tennis competition facility. Later, considering that table tenn
regarded as the national sport in China, and because it was much more popular than 
wrestling, PKU attempted to negotiate with relevant governmental departments in order 
to swap with CAU. Another reason for the idea of exchanging was that PKU operated a 
professional table tennis club. Finally, PKU was approved to be the venue owner for 
Olympic table tennis competitions in 2008, while CAU became the owner of the Olympi
wrestling arena.
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Foundation, a portion of the balance came from a special fund of the Ministry of 
                                                       
397  
As to the investment, PKU originally attempted but failed to attract donations 
from private enterprises. To obtain this, PKU initiated a marketing campaign attempting 
to attract 10,000 enterprises with a price tag of 
 unsuccessful, but several million CNY was generated.398 In November 2006, th
Khoo Teck Puat Foundation donated CNY 173.3 million (USD 26.7 million) to the 
Peking University Education Foundation to support the University’s development. Of t
total amount of the donation, CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) was used for the 
construction of the new Olympic Table Tennis venue.399 One of the conditions for th
donation was that the new venue would be named the “Khoo Teck Puat Gymnasium.”400 
According to Li, the total investment in the venue was CNY 250 million (USD 38.5
million). In addition to CNY 150 million (USD 23 million) from the Khoo Teck Puat 
 
397 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
 Website of Peking University Education Foundation, “Khoo Teck Puat Foundation Donated 
398 Ibid. 
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CNY 173 Million for Constructing New Olympic Venue in PKU,” 
http://www.pkuef.org/newdetail2.php?id=518 (accessed March 28, 
400 Ibid. 
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Education of China. The final amount needed came from a number of minor donations 
and the “PKU Funds.”401 
After the Games, embracing more than 7,700 seats, the venue was mainly used
a public gathering place for activities such as sports competitions, campus culture
organizations’ meetings, commercial events and political campaign gatherings. Accordin
to Li, there were 70 indivi
 as 
 events, 
g 
dual activities held in the venue during the last three years 
(2009-2
instance, 
ring the 
 
 
                                                       
011).402 According to the official website of the venue, thirty-one major activities 
were held in the venue between September 2008 and March 2011.403 In 2009, the Law 
School in PKU was expanded and renovated. The University decided that six 
departments of the Law School were to move into the PKU Gymnasium as their 
temporary office location. As a result, a number of function rooms under the spectator 
stands were used as faculty offices for more than one year. According to Li, this change 
influenced the utilization of the venue, especially for sport-related events. For 
during the “Law School” tenancy the venue could not host sports competitions du
working hours. As a result, the main hall was merely opened to the public for playing 
badminton. A user fee was applied. In addition, students could not use the venue for gym
classes, except for the Yoga classes. Li did not comment on this but pointed out that the 
venue was supposed to meet the needs of physical education as well as the needs of 
student athletes training on campus.404  
In terms of the venue’s operation costs incurred, basically the University covered 
most of the expenses over the last three years. The University offered rooms in the venue
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l Website of the Peking University Gymnasium, “Major Events Held in the Venue,” 
401 Jie Li, 
402 Ibid. 
403 Officia
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to other departments on campus, which led to the venue not being open regularly. Lit
revenue was generated. Under such a situ
tle 
ation, the University did not set a budget for the 
venue d
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s on university campuses following the Games. The project 
uring the last three years. The University paid for the expense balance. The venue 
has not paid for the energy expense for three years. According to Li, every time the bill 
arrived, the venue wrote a report to the University regarding the difficulties the venue 
faced, such as it being used as faculty offices. It applied for an exemption from paying 
the bill. Such applications have been approved. Li also pointed out that all venues on 
campus used various ways for reducing operation expenses, such as turning off air 
conditioning during summer time and minimally decreasing employees.405  
Quite simply, there was no direct correlation between expenses and revenues for
the PKU Gymnasium. The reason for this was due to the venue’s irregular operation a
the Games. According to Li, the University was not able to calculate the expense an
revenue on a regular basis, a basis that might guide the University towards set
or revenue goal for the venue. In addition, Li also stated that the University had 
never anticipated revenue from the venue; it wanted the venue to serve the University and 
its students.406 No matter what the reasons, the fact is that for the last three years Li an
his management team have not paid much attention towards generating revenue or 
reducing operation expense. 
What the management team actually focused on was the expansion project for the 
venue. It started in the summer of 2010 and was completed at the beginning of 2012. The
expansion and renovation project of the venue, according to Li, was the biggest one
among the six Olympic venue
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d the venue’s reconstruction for functional change and structural adjustment. After 
the project was completed, eighteen new sports were added to the venue’s capacity, such 
as swimming, squash, fencing, taekwondo, billiards, dancing, fitness, volleyball, and
basketball. The new swimming pool in the venue was reserved but not used until the 
project was completed. PKU used to have a small pool (25 meters long) for years. The 
new pool was built 50 meters long with 8 lanes. There were also multifunction 
conference rooms and newly renovated offices for the Department of Sport and Physic
Education. After the renovation, there was a service area built, including an informatio
desk, a coffee shop, a convenience store and a rest area for guests.407 In addition, a fitne
consultancy center was established in the venue - clients and members’ fitness a
information could be collected and analyzed by relevant experts, followed up by 
recommended solutions.408 
The finance for all these expansion projects, more than CNY 10 million (USD
1.54 million), was covered by the University. According to Li, the core task after the 
expansion was to serve students, which was the University’s top priority for all sport 
facilities on the campus. Tha
 the venue’s management team to generate revenue. Although students paid for 
using the venue, the rate level was exceedingly low, compared to the rate for the 
University’s employees, which was medium, and the rate for the public, which was hi
For instance, the hourly rate for playing badminton was CNY 30-40 (USD 4.6 to 6.2
students; the regular rate was CNY 60 (USD 9.2). The rate policy, according to Li, 
prioritized students regarding use of the venue. In addition, by applying this rate p
 
407 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation when Li showed him around the 
venue. 
408 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
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the University could control the number of the clients, thereby providing more space and 
time for students. Serving students and generating revenue might conflict with each other,
but based on the University’s principle, the venue would definitely regard serving 
students as its priority in future development. Neither the venue’s management team nor 
the Department of Sport and Physical Education had decision rights with respect to the 
venue’s development direction. Adhering to the University’s policies and 
decision-making was the only choice for the venue. For instance, according to Li, s
2011 the venue had seldom held large assembly events due to safety issues and PKU’s 
sensitivity towards serving students,
 
ince 
ondition of the 
y 
s 
f CAU within the University Area.411 As early as July 2002, CAU advocated that some 
of O ses for the Beijing Olympic 
Games in 
                                                       
409 even though renting space for such activities 
might be a favorable way to generate revenue. Despite the compromising c
venue in terms of decision-making, Li expressed confidence regarding the future of the 
venue. The future will be guaranteed and predictable, because the University would full
support the venue. As the venue is under the complete control and leadership of the 
University, stability should be maintained for a relatively long period into the future.410 
 
4-2. China Agriculture University Gymnasium 
The China Agriculture University (CAU) Gymnasium, where the wrestling 
competition events were held for the 2008 Olympic Games, is located on the east campu
o
lympic venues should be built on university campu
. Three months later, the Chinese Central Government chose six universities 
 
409 For holding large events, the venue had to be closed for several days for preparations, during which 
students could not utilize the venue in any ways. That was obviously not what the University wanted to 
ial Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Wrestling Venue Ready for Competitions,” 
214132980.shtml
happen. 
410 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
411 Offic
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/cag/headlines/n  (accessed March 29, 2012). 
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Beijing to build Olympic venues on their campuses. CAU was one of those chosen.412 
The funding for the venue’s construction came from three entities: the national treasury, 
the Ministry of Education of China, and the University itself. 
Following the 2008 Olympic Games, the CAU Gymnasium hosted only one 
international level sport competition, the Sportaccord Combat Games, in August 2010.413
In terms of student physical education courses, based on the Schedule of Gym Classes for
Students in 2011 Spring Term, which was posted on the officia
 
 
l website of the venue, 
there w
eside 
g 
                                                       
ere four courses held in function rooms inside the venue: table tennis, sport 
dancing, aerobics and Yoga.414 The rooms for education purposes were not open to the 
public. Only students and gym teachers were allowed to enter for classes.415 In addition, 
to attend gym classes held in the venue, students had to show their student ID at the 
entrance.416 A badminton area opened in March 2009, located at the practice court b
the main competition hall. CAU students and employees could play badminton by payin
fees.417 In terms of the main hall in the venue, student culture and art events were held 
there; also, with the University’s permission, it was rented to other organizations for 
holding assembly events. After the Games, more than thirty large culture events were 
staged in the venue.418 Utilizing the former news press room and media center in the 
 
412 Internal Circulated Document in CAU, “A Summary of the Public Introduction of the CAU 
g, “CAU 
10.org/beijing2010/competition/CAU/index.html
Gymnasium,” (March, 2011), p. 1. 
413 Internal Circulated Document in CAU, “A Summary of the Public Introduction of the CAU 
Gymnasium,” (March, 2011), p. 1; Official Website of Sport Accord Combat Games 2010 Beijin
Gymnasium,” http://www.beijing20  (accessed March 29, 
2012). 
414 Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium, “Download Center,” 
http://tyg.cau.edu.cn/tyg_clt/news/user/title.do?typeid=9 (accessed March 29, 2012). 
415 Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium, “CAU Sport Venue Regulation for 
Educational Management,” http://tyg.cau.edu.cn/tyg_clt/news/3/43.html (accessed Marc
416 Ibid. 
h 29, 2012). 
417 Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium, “Regulations for CAU Badminton 
Court,” http://tyg.cau.edu.cn/tyg_clt/news/3/110.html (accessed March 29, 2012). 
418 Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium, “Introduction of CAU Gymnasium,” 
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venue, vacant after the Games, the University opened a culture and art gallery in June 
2009. The gallery has staged nineteen art exhibitions since then, including calligraphy
painting, and crafts shows. Also, some famous artists were invited to deliver public 
lectures to students and enthusiasts in the gallery.
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Olympic project. The rest of the money was generated by the University in the form of 
     
419  
Chengsong He, a staffer in the general office at the Gymnasium management 
center in CAU, provided the researcher with relevant information on the venue. In term
of its administrative mode, He stated that previously the venue was an independent u
in the University, named the CAU Gymnasium Manage
ent of Sport and Physical Education. In June 2011, the supervisor of the Cent
was appointed by the University to be the director of the Department of Sport and 
Physical Education. As a result, both the Department and the Center were supervised by 
the same person. Although the two units were not merged officially, the supervisor 
effected smooth cooperation between the two.420 
The CAU Gymnasium was mainly funded and owned by the University. As
as 2002, Zhangliang Chen, former president of CAU, first proposed the idea regarding 
building Olympic venues on campuses, an idea that would insure that Olympic facil
be well utilized after the Games. At the end of 200
ities to build an Olympic venue on its campus. The total investment in the 
construction was CNY 158 million (USD 24.3 million), of which CNY 20 million (USD
3.1 million) came from the national treasury as a special fund for China’s general 
                                                                                                                                                                
http://tyg.cau.edu.cn/tyg_clt/news/99/8.html (accessed March 29, 2012). 
419 Internal Circulated Document in CAU, “A Summary of the Public Introduction of the CAU 
Gymnasium,” (March, 2011), p. 3. 
420 Chengsong He, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011 
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education loans, charities, and donations from the University’s employees. For instan
the University initiated a campaign on the campus encouraging staffers, faculty me
students, and alumni to “donate a seat” for the new venue. According to He, CAU was 
not as “rich” as certain universities, such as PKU; thus, CAU had to find its own m
to collect money for the venue. Consequently, under such a financial situation, the 
internal decoration of the venue was not as “luxurious” as certain others, especially those
located in the Olympic Park. For instance, before the re-decoration of the venue in 2011, 
the floor of the main court had been made of concrete (see the picture in Appendix Q) 
and the entrance gates to the spectator stands were made of wood without elaboration. In
addition, a swimming pool was originally built beside the main competition hall. 
However, due to a lack of funds, after the Games the pool was filled and some temporary 
rooms were built in its place for non sport-related use.
ce, 
mbers, 
eans 
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 all Olympic venues on 
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421 
According to He, the University once embraced plans for post-Games utilizatio
of the venue. In addition to the swimming pool that was supposed to be renovated, an 
indoor basketball court was to be transformed to an indoor track. In terms of the o
warm-up area, it was planned to establish a physiological and aerobic testing center for 
students. Moreover, as the largest competition hall among
ity campuses in Beijing, CAU planned to rebuild it in such a way as to be an 
interchangeable gymnasium/skating rink for students. There were also plans for functio
rooms around the main hall, and a fitness and weight lifting room. However, none of 
theses plans have been carried out yet, three and a half years after the Games. According
to He, the lack of financial aid is the major reason for the situation.422   
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The Center did make some modifications regarding the functions of the venue. At 
one time, there was a badminton playing area with seven badminton courts. These wer
available to students and employees of the University. According to He, the Center 
decided to change this area to a table tennis area and relocate the badminto
e 
n area to the 
main co
s, 
r 
er 
s 
 
n 
 
 construction cost, the University simply used original concrete 
flooring  
                                       
urt of the venue. This required changing the flooring of the main court. The 
flooring change was completed at the end of 2011. In terms of the function rooms, the 
Center assigned them to various student groups, such as yoga groups, musical group
drawing groups, and poetry groups. Students could use these rooms for their activities fo
free; but they had to apply in advance and wait until the Center’s approval. The Cent
did not use function rooms where ventilation conditions were poor, because if the room
were used, then air conditioning had to be turned on, which increased energy expenses.
Thus, many activities and gym classes were usually held in the open space of the venue 
such as the main court (before the flooring change) and areas along hallways. In additio
to serving students, the University also attempted to rent the newly renovated main court 
to potential clients for generating revenue, a vital exercise in terms of financially raising
the venue itself.423  
The project of flooring change cost almost CNY 4 million (USD 0.62 million), 
which was paid by the University. Because during the 2008 Games the CAU Gymnasium 
was the site for the wrestling competitions, a special cushioned floor was needed. At the 
time, to minimize the
 instead of wood covered by carpet, over which the cushioned floor surface was
placed. However, for the flooring change three and a half years after the Games, the work 
                 
423 Ibid. To compare the change of the floor of the main court of the CAU Gymnasium, please see 
Appendix Q. 
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was complicated because first the concrete flooring had to be completely removed from 
the venue and then the entire main court area had to be waterproofed before new floor
was installed. According to He, the University paid the bill for this construction expecting
to recoup its investment by utilizing the facility to generate revenue. It is highly possible 
that the newly renovated main court will not be opened to students for physical education
purposes in the future; instead, it might be opened to the public for recreation activities 
with a fee applied, such as badminton, basketball and indoor soccer, or rented to 
commercial clients for holding large assembly events.
ing 
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venue and at the same time to 
minimi
and 
 
 
                                                       
424  
The Center did not have a revenue goal set by the University, which was the same 
circumstance as the PKU Gymnasium. There was no direct correlation between the 
revenue the Center made and the costs incurred. However, the Center, as an indep
unit in the University, had to find its own way to generate re
ze expenses. In terms of revenue, the major portion came from renting the main 
court for large events, such as culture events of the Ministry of Agriculture of China 
celebration events of other organizations. In general, the rental fee was around CNY 
80,000 (USD 12,308) per day; some large events would take several days. The frequency 
of events in the venue is hard to determine, because it was quite irregular throughout a 
year’s period. No matter how much the Center earned, all the revenue was returned to the
University. The University would then allocate a certain amount of money on a yearly
basis to the Center to compensate for the venue’s expenses. According to He, the 
University’s allocation never fully covered all the costs incurred in the Center. The 
University had certain policies, such as partial exemption of energy costs for the Center, 
which helped offset the deficit. According to He, the main court usually utilized natural 
 
424 Ibid. 
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light rather than electric lights. Moreover, the venue’s sunroof was usually closed 
reduce dust penetrating from outside. Otherwise, cleaning up the entire main hall wo
be too huge to be completed by the five cleaning workers in the Center.
to 
uld 
 
comme , 
egarding the 
t 
 own revenue if the current operation status 
continu
ificant 
                                                       
425 
In terms of other activities staged in the venue, none generated revenue for the 
Center. The Center provided the students and staffers in the University with function 
rooms for free. In addition, a culture and art gallery was established in 2009. This is open
to the public for free. The University was reluctant to make the gallery too 
rcialized; thus, the activities held in the gallery are not revenue involved; namely
organizers do not need to pay for holding events there. Neither do visitors pay to see 
exhibitions in the gallery. There is no employee in the Center specifically responsible for 
market exploitation of the gallery. There is no demand from the University r
development of the gallery.426  
As to future development, the Center will try to maximize its revenue so that i
can fund itself without the University’s financial support. In addition, potentially, major 
maintenance will be needed next year, five years after the 2008 Games. This will be 
difficult to be fully covered by its
es.427 However, the ultimate decision for the future of the venue in terms of its 
management mechanism and operational mode will be made by the University. As long 
as the University does not take a step towards changing, the venue will be forced to 
maintain the current condition. It will be virtually impossible to make any sign
progress in this area by its own efforts. 
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4-3. Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium  
The Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) Gymnasium was used as a competiti
site for the 2008 Olympic volleyball eve
on 
nts and the goalball competitions of the Summer 
aralympics.428 The venue, originally named the BIT Sport and Culture Center, broke 
grou 429 In 2005, BOCOG 
queried
 
ter the 
bly 
ysical 
 
P
nd in September 2003 and was completed in September 2006.
 BIT whether its newly-built venue could be utilized as an Olympic competition 
site. BIT responded positively.430 In April 2007, the reconstruction of the venue 
specifically for the Olympics began. A temporary indoor warm-up arena was also built 
directly beside the venue.431 Although the BIT Gymnasium was not originally planned 
for the Olympics, before the venue had been completed, it had already been approved as 
one of the Olympic venues in the City. Moreover, after completion of the original
construction in 2006, the venue was unused by the University before the Olympic 
reconstruction started in April 2007. Thus, the BIT Gymnasium actually might be 
considered a newly-built Olympic venue, in spite of the original motive for building the 
sport facility on campus. Vice president Xianrui Zhao of BIT stated in 2007 that, af
Games, the Gymnasium would be the University’s main sports, cultural, and assem
center.432 According to Zhao, the venue would be used for the University’s daily ph
education courses. In addition, cultural and art activities and other assembly events of the
University would be held there.433 
                                                        
428 Official Website of People’s Daily, “An Overview of Olympic Venues in Beijing: The BIT 
Gymnasium,” http://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22180/22196/96613/7479586.html (accessed April 1, 2012). 
429 Official Website of CCTV Sport Channel, “ A Perfect Olympic Project: BIT Gymnasium’s Three 
Concepts,” http://space.tv.cctv.com/article/ARTI1215409762425831 (accessed April 1, 2012). 
430 Qi Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Official Website of BOCOG, “BIT Gymnasium has a Bright Future after the Games,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/tig/headlines/tig/s214151314/n214152998.shtml (April 1, 2012). 
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the history of the venue, since BIT had not owned a 
multifu
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for the first time. For the Olympic Games, according to Han, the venue was new, which 
                                       
nctional sports facility on campus for years, the University decided to build a 
large scale gymnasium at the beginning of the new century. At the time the 2008 Olympic
Games had not yet been awarded to Beijing. The funding for the venue was completely 
from the University rather than the national treasury, the Ministry of Education of Chi
or BOCOG. When learning that some Olympic venues would be built on university 
campuses, BIT considered that a title such as “Olympic venue” was a kind of intangible 
capital, one that might enhance the image of the new gymnasium as well as the 
University. However, the University missed the deadline for requesting financial sup
from the government for Olympic construction projects.434  
In addition to funding the venue’s original construction, completed in 20
University also paid most of the costs for Olympic-related reconstruction to the venue in 
2007. At the time, according to BOCOG’s demand, a tempora
t beside the main venue. Moreover, some function rooms in the venue were built 
specifically for the Games. Within the venue, part of structure was reconstructed and 
certain equipment and faculties were added such as special elevators, barrier-free 
entrances, and special corridors to meet the needs of the Paralympics. Although the venu
was completed two years before 2008, it was never used by students before the Game
October 2008, one month after the Games concluded, the venue was opened to stu
was part of the reason that the BIT Gymnasium was later selected as one of the “Best 
                 
434 Qi Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011. 
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Olympic Venues.” In terms of the reconstruction expense, according to Han, BOCOG 
promised to partially pay for it. However, after the Games, when the two parties 
addressed the payment matter, BOCOG offered the University a quantity of furniture and
a small amount of money. Compared to the reconstruction expense the University paid, 
the amount of money that BOCOG offered was too small to even matter. At least, 
according to Han, the University fully owned the venue, which was definitely consider
an Olympic legacy for the University.
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pointed jor 
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t 
435   
The University authorized the Department of Physical Education and Sport to 
supervise the venue, a practice present at other institutions with regard to Olympic sport 
venues built on campuses. That the Physical Education Department managed the v
ensured that serving students would be the priority of the venue’s functions. Using the 
venue as a means to generate revenue for the
 out that certain universities regarded their sport venues as places where the ma
mission was to generate revenue. This was definitely not the case for BIT. University 
sport facilities were supposed to serve students for physical education courses and studen
athlete training; other purposes were secondary. To achieve such a fundamental goal, 
university sports facilities must be supervised internally, namely, by a department o
physical education. According to Han, the University did not expect the venue to generate 
revenue, but did expect that its primary service was to students.436 
Han further explained in detail how this fundamental principle was applied to 
venue’s routine operation. The top priority was student physical education classes and
student athlete training. For most of the morning, the venue was only open for studen
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physical education classes; from 3:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon during weekdays, the 
facilitie  to 
e 
job 
ying 
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some fifteen days in which the venue was closed during the soccer season, but, 
                                                       
s in the venue, such as the weight lifting room and the main court, are available
intercollegiate teams, such as basketball, volleyball, martial arts, and track and field. Th
second priority is to serve the University, meaning that the University and various 
faculties might use the venue to hold large assemblies, such as convocation, campus 
fairs, culture events, and anniversary celebrations. There are 4,500 permanent seats and 
1,000 retractable seats in the venue, making it entirely suitable for large scale gathering 
events on campus. The last priority was to open the main court to the public for pla
badminton, table tennis, and basketball. The users could be students, university 
employees, and local residents, all of whom paid different use-rates. In terms of the rate,
if the badminton courts were available in the morning of weekdays (most of time they 
were occupied for physical education classes), the rate was CNY 10 (USD 1.5) for each 
court per hour; for the evening time (6:00 pm to 10:00 pm), the rate was CNY 40
6.2) for wood flooring courts and CNY 50 (USD 7.7) for the anti-slip PVC flooring 
courts. The venue did not reserve the courts in advance, because university events had 
higher priority. Whenever large gathering events were held, all activities in the venue 
ceased because of the safety issue.437 In addition, the BIT men’s soccer team was one of 
the thirteen professional soccer teams in the A Soccer League of China.438 Its home f
was adjacent to the BIT Gymnasium. The visiting team accommodation area was locate
in the Gymnasium. Thus, whenever the BIT soccer team played at home, based on the
Beijing PSB rule, the venue must be vacated. As a result, every year, there would be 
 
437 Ibid. 
 A Soccer League was the second class professional soccer league of the country, while the 
was the China Super Soccer League. 
438 In China, the
first class 
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fortunately, most of them were Saturdays. Although it was called a professional soccer 
league, the games were free for spectators.439 
In terms of the venue’s operation cost, it consisted of expenses for energy (not 
including heating costs in winter, which comprised the major part of the energy cost a
was paid by the University), maintenance, human resources, and equipment upd
incurred cost that exceeded CNY 100,000 (USD 15,400) needed application for special 
funds from the University. According to Han, u
nd 
ate. Any 
nlike other universities where the venues 
sought 
 the 
 of 
 
0) per 
 
to maximize revenue, the BIT Gymnasium focused squarely on minimizing 
expenses in an attempt to balance its financial condition. The annual revenue of the BIT 
Gymnasium, in general, was CNY 1.2 million (USD 0.18 million), while its annual 
expense figure was around CNY 0.6 million (USD 0.09 million). The profit went into a 
special fund for major maintenance and the venue’s possible expansion in the future. The 
venue used various strategies to reduce cost on a daily basis. In terms of employees,
venue has less than 20 staffers; most of them perform multiple duties. In contrast, there 
are more than 70 staffers in the PKU Gymnasium. As to energy, there is a difference
electricity rate for commercial-purpose use (CNY 1.8 (USD 0.28) per unit) and 
educational-purpose use (CNY 1.5 (USD 0.23) per unit); the venue paid its electricity 
bills under the rate for educational-purpose use, even though the business of the venue is
not totally for educational-purposes. In addition, the venue turns off its lights whenever 
there is no formal game scheduled. Natural light is used as much as possible. Air 
conditioning is usually turned off because it cost more than CNY 5,000 (USD 77
hour. That is considered too much for the venue. In terms of the profit the venue gained
each year, the University gives part of it back to the venue for its operational fund. This 
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amount, of course, depended on how much the venue earns.440  
Since 2009, during winter and summer breaks, the venue does not hold any 
commercial events. In 2009, the venue rented the main hall to a company to hold i
commercial event over several days. The event organizers had not gained the necessary 
approval to hold the event. The supervisor of the venue was criticized by the University, 
even though the University received CNY 278,000 (USD 42,769) from the business. 
After that, the venue was not rented out for any commercial event
ts own 
s because of potentially 
high ris sity 
ue 
at the 
 
be directly and simply judged by right or wrong for the time 
being. I
                                                       
ks regarding legal and safety issues. Moreover, according to Han, the Univer
has not demanded that the venue “pursue business” since the Olympic Games 
concluded.441 The venue has held events during summer breaks, such as sport-related 
summer camps and athletic training for middle school students.442 By doing this, the 
teachers in the department earned extra income, while the venue also generated reven
for the University.443   
According to Han, in terms of future development, the venue will likely continue 
to follow the University’s top priority - serving students. It is highly possible th
current conditions will be maintained for a relatively long period, in terms of 
administrative mode, business operation, and financial condition. Han also emphasized
that among Olympic venues in Beijing, there were various management modes and 
visions, which could not 
t might be too soon to draw a conclusion regarding the post-Games utilization of 
 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Official Website of Beijing Institute of Technology, “Youth Sports Training Class Recruitment in the 
BIT Gymnasium 2009,” http://www.bit.edu.cn/docs/extra/col16/zsjz.doc (accessed April 2, 2012). 
443 Qi Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011. 
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Olympic venues three and a half years after the Games.444      
 
4-4. Beihang University Gymnasium 
The Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics (BUAA) Gymnasium, al
known as the Beihang University Gymnasium,
so 
 
 for the World 
niversity Games in Beijing. In 2007 it was reconstructed and expanded for the 
Oly stment came from BUAA, while the other 
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445 a pre-existing sport venue, is located at
the south end of the BUAA campus. It was originally built in 2001
U
mpics.446 Half of the reconstruction inve
e from the national treasury.447 During the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 
BUAA Gymnasium hosted the Olympic weightlifting competitions. The power lifting 
competitions for the Paralympics were also held there.448  
The facility consisted of a main competition hall, a rest & catering area, a
swimming pool, and various function rooms. For the Olympics, a weightlifting 
competition platform and a background wall were temporarily built in the main 
competition hall. They were dismantled following the Games (see the pictures in 
Appendix R).449 The rest & catering area was built in 2007 f
icials during the Games. After the Games, the area was renovated to becom
badminton venue in which a badminton club, named the Yangyang Badminton T
 
 Official Website of Beihang University, “Brief Introduction of BUAA,” 
http://ev.buaa.edu.cn/about/index.php?page=introduction
444 Ibid. 
445
 (accessed April 2, 2012). The term “Beihang” is 
iation of the Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics in Chinese, which is now the abbrev
officially used as the formal name of the University.  
446 Official Website of BOCOG, “Expansion Project Delivers ‘New’ BUAA Gymnasium,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/aag/headlines/aag/index.shtml (accessed April 2, 2012). 
447 Yonggang Qian, telephone interview by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
448 Official Website of BOCOG, “Expansion Project Delivers ‘New’ BUAA Gymnasium,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/aag/headlines/n214217793.shtml (accessed April 2, 2012). 
pic Venue Became Sports 449 Official Website of Xin Hua News Agency, “BUAA Gymnasium: Olym
Center for the Public,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2009-08/07/content_11839598.htm (accessed April 
2, 2012). 
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Center, was located (see the picture in Appendix R).450 In addition to serving its 
registered members, the club was also opened to the public for playing badminton, with a 
fee applied (CNY 50 (USD 7.7) per hour).The swimming pool, located beside the 
Gymnasium, was used as a practice area during the Games and afterwards opened to the 
public. Swimmers who utilize the pool buy tickets under a different rate schedule:
(USD 1.2) per hour for BUAA’s students (with valid student ID) and CNY 30 (USD 4.6) 
per hour for non-student users. Function rooms that were used during the Games ar
leased out for commercial purposes (see the picture in Appendix R). Of the lessees, the 
major one thus far has been the Beihang Fitness Club; personal trainers teach sport 
dancing, Yoga, and martial arts.
 CNY 8 
e now 
the Gymnasium, the researcher received similar 
respons es. The 
r it is 
ort and 
 Holdings Co., Ltd., a University-owned assets management 
451  
In terms of the venue’s educational function, a venue staffer informed the 
researcher that physical education classes for students did not take place there. All such 
classes used outdoor sport facilities and an older gymnasium on the campus. Upon 
randomly asking students passing by 
es, namely, the Olympic venue was not used for physical education purpos
venue was used as an assembly place for University gathering activities such as 
convocation, job fairs, and culture events staged by student organizations. Wheneve
available, the venue is open to the public as a badminton facility where students as well 
as other users pay to play (see the pictures in Appendix R).452 
The University registered a company in 2009 called the Beijing Ao Ju Sp
Culture Company. Its mission was to manage the Olympic facility. The Company was 
controlled by the BUAA
                                                        
450 Ibid. 
451 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation and investigation. 
452 Ibid. 
 
187 
company under the full authority of BUAA.453 Yonggang Qian, manager of the Company
declined a request from the researcher for a personal interview
, 
. He consented to be 
intervie
 
ple 
trative modes applied to the Olympic 
venues as 
ally, the 
ding 
er 
rooms in the venue to sport-related businesses such as the Beihang Fitness Center, or non 
                                       
wed via telephone. According to Qian, the management principle of the venue 
was to serve the University first and then, “modestly,” to open to the public to generate
revenue. Even hosting Olympic competition in 2008 did not influence the basic princi
of the management and operation of the venue.454 
In terms of the financial condition of the venue, Qian stated that the venue’s 
operation after the Games approximately balanced the financial condition of the 
Company. Before the Company was established, all the revenue from the venue was 
returned to the University, which in turn allocated money to the venue to support its 
operation. This situation was similar to the adminis
 located at PKU, BIT, and CAU. After the Company was formed, the venue w
operated under semi-independent management rights, which meant that, theoretic
venue could independently set its top priority as one generating revenue instead of 
serving student physical education classes. The major commercial uses of the venue, 
according to Qian, were the badminton courts, which generated stable revenue yearly. In 
addition, the main competition hall was rented for staging various events such as pop 
concerts, corporate celebrations and receptions, and other cultural activities with large 
number of attendees. Considering the safety issue and atmosphere on campus, accor
to Qian, the Company attempted to select events that were less commercialized in ord
to maintain a positive image for the University. Moreover, the Company rented function 
                 
453 Official Website of BUAA Holdings Co., Ltd., “Investment of the Company,” 
http://www.buaaholdings.cn/tzqy/index.htm (accessed April 3, 2012). 
454 Yonggang Qian, telephone interview by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
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sport-related entities, such as an English Language Training Center.455  
Although Qian consistently emphasized the venue’s independence from the 
University, he also admitted that the profit the Company made would continue to be 
returned to the University, while the University, in turn, would aid the Company if a 
deficit was incurred during its operation. In other words, despite the Company being 
registered to independently manage the venue with market mechanisms in mind, Qian 
and his company were “hamstrung” by University rules; no decisions could be made 
indepen
For 
 
at if 
tion of fixed assets were included in the cost calculations, every sport venue 
in Chin s 
t 
                                                       
dently. After all, the Gymnasium was owned by the University. The owner 
ruled.456  
In terms of profit, Qian stated that whether or not the venue showed a positive 
balance on its financial sheet largely depended on how the expenses were calculated. 
instance, the BUAA Gymnasium showed a profit on its financial sheet because the 
expenses calculated consisted of human resources, energy, logistics, and maintenance
costs, but excluded depreciation of fixed assets of the venue. Further, Qian stated th
the deprecia
a would reflect a negative summation on their financial balance sheet records. A
to future development, Qian admitted that there was neither a plan nor a goal for the 
Company’s further development. According to Qian, perhaps maintaining the curren
condition might be the ideal way for the BUAA Gymnasium to function.457   
Of the six Olympic competition venues built on various campuses, the BUAA 
Gymnasium was the only one that registered a company to manage its own venue. 
Regarding this, other university Olympic venue supervisors shared various opinions. Qi 
 
455 Ibid.; and the description was also based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid. 
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Han, supervisor of the BIT Gymnasium, argued, in negative fashion, that students at 
BUAA had to pay to utilize the Olympic venue on their own campus. So, too, did BUA
itself. For instance, the University paid CNY 20,000 (USD 3,077) per game for
A 
 its men’s 
volleyb
 so 
ed 
ight 
e 
ved the University from 
dispute
, 
. By the time 
. 
                                                       
all team to use the BUAA Gymnasium in competition with other teams in the 
league. The good thing was that at least the University retained an older gymnasium
that student physical education classes could be held there.458  
Jie Li, supervisor of the PKU Gymnasium, applauded what BUAA implement
regarding its Olympic venue management. He stated that BUAA had the longest history 
regarding operation of Olympic venues on campus among the six universities. It was the 
first one to introduce a market mechanism into its venue management mode, which m
be the way for the other universities to proceed in the future. Furthermore, in terms of th
advantage of BUAA’s operation mode, Li suggested that it remo
s with the venue’s business clients because the Company would deal with any 
disputes and conflicts, in effect, acting as a buffer zone for the University. However, Li 
also stated that it should take care when copying BUAA’s mode, because of 
encroachment on the priority of serving students, a violation of the original purpose for 
building Olympic venues on campuses.459  
Huadong Zou, supervisor of the Beijing University of Science and Technology 
(USTB) Gymnasium, stated that a key point remained university ownership. Therefore
management policy should be guided by the owner. The marketing of the BUAA 
Gymnasium was done more effectively before the Olympic Games than after
of the Games, the venue’s yearly surplus had reached CNY 2 million (USD 0.31 million)
 
nterviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011. 458 Qi Han, i
459 Jie Li, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 29, 2011. 
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However, after the Games, BUAA limited its activities and business because of safety 
and cam re 
 
ably 
m, 
he 
neer in the case of Olympic venues located on campuses. 
Its oper
do 
pus atmosphere issues. In addition, some new university research buildings we
established directly adjacent to the venue complex, which influenced the ease of reaching
the venue. The two complexes were so close to each other that disturbances inevit
occurred. This was part of the reason why the University decreased assembly activities 
held in the Gymnasium.460  
Pu Wang, supervisor of the Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasiu
pointed out that although the Company represented BUAA in the management of the 
Gymnasium, the University ultimately was responsible if potential disputes or accidents 
happened in the venue. After all, the venue belonged to the University; no matter who t
manager was, the owner was the ultimate responsible authority.461 As Li stated, the 
BUAA Gymnasium was a pio
ation and management mode has not as yet been seriously tested by any other 
university. Therefore, current problems faced by BUAA might be faced by other 
universities in the future. Then, too, the lessons experienced by BUAA should be needed 
by other universities.  
 
4-5. University of Science and Technology Beijing Gymnasium 
The University of Science & Technology Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium was a 
newly-built Olympic venue on the campus of USTB. It hosted Judo and Taekwon
competitions during the 2008 Olympic Games. Wheelchair basketball and wheelchair 
                                                        
460 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011. 
461 Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011. 
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rugby competitions were also held there during the Paralympics.462 In October 2002, 
UST ums on their 
campus  the 
, the 
 
on 
nue: 
il or other student 
             
B was selected as one of the four universities to build new gymnasi
es for the Beijing Olympic Games. Throughout the design and construction of
venue, its post-Games use was thoroughly considered by the University. For instance
venue was designed to have 4,000 permanent seats and 4,000 temporary seats for the 
Games. After the Games, according to the design, seating would be reduced to 3,800 
permanent seats and 1,200 temporary seats. The space occurring in place of the removed 
seats was planned for tennis and basketball courts.463 The venue was completed in 2007. 
At that time all the space for post-Games use had been set. For instance, after the Games 
the press room would transform to a dancing room; the news center would become a 
catering center and an exhibition room; the athlete rest area would become a fitness 
center; and the anti-doping testing center would become a sport clinic for student athletes.
In addition, the warm-up area was built over a swimming pool located beside the main 
competition hall. The pool was restored after the Games.464  
Following the Games, the venue was mainly used for student physical educati
courses. There were eight classes held simultaneously in various places within the ve
swimming, badminton, table tennis, Yoga, sport dancing, aerobics, Judo, and 
Taekwondo.465 The venue also accommodated the University’s sports competitions and 
various arts and cultural events organized by the student counc
                                           
462 Official Website of BOCOG, “Beijing Science and Technology University Gymnasium,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/stg/n214073931.shtml (accessed April 3, 2012). 
463 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “Introduction of the Gymnasium,” 
http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?action=c&alias=introduction (accessed April 3, 2012); “USTB 
Gymnasium’s Double Identity: Changing to Basketball Court after the Olympics,” 
http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?id=56 (accessed April 3, 2012). 
464 Ibid. 
465 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “Physical Education Courses Started in the Gymnasium,” 
.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?id=106http://gym  (April 4, 2012). 
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organizations. In addition to serving an educational purpose, the venue was also operated 
for generating revenue. The swimming pool, badminton courts, table tennis co
court, and basketball courts were all opened to students and the public with certain user 
fees applied.
urts, tennis 
ing 
nasium. Thus, the University embraced the idea of 
buildin
ed 
tely 
 
ou stated 
ents, 
466 The venue also rented its main hall to commercial clients for hold
large assembly events, such as business fairs, pop concerts, corporate sports meetings, 
and commercial exhibitions.467 
Huadong Zou, director of the USTB Gymnasium, provided the researcher with 
information regarding the history, current status and future development of the venue. 
USTB owned a long sports tradition since its establishment in the 1950s. But, it had 
never had a multifunctional gym
g an Olympic venue on its campus. Its selection as a recipient for a new 
gymnasium occurred in 2002.468 Both national treasury funds and USTB monies cover
the investment for construction. According to Zou, each party contributed approxima
a half. The total investment was around CNY 220 million (USD 33.85 million). The
University applied for special loans to finance its share of the venue. Although Z
that private monies were not solicited for the venue,469 a list of financial patrons 
embossed on an elaborate board hung on the wall beside the main entrance of the venue 
showing that there were a number of organizations and individuals, among them stud
faculty members, alumni, university-related groups, and corporations, who donated 
                                                        
466 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “The List of Fees for the Leisure Time Sports in the USTB 
Gymnasium,” http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?action=c&alias=charging_standard (accessed April 4, 
2012). 
467 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “Leasing and Renting Business for Large Group Events,” 
http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?action=c&alias=venue_leasing (accessed April 4, 2012). 
468 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “Introduction of the Gymnasium,” 
http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?action=c&alias=introduction (accessed April
interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011. 
469 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, 
 5, 2012); Huadong Zou, 
August 31, 2011. 
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money for construction of the venue (see the picture in Appendix S).470  
The location of the venue was in an area previously used by the University’s 
kindergarten, professor residences, and a beautification center. Because most of the 
University’s staffers, faculty members, and students supported the building of an 
Olympic venue on campus, all the old buildings were removed and relocated, emptying 
the site
 the 
 
ded the seats were quickly 
remove
tion 
 to 
 
imming pool, the main competition 
hall bec
 for the new venue. The venue was completed in November 2007. During the 
design period, post-Games use of the facility had been emphasized. Students use was
top priority in the facility’s design and construction.471  
During construction, it could readily be seen that all the facility’s function rooms
reflected a standard layout and arrangement so that they could be easily converted to 
accommodate different purposes in the future. The seats on the upper level of the 
spectator stands were temporary. When the Games conclu
d and the resulting space accommodated two basketball courts and a tennis court 
for student use (see the pictures in Appendix S).472  
Because the detailed plan had been made before the Games, the reconstruc
project after the Games took less than six months to complete. The venue was opened
the public in April 2009. In addition to the two new basketball courts and the tennis court
at the upper level platform as well as the renovated sw
ame a badminton area with 20 courts. The original athlete rest and registration 
area became a table tennis area with 21 Ping Pong tables. The hallway outside the main 
competition hall, partially covered by removable mats left after the Games, became an 
                                                        
470 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
471 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011. 
472 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011; the description was also based on 
researcher’s on-site observation. 
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area for Judo and Taekwondo classes.473 There was an abundance of material left after the 
Games used for renovation and reconstruction. Moreover, a new fitness room was built
the venue. It was leased to a commercial company which operated a sports club business
According to Zou, the total reconstruction expense, around CNY 2 million (USD 0.31 
million), was covered by the University.
 in 
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on team was formed during the 
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474 
In terms of administrative mode, Zou stated that the USTB Gymnasium 
Management Center was an independent unit under the direct authority of the University
The Center was financially controlled by the University. Its revenue was returned to t
University’s financial department. The Center’s operati
ic Games. Most employees, such as technicians and security guards, have
working in the facility since then. New staffers for reception, services, and marketing 
joined the team when the venue was reopened in 2009. The Center was separated from 
the Department of Sport and Physical Education, which was a different condition than 
PKU, CAU, and BIT. Despite the separation, the Center cooperated and collaborated 
closely with the Department. Since Zou used to be a student athlete at USTB, he 
maintains close working and personal relationships with the Department.475  
According to Zou, securing physical education needs for students and training 
requirements for student athletes are the top working priorities of the Center. Physical
education classes are held in the venue. During the academic term, before 11:00 a
between 1:00 pm and 3:00 pm during weekdays, the venue is open for educatio
s. The time between 11:00 am and 1:00 pm is the period during which the pool
 
473 Official Website of the USTB Gymnasium, “Capital University Media Alliance: USTB Gymnasium, 
New Post-Games Utilization,” http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?id=59 (accessed April 5, 2012). The 
description was also based on researcher’s on-site observation. 
474 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011. 
475 Ibid. 
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and the courts are open to University employees. After 3:00 pm, the venue is open to th
public until 10:00 pm. Although the fitness club in the venue is owned by a company and
the Center merely leases the space, as a condition in the agreement, the fitness club 
provide its equipment and its space for student physical education classes and student 
athlete training before 3:00 pm whenever needed. After that the club is open for its own 
business.
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476 In a week, on average, there are 92 physical education classes held in the 
venue. The number of the students involved is about 3,000.477 The venue, especially the 
main competition hall, is also used by the University to hold events such as convocatio
job fairs, and student cultural events. In addition, during the “down time” such as 
weekends and summer/winter breaks, the Center rents the main hall for commercial 
purposes. The rental rate is around CNY 70,000 (USD 10,770) per day. During 
summer/winter breaks, the Center organizes sports training classes for youth, such as 
swimming, badminton and table tennis. At times when there are no such activities,
venue is usually opened to the public for recreation purposes. In general, according to
Zou, the business operated during the “down time” earned the major part of reve
generated by the Center.478  
Speaking of revenue and expense, according to Zou, the Center has earned a 
slight surplus since it reopened in April 2009. Each year, the University set an expense 
budget for the venue, based on its record of the previous year. On average, the annual
budget was around CNY 5 million (U
resource, and daily operation costs. Similar to other universities, or most venu
 
476 Ibid. 
477 Official Website of USTB Gymnasium, “Capital University Media Alliance: USTB Gymnasium, New 
Post-Games Utilization,” http://gym.ustb.edu.cn/article.php?id=59 (accessed April 5, 2012). 
478 Huadong Zou, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 31, 2011. 
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in China for that matter, the depreciation of fixed assets of the venue was not included a
a kind of cost. In terms of energy cost (water, electricity, and heating), the University 
covered one half of the total, while the Center was responsible for the other half. 
According to Zou, the University exempted half of the energy expense for the venue 
because the University used the venue gratis as an assembly place for educational matters
Such exercise occupied 50% of the total time of the venue’s regular operation. Under 
these circumstances, the Center earned a surplus of more than CNY 1 million (0.1
million) for the year 2010 and 2011. The University did not set revenue goals for the 
venue, but arranged an incentive policy for the Center. If the venue’s surplus reached 
CNY 1 million, then 70% of it would return to the University, while the Center would 
retain 30%. If the surplus exceeded CNY 1 million, 60% of the exceeded portion wo
return to the University, while the Center would retain 40%.
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479  
Zou expressed his satisfaction about the current policy and management mode 
applied in the venue. After all, the venue’s daily operation and its current condition 
satisfied both the University and the students, the two most important constituencies that
the venue served. Since the relationships between the Center, the 
sical Education, the University, and the students, were harmonious, according t
Zou, the current status of the venue should be maintained in the future.480  
 
4-6. Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium  
Unlike the other Beijing Olympic venues built on campuses located in the 
University Area, the Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) Gymnasium,
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newly-built venue that hosted badminton and rhythmic gymnastics competitions during 
the 2 ity Area of Beijing. Moreover, 
the BJU  in 
0 million 
ale 
e 
 a 
tion 
 
 
well as Beijing’s southeastern 
             
008 Olympic Games, was located in the East Commun
T Gymnasium, according to BOCOG, was the only Olympic venue located
Beijing’s southeastern area.481 The investment in this venue was about CNY 20
(USD 30.8 million), of which around CNY 60 million (USD 9.2 million) came from the 
national treasury; the balance was largely covered by the Beijing Municipal Commission 
of Education.482 Of the six universities in the city with Olympic competition venues, 
BJUT was the only one that belonged to the Beijing Municipal Commission of 
Education.483 The municipal government of Beijing paid particular attention to the 
location of this venue. To obtain the land adjacent to the University to build the new 
venue, the municipal government had to persuade local residents to relocate, an 
expensive exercise to complete.484 The BJUT Gymnasium was the only large sc
multifunction sport facility in city-south. Since 2008 the facility has been used by th
University as an assembly place for sport competitions and cultural events, as well as
leisure and recreation site for local communities.   
The Gymnasium, completed in September 2007, consisted of a main competi
hall with a total of 7,500 seats and a warm-up arena.485 According to Ailin Zhang, vice
president of BJUT, the Gymnasium remained an important cultural legacy of the Beijing
Olympics and became a landmark on the campus as 
                                           
481 Official Website of BOCOG, “Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium Ready,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/btg/index.shtml (accessed April 6, 2012). 
 Universities in Beijing 
w.bjedu.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab480/
482 Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011. 
483 Official Website of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, “The
Authorized by Municipal Commission of Education,” http://ww  
COG, “BJUT Gymnasium: An Environmental-Friendly Venue,” 
72635.shtml
(accessed April 6, 2012). 
484 Qi Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 15, 2011. 
485 Official Website of BO
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/btg/headlines/n2141  (accessed April 6, 2012). 
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area.486 A year before the Games, Zhang stated that after the Olympics, the venue would
maintain three functions: the University’s activity center, a recreation center for 
neighboring residents, and a training base for national badminton athletes.
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investigation in Beijing, the researcher visited the BJUT Gymnasium on two occasions. 
On each visit a badminton competition was in progress. One was the Beijing PSB
Badminton Competitions (see the picture in Appendix T) and the other was the Li Ning 
Cup National Badminton Championship organized by GASC. Staffers there told the 
researcher that various badminton competitions were frequently hosted in either the
warm-up arena or the main competition hall. Because of the advanced technology 
installed in this badminton-specified venue, many badminton match organizers in the
sought the BJUT Gymnasium for their competition’s site.488  
However, frequent badminton competitions held in the venue often influenc
physical education function of the venue. For instance, during the Li Ning Cup National 
Badminton Championship on 6 September 2011, students who 
l education classes in the venue were stopped at the entrance and were told that 
the venue was closed because of the competitions. Having had no advance notice, 
students complained that the venue management center or their gymnasium teacher 
should have notified them. This was not the first time that students faced this kind of 
situation. In addition, according to one of the venue staffers, due to overuse, the ve
wood flooring had deteriorated considerably during the last three years. Thus, in the 
summer of 2011, the University decided to upgrade the flooring of the main competiti
                                                        
486 Official Website of BOCOG, “BJUT Gymnasium: An Important Cultural Legacy for Post-Games,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/btg/headlines/n214172657.shtml (accessed April 6, 2012). 
487 Ibid. 
488 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site observation and investigation. 
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hall (see the picture in Appendix T). Consequently, the rate for playing badminton for 
individual players was increased from a previous CNY 10 (USD 1.5) per hour to CNY
(USD 6) per hour. According to one of the physical education teachers in the University, 
between generating revenue from holding large scale events and its renting for recreati
use, the main hall was not available for physical education purposes. Students used the 
warm-up arena as a substitute venue.
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489 
To investigate the current status of the venue’s post-Games utilization, the 
researcher attempted to contact the individuals who were in charge of the venue. Qicai 
Ren, the deputy manager of the BJUT Gy
ng the venue, even though he accepted the interview request via telephone. As a 
result, the interview with Ren lasted less than five minutes without any useful 
information provided. The researcher later contacted Pu Wang, the manager of the BJUT 
Gymnasium, who also accepted the interview request and did provide relevant 
information for the study. Wang was appointed as the manager of the venue in 
before that he was the vice chairman of the employee labor union in the University. 
According to Wang, as a recreation center, the venue was opened to the public f
activities as basketball, badminton, table tennis, fitness, fencing, and indoor climbing.
Customers were required to pay different rates to indulge in these activities. Accordin
Wang, charging fees for these on-campus recreation activities was illegal, although most
universities in China were doing so. Universities were non-profit organizations, which 
meant that they were not supposed to operate profit-driven businesses. The legal issue 
aside, since the University had been operating the venue as a business, it was supposed to
 
489 Ibid. 
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establish a revenue target for the venue. The University had never done this.490 Despite
the fact that the venue has hosted various large events, including national sport 
competitions and some commercial events, which definitely generated profit for the 
University,
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491 there is neither a revenue goal for the venue nor any incentive pol
employees.492  
Wang pointed out that the management mode applied to the venue did not match
with the business op
uals who came to use the facility, while the venue was opened to the students 
having physical education classes for free. According to Wang, the cafeteria on camp
charged fees to students because its operation was conducted by a company, not the 
University. In other words, the University should consider registering a company 
specifically to operate the business in the Gymnasium, similar to what the BUAA 
Gymnasium did. According to Wang, the University did consider leasing the venu
company. A similar example existed on campus. A hotel on campus was leased to a
private company that paid the University a specified amount of money per year to 
maintain the chartered management rights to the hotel. The result of this, according t
Wang, was that the University experienced inconvenience whenever it needed to us
hotel, while the hotel business was not as good as what the University expected. Thus, 
University became reticent about the Gymnasium being in the hands of a management 
company.493  
Wang addressed the priority schedule for the venue’s use. For the BJUT 
 
490 Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011. 
vation and investigation. 491 The description was based on the researcher’s on-site obser
492 Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011. 
493 Ibid. 
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Gymnasium, the top priority is to serve the University directly and indirectly, including 
providi  public 
 
r 
sues 
 
ucation 
him. The function of the venue must satisfy the leaders of the University and their guests 
                                                       
ng space for the activities the University organizes for its educational and
relations purposes.494 To achieve this goal, the venue renovated its original function 
rooms to a new conference hall, a VIP room, an entertainment room (karaoke room), a 
coffee house, a music salon, a commercial conference center, and some multifunction
recreation rooms.495 The venue also added a series of new services for facility users, 
especially those invited by the President of the University. The second priority, according 
to Wang, is to generate revenue for the University, obtained by leasing the main hall fo
sports and commercial events and opening the courts for playing badminton, table tennis, 
basketball, and volleyball. Although the University did not set revenue goals for the 
venue, Wang, as the manager of the venue, admitted that the Gymnasium needed to earn 
as much money as possible to offset its operating expenses. However, due to safety is
on campus, the University had to choose relatively “safe” events to stage, such as those 
organized by governmental departments, sport bureaus, or ministries. Thus, safety issues 
can influence the venue’s revenue generation. The last priority for the venue is to serve 
students for physical education purposes. The students used the warm-up area for 
physical education classes; the main competition hall was opened to the public on a daily
basis. Whenever large events were held in the venue, all the scheduled physical ed
classes in the venue had to be transferred to outdoor sport facilities on campus.496  
According to Wang, the three-level priority system was the working principle for 
 
l Website of Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium Center. “New Services in the 
494 Ibid. 
495 Officia
Gymnasium,” http://cgzx.bjut.edu.cn/etcms/booking/yumaoqiu_active.html (accessed April 7, 2012)
496 Pu Wang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, September 6, 2011. 
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visiting campus. They can play sports and enjoy the entertainments offered in the venue, 
which 
es 
 
 and 
and the 
lue as 
e MasterCard Center (MCC), originally named the Beijing Olympic Basketball 
ymnasium, then changed to the Wu Ke Song Arena, is located at the Wu Ke Song Sport 
c Baseball Field was built. During the 
200 d finals were hosted in the venue, 
while t
was the major reason that new sports and amusement services were added. This 
principle remains as the venue’s core strategy for future development. Wang emphasized 
that the most important goal of the venue in the future was to become a key factor in 
serving the University’s public relations activities.497 Unlike its counterparts on campus
such as USTB and BIT, in terms of post-Games utilization, the BJUT Gymnasium has not
placed sports and physical education functions for students as the venue’s top priority
the core value of this advanced Olympic facility. Considering its unique location 
original goals expected, the Olympic legacy of this venue hardly embodies its va
the only multifunctional sport facility at city-south, as long as its top priority is heavily 
focused on serving the University administrative leaders and their guests.  
 
5. Private Enterprise-Owned Venues 
5-1. MasterCard Center and Baseball Field  
Th
G
& Culture Center, the site at which the Olympi
8 Games, the Olympic basketball preliminaries an
he adjacent Olympic Baseball Field served as a temporary venue. It hosted the 
2008 Olympic baseball tournament, perhaps baseball’s final Olympic appearance.498 
                                                        
497 Ibid. 
498 Official Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Basketball Venue Ready,” 
http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/wis/n214230615.shtml (accessed April 8, 2012); “Beijing Wu 
Ke Song Sports Center Baseball Field,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/wkb/n214074588.shtml 
ll from the Olympic sports after the 2008 
ympics. 
(accessed April 8, 2012). The IOC had voted to remove baseba
Beijing Ol
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Baseball has been discontinued as an Olympic sport. The Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture
Center is now owned by the Bloomage International Investment Group, a private 
enterprise entity in China, embracing a business range of project investments, corporate 
acquisitions and other development projects including real estate, finance, and 
biotechnology. In China, real estate business has been the Company’s focus.
 
e 
rise.500 
der 
. It is the 
 the 
A 
ual Conference, and the CBA 
499 The venu
was the only Olympic venue in Beijing that was owned solely by private enterp
Moreover, the naming rights of the venue were sold to MasterCard in January 2011 un
a five-year deal. The venue has been known as the MasterCard Center since then
first and the only Olympic venue in the city so far that has been rebranded 
commercially.501 MasterCard (MCC) is operated by the Beijing Wu Ke Song Arena 
Management Co. Ltd., owned by the Bloomage International Investment Group.502 As
strategic partner of Bloomage, the US-based Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG), one 
of the leading international sports and entertainment companies, provides consultancy 
support in the operation of MCC.503 After the 2008 Olympic Games, the venue was 
commercially exploited by holding various commercial events there, such as the NB
China Games, the Beyoncé concert, the Amway China Ann
                                                        
499 Official Website of the MasterCard Center, “About Bloomage Group INC,” 
239http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/Our_team.jsp?id=1  (accessed April 8, 
w.mastercard.com/hkc/personal/zh/wce/PDF/110107_MasterCard_Center_Press_Release_zh.pdf
2012); official website of MasterCard, “Beijing’s Iconic Wu Ke Song Arena Re-Named MasterCard 
Center,” 
http://ww  
c Baseball Field was also owned by the Bloomage International Investment 
 
s Iconic Wu Ke Song Arena Re-Named MasterCard Center,” 
(accessed April 8, 2012). 
500 The dismantled Olympi
Group. Although the baseball field had no longer existed after the Games, Bloomage still owned the land
on which the field had ever been built up. 
501 Official website of MasterCard, “Beijing’
http://www.mastercard.com/hkc/personal/zh/wce/PDF/110107_MasterCard_Center_Press_Release_zh.pdf 
(accessed April 8, 2012). 
502 Official Website of the MasterCard Center, “Our Team,” 
Our_team.jsp?id=1238http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/  (accessed April 8, 
. 
2012). 
503 Ibid
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All-star Weekend.504  
The baseball field, located beside MCC, was dismantled and obliterated right af
the Games and the site has been empty since. Because the baseball field was originally 
designed as a temporary sport facility, there was n
ter 
o post-Games utilization plan for it.505 
When t
 left 
the 
 as 
 
Arena Management Co. Ltd., after the 2008 Games, Bloomage had plans to develop the 
                                                       
he researcher visited the original baseball competition site in August 2011, it 
could be seen that due to no maintenance and no security around the area, the former 
Olympic Baseball Field had become an abandoned place in which there was nothing but 
rubble, wild grass and weeds, and debris and trash scattered about. There was nothing
that could help the researcher associate the place with the Olympic Baseball Field for 
2008 Games; it was more like a ruin or a dumping site. There were vestiges of some 
equipment used for the Games left on site; workers were in the process of removing it. In 
the middle of the site, some shabby shelters were built in which migrant workers lived. 
Between the former baseball field and MCC, a large temporary tent was erected, used
a flea market. This “dumping site” was separated from MCC by an iron fence. On the 
other side of the fence, MCC was starkly different, well maintained and no one was 
allowed to enter without proper IDs, even when there was no commercial event held 
inside (see the pictures in Appendix U).506 The Bloomage International Investment Group, 
owner of the land, has done nothing yet on the previous baseball field site since the 
Games concluded. According to Jerry Han, events director of the Beijing Wu Ke Song
 
l Website of the MasterCard Center, “About the Arena,” 
_gaishu.jsp?id=1242
504 Officia
http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/Venue  (accessed April 8, 
es, 
 was based on the researcher’s on-site observation. 
2012). NBA - the National Basketball Association, the men’s professional basketball league in North 
America; CBA- the Chinese Basketball Association, the men’s professional basketball league in China. 
505 Beijing 2008 Project Construction Headquarters Office, Beijing Olympic Venues and Related Faciliti
(2006), pp. 44-49. 
506 The description
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baseball field to a commercial and recreation area to complement its own local real e
business. However, the financial crisis erupting at the end of 2008 stopped, or at least 
postponed, Bloomage’s business plan for the site. Han also pointed out that Bloomage, as 
the landlord, did not worry too much about the exploitation of the site; after all, it owned 
the land and could wait for better timing to carry out its plan.
state 
rt 
Ltd. (B
., 
tment 
 
ell 
507 
In terms of construction of the venue, the original plan of the Wu Ke Song Spo
& Culture Center included the Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, the Olympic Baseball 
Field, and some other complementary commercial and sports facilities. Construction was 
awarded to the Consortium of the Beijing Centergate Development and Construction Co., 
CDC) in September 2003.508 The BCDC Consortium included four shareholders: 
the CENCONS Group509, the Hai Dian District State-owned Assets Investment Co., Ltd
the Beijing Urban Construction Group Co., Ltd., and the Beijing Tianhong Group. 
According to Han, the budget of the project was more than CNY 1 billion (154 million). 
Construction broke ground in 2005. However, the project did not progress smoothly. 
During the construction stage, financial problems occurred, leading to a significant delay 
of the project. In addition, the consortium expressed pessimism regarding the inves
return on the project, especially for the period following the Olympic Games. 
Consequently, some corporate entities in the consortium attempted to quit the project.
This resulted in a critical situation, prompting the government to seek a solution in order 
to continue the project. At the time, Bloomage envisioned that it would be a great 
opportunity to get involved in such an Olympic-related project, which might w
                                                        
507 Jerry Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
508 Xian Guo, “The Bid of the Project of Wu Ke Song Culture & Sport Center: An Exploration of Multi 
Investments of Olympic Projects,” Project Management Technology 6, no. 4 (April 2008), pp. 45-49. 
509 According to its Official Website (www.cencons.com), CENCONS Group was another name for 
Beijing Centergate Development & Construction Co., Ltd. 
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improve its local real estate business and its relationship with local government. As a 
result, Bloomage, with the government’s authorization, invested in the project. By doing 
this, Bloomage became the project’s largest shareholder. At the same time its investm
offered the government a solution. After that, Bloomage negotiated with both gove
and private enterprise within the consortium to buy their business shares. In the end, 
Bloomage became the sole owner of the Wu Ke Song Sports & Culture Center.
ent 
rnment 
 
 not 
e 
favor to
 
n, 
ic 
asium for post-Games operation.513 Because of its partnership with the 
Nationa e 
                                                       
510  
Despite the ownership transfer, the CENCONS Group continued to play the major
role in charge of the project’s construction.511 Although Han did not disclose any details 
regarding the negotiation between Bloomage and the government, relating that he did
know anything about it, he stated Bloomage’s “step up” action was considered a hug
 the government, one which translated into potential benefit from the government 
for its real estate business. In addition, Bloomage inherited the land from the government,
not only for the basketball gymnasium and the baseball field, but also the peripheral area 
on which Bloomage planned to develop real estate projects. Therefore, according to Ha
the cooperation between the government and Bloomage was a win-win strategy at the 
time.512       
On 8 October 2008, one month after the Beijing Olympic Games, China 
International Business reported that AEG, one of the world’s leading providers of live 
sports and entertainment events, had acquired management rights of the Beijing Olymp
Basketball Gymn
l Basketball Association (NBA), AEG planned to stage NBA games in th
 
510 Jerry Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
ruction Co., Ltd., “The Olympic Projects,” 511 Official Website of Beijing Centergate Development & Const
http://www.cencons.com/project/olympics.html (accessed April 9, 2012). 
512 Jerry Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
513 Kit Gillet, “A Sporting Legacy?” China International Business, (October 8, 2008), pp. 36-37. 
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Gymnasium. At the time AEG was confident of this plan. According to Sam Piccione, 
general manager of AEG in Asia, other Olympic venues in Beijing did not have the same 
sustainability as the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, an important factor in the 
AEG – NBA initiative.514 Moreover, Alan Graham, AEG’s general manager of the 
Gymnasium at the time, stated that the venue could be a catalyst to open the concert 
market in China. The facility might well become the centerpiece for the entire Western 
Community of the city.515 According to the report, AEG believed that the venue could 
host a big event every three days, once the facility was fully operational.516 AEG sta
two NBA pre-season games in the venue, one between the Milwaukee Bucks and the 
Golden State Warriors in October 2008, and the other between the Denver Nuggets and 
the Indiana Pacers one year later.
ged 
 
eas AEG, together with NBA, had become the 
strategi
                                                       
517 In addition, during AEG’s management period, the 
venue also hosted Canadian singer Avril Lavigne’s first concert in Beijing, “the Best 
Damn Tour,” in October 2008.518   
However, according to its official website, at the end of 2011, MCC (formerly the
Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium or the Wu Ke Song Arena) is operated by the 
Beijing Wu Ke Song Arena Management Co. Ltd., which is owned by Bloomage 
International Investment Group, wher
c partner of Bloomage providing consultancy support in operating MCC.519 
 
l Website of the MasterCard Center, “2008 Events Photos,” 
.jsp?id=1337&article_id=122328
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Officia
http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/imgarticle  
ukesongdl/imgarticle.jsp?id=1335&article_id=122327
(accessed April 9, 2012); “2009 Events Photos,” 
http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enw  
 MasterCard Center, “2008 Events Photos,” 
.jsp?id=1337&article_id=122329
(accessed April 9, 2012). 
518 Official Website of the
http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/imgarticle  
erCard Center, “Our Team,” 
(accessed April 9, 2012). 
519 Official Website of the Mast
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According to Han, AEG has not managed and operated MCC since the beginning of 20
In terms of the management rights changing, Han shared certain information that m
be helpful to understand AEG’s role transformation. AEG became involved in the 
business of the Wu Ke Song Arena at the beginning of 2008 through a recommendat
by the NBA. At the time, it was AEG’s first experience in attempting to exploit the 
market in China. As a foreign company, AEG might have felt over-confident regarding 
China’s market, and the commercial operation of the Gymnasium. This was probab
to a lack of thorough pre-analysis of the Chinese market and the unique circumstances 
encountered there. Business in China was totally different from AEG’s normal busin
experience acquired largely in the United Sates and Australia. AEG underestimated the 
complicated situation regarding management and operation of a sport venue in China. 
Thus, according to Han, over-optimism and high expectation for the venue’s commercia
success in the future were major reasons that led to AEG’s frustration and unrest that 
arose when facing difficulties during its operation. One of the most significant problems
resided in the cooperation and communication between AEG and the Beijing Public 
Security Bureau (PSB), in other words, the conflict between AEG’s western concept 
regarding the venue’s operation mode following free market rules versus the police 
regulations in China.
10. 
ight 
ion 
ly due 
ess 
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Ti 
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se it 
was quite difficult at the beginning to understand the venue’s operation mode in China. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
520 
Zhihong Zhang, supervisor of the operations department of the Beijing Gong 
Center, contributed his point of view in terms of AEG’s involvement in the Wu Ke So
Arena. AEG attempted but failed to manage and operate the venue effectively, becau
 
Our_team.jsp?id=1238http://www.mastercardcenter.com.cn/templet/Enwukesongdl/  (accessed April 8, 
terviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
2012). 
520 Jerry Han, in
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Neither did AEG understand nor appreciate why PSB was involved in so much of the 
venue’s
. 
, 
lly 
s 
er 
versely 
lanned 
, 
an unpleasant relationship with local PSB authorities would quite obviously compromise 
                                                       
 business. Nor did AEG understand why the government had so many concerns 
regarding the venue’s business, especially with regard to holding large commercial events
Based on AEG’s concept, it was simple that if the Company had the management rights 
of the venue, then how the Company operated was its own business as long as all 
business actions obeyed relevant laws. Moreover, AEG might have dismissed such 
security encroachment as soccer hooliganism as “normal” conduct, which could be 
handled following relevant bylaws. However, such “security encroachment” would be 
considered seriously by the government in China, because based on government concept
such incidents would always be associated with political issues that might potentia
undermine the regime’s stability. Therefore, the government always supported PSB’
involvement in the business of city venues to secure and insure complete spectator 
control. This was considered a normal business environment for Beijing’s large scale 
sport venues, which AEG or any other foreign companies could not change.521 According 
to Han, due to the conflicts in terms of the thoughts and actions at the beginning of its 
management, AEG always attempted to direct PSB to “back off,” which probably furth
poisoned the relationship between the two.522 Further, Zhang pointed out that PSB 
consistently operated on the premise that it was the venue’s full responsibility for any 
“incidents” occurring during the events,523 incidents that would severely and ad
affect the venue’s future application for commercial events. In China, if a venue p
to hold an event, the organizers had to submit applications to PSB for approval. Therefore
 
521 Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
522 Jerry Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
523 Zhihong Zhang, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 24, 2011. 
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business initiatives for the venue.       
As a result, when conflict between AEG and PSB, as well as other rele
governmental departments, became more pronounced, AEG began to entertain the idea
giving up business in the Wu Ke Song Arena at the beginning of 2010. AEG and 
Bloomage signed an official memorandum of understanding;
vant 
 of 
 
anagement 
team th enue. 
the 
 
 
ith relevant governmental departments and 
PSB. D
s. 
The project took 9 months to complete. After the reconstruction the venue was suitable 
524 AEG agreed to continue
to cooperate with Bloomage as a strategic partner offering consultancy support on the 
operation of the venue, but not operate the venue’s business directly. The m
at AEG had established voluntarily remained and continued to manage the v
According to Han, most of the Chinese employees from the original team chose to stay 
and continued to work there. Now the team is under the direct and full control of 
venue’s owner, the Bloomage Group.525  
Although the situation AEG had consistently faced still existed, the lessons from
AEG’s experience were learned by Bloomage as well. According to Han, the operation 
and management became more realistic and more effective than before. The Company 
came to understand and accept the reality regarding the unique circumstances in China, 
which the management team of the venue necessarily had to deal with. The Company
tried its best to maintain the relationships w
espite AEG’s failure, Han admitted that AEG absolutely left behind valuable 
legacies for venue operation and management. First, AEG provided the owner with a 
detailed post-Games operation plan. Based on the plan, the owner invested some CNY 
200 million (USD 30.8 million) to the reconstruction project of the venue after the Game
                                                        
524 The detailed terms in the agreement were not provided by Han. 
525 Jerry Han, interviewed by Xiaowei Yu, August 30, 2011. 
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for its post-Games use. A solid basis for its operation and future business development 
was established. In addition, AEG left its advanced management experience to the 
Company, such as the venue’s organizational structure, internal administrative regula
detailed service standards, events staging procedures, employment regulations, and 
incentive mechanisms, all of which were considered the “soft” capital for the venue’s 
management and development. However, Han commented that this “soft” capital should 
combine with the Company’s current strategy in terms of the way it should deal with the
relationships between it and government departments and the PSB. Said Han, that was 
the only way to successfully operate an Olympic venue in the city, especially one ow
by private enterprise.
tions, 
 
ned 
he 
rcial events. According to Han, the venue’s operating cost has 
reached ayment, 
rd.527  
d 
526   
In terms of the venue’s current operation, Han expressed satisfaction with 
operational and management conditions. Since the reconstruction was completed and t
management rights transferred from AEG to Bloomage in the middle of 2010, the venue 
has hosted more than 60 events, of which 15% of the total have been sports events 
(commercial games), 10% non commercial events, and 75% commercial events with 
admission fees. There is no doubt that the major business of the venue’s post-Games 
utilization is to host comme
 CNY 30 million (USD 4.6 million) per year. This did not include loan rep
depreciation of fixed assets, and major maintenance expenses. As to revenue, Han did not 
disclose figures regarding the annual revenue, but stated that the financial sheet of the 
venue was balanced and a surplus appeared after the naming rights sale to MasterCa
AEG played a role in terms of the naming rights sale for the venue. MasterCar
                                                        
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
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was introduced to Bloomage by AEG. At the time, Bloomage sought money from the 
naming rights sale to compensate for the venue’s huge operation cost. Meanwhile, 
MasterCard faced its own problem in China’s market. Its major competitor, VISA, was a 
TOP partner of the IOC and initiated significant marketing promotions in China during
the 2008 Olympic Games. MasterCard felt it had to act in some way to try and gain in 
 
China’
nd, 
 
ode, 
 the 
its competitors, Han considered NIS in the Olympic Park as MCC’s major competitor in 
                                                       
s prospective market. As a result, according to Han, the two parties responded 
positively when AEG introduced the deal to both sides. The government, initially 
reluctant, later approved the sale of naming rights. Also, on the government’s dema
the terms “gymnasium,” “sport center,” and “Wu Ke Song,” were required to be retained 
in the new title of the venue. MasterCard did not like this requirement. Finally, through 
negotiation, the title of the venue was changed from “Wu Ke Song Arena” to 
“MasterCard Center.” Although the exact amount paid for the naming rights was not 
revealed, Han stated that the number was large enough to cover the venue’s annual
operating cost. In addition to the naming rights fee, MasterCard also established a 
promotion program in the management company, by which, based on MasterCard’s final 
approval, the Company could financially aid its clients by offering sponsor fees to their 
events in order to attract more potential clients.528     
 In terms of the venue’s strength and potential opportunity in the future, Han 
stated that the business experiences AEG left behind, and the current management m
were major strengths of MCC. Moreover, hi-tech equipment and the high quality of
venue’s internal environment are also strengths in terms of possible competition with 
other Olympic venues with roughly the same capacity and scale in the city. Speaking of 
 
528 Ibid. 
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the future. Although a private enterprise can independently operate its business to 
maxim
n 
nt as 
 a 
eijing Sport 
 
 
e 
                                                       
ize profit, the nature of being private is also a weakness in China, especially 
compared to state-owned enterprises. For instance, land taxes for certain 
government-owned venues are exempted by the government, while it would be quite 
difficult for MCC to achieve any tax redemption status. As to potential opportunity, Ha
suggested that one of the key factors influencing the development of MCC in the future 
will be the relationship between Bloomage and the government, which was the reason 
why one of MCC’s core tasks was to maintain the relationships with the governme
well as relevant governmental departments.529 As a result, MCC attempts to work on
positive basis with government. A case in point - on 15 March 2012, the B
Bureau announced that if the Beijing basketball team won the semi-finals for the CBA
Championships, the final games started in six days would be held in MCC, a mere six 
days away.530 When MCC received the final confirmation regarding hosting the final 
games in MCC, there were only two days left for the employees in the venue to prepare
for the matches.531 MCC made all the preparations in two days, securing the necessary 
“clearances” for the contests to be staged smoothly. In addition, during the following nin
days, MCC was used for three final games for free.532 Since MCC’s scale was much 
larger than that of the Beijing basketball team’s home arena, the team’s ticket sales 
 
e e 
529 Ibid. 
530 Official W bsite of Chinese Basketball Association, “MCC Will Hold Final Games if Beijing Win th
Semi-Finals,” http://basketball.sport.org.cn/team/2012-03-15/373870.html (accessed April 10, 2012). 
531 Official Website of the Bloomage International Investment Group, “Beijing Basketball Team Won the 
Champion Again in MCC Twenty-nine Years later,” 
http://www.bloomage.com/a/xinwenzhongxin/gongsixinwen/2012/0405/36.html (accessed April 10, 2012). 
532 Official Website of the Bloomage International Investment Group, “Beijing Basketball Team Won the 
 Again in MCC Twenty-nine Years later,” 
.bloomage.com/a/xinwenzhongxin/gongsixinwen/2012/0405/36.html
Champion
http://www  (accessed April 10, 2012); 
Official Website of The Economic Observer, “The Magic of the Wu Ke Song Arena,” 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/2012/0329/223697.shtml (accessed April 10, 2012). 
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has 
revenue for the three final games was equal to the revenue gained from the rest of the 
games during the whole season.533 As a private enterprise-owned Olympic venue, MCC 
has to be careful when it comes to interfacing with the government. Sometimes MCC 
to put aside its economic goal, albeit briefly, so that it can partially serve the 
government’s goal. After all, without government’s satisfaction and support, MCC’s 
development in the future will be unpredictable and unsettled. 
                                                        
533 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations  
1. Conclusions  
This research made efforts to investigate the conditions of the Olympic facilities 
in Beijing through the entire competition venues line three and half years after the Games, 
which had not been done since the 2008 Beijing Games finished. As an exploratory 
research, this study is the first one covering this specific academic field. It significantly 
contributed to the international Olympic knowledge base in terms of the post-Olympic 
utilization of Olympic facilities in Beijing. Through this study, the researcher examined 
the post-Games status of all the Olympic competition facilities in Beijing, in terms of 
their management, operation, and utilization. The study was initiated by categorizing 
those venues. To systematically code the data collected through the investigation, three 
categories were applied to this study: Category 1 referred to the nature of the venues in 
terms of them being newly-built, pre-existing, or temporarily-built; Category 2 was based 
on their geographical disposition in the city; and Category 3 was based on their 
ownership.  
 
1-1. Category 1: New, Pre-existing, and Temporary 
According to BOCOG, of thirty-seven sport venues that were used as the 
competition sites for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, thirty-one venues were located 
within the city of Beijing, including twelve (12) sport facilities built specifically for the 
Olympic Games, eleven (11) converted or expanded pre-existing venues, and eight (8) 
temporary sport facilities built especially for the Games and planned to be transformed 
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for other functions after the Games or obliterated altogether.1 Through the investigation, 
however, the researcher found a difference between the original official 
BOCOG-established category and the actual existing condition.  
Two “pre-existing” venues, in BOCOG’s Official category, were actually 
newly-built ones based on the researcher’s investigation. The Feng Tai Sport Center 
Softball Field was built specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games, although there had 
been a baseball field on the site before the new one was built. The baseball field was too 
small and old to meet Olympic standards. The government decided to completely 
demolish the old one and rebuild with a totally new design. The BIT Gymnasium was 
built before it was selected to be an Olympic venue. However, the investigation showed 
that the BIT Gymnasium had never been used before the 2008 Olympic Games. In 
addition, after its completion in 2007, the venue was specifically reconstructed for the 
Games. Therefore, the two venues should be considered as newly-built. Moreover, the 
Olympic Tennis Center, also known as the Lotus Tennis Court, was planned to be built as 
a temporary venue in 2006, according to the Beijing Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform.2 However, one year later, in 2007, the government changed it
mind and built it as a permanent sport facility.
s 
                                                       
3 Therefore, the Olympic competition 
facilities in Beijing should include fourteen (14) newly-built venues, nine (9) expanded 
pre-existing venues, and eight (8) temporary venues.  
 
1 Official Website of BOCOG, “Olympic Venues,” http://en.beijing2008.cn/venues/  
2 Official Website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Beijing 
Construction Projects in 2006: Temporary Olympic Venues in the Olympic Park,” 
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/tzgl/zdjs/2006_zdgc/zdqqxm/aycg_2006/200607/t124920.htm (accessed April 13, 
2012). 
3 Official Website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, “Beijing 
Construction Projects in 2007: Olympic Tennis Center in the Olympic Park,” 
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/tzgl/zdjs/2007_zdxm/07zdxm/07zd_ay/200706/t180329.htm (accessed April 13, 
2012). 
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In terms of the eight temporary venues, instead of being dismantled after the 
Games, three of them continue to be used in their original sports functions, though with a 
different frequency use for each of them. According to the investigation, the triathlon 
course at the Ming Tomb Reservoir has been used for national and international triathlon 
competitions held annually. When it is not in use, the spectator area is empty and locked. 
The race course has been restored to an urban road for regular traffic on a daily basis. The 
hockey field in the Olympic Forest Park is open to the public for playing ball games with 
a user fee applied. There was only one occasion when a professional hockey team trained 
on the field during the last three and a half years. The Olympic Beach Volleyball Ground 
at the Chao Yang Park has not been opened to the public after the Games. Beside the 
venue a beach-theme park was established in 2009 using the sand from the venue. In 
general, the beach volleyball court has been unused during the last three and a half years, 
but did host two beach volleyball competitions. As to the other five temporary venues, the 
fencing area was removed from the China National Convention Center. The cycling urban 
race course was restored to a regular urban road. The BMX course was abandoned; the 
site has been empty and locked with no use of any kind. The archery field in the Olympic 
Sport Park was partially demolished for the construction of a new tennis stadium. The 
baseball field was completely dismantled, and the site became a “dumping area” after the 
Games. Considering their poor current condition, and the high-standard of construction 
originally committed, these temporary venues must be regarded as an absolute waste 
because there will be no social or financial return generated in the future. 
Based on this investigation, the researcher summarized eight avenues of 
post-Games utilization for the Olympic venues in Beijing: (1) tourism, (2) mass sport 
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(including leisure time recreation, amateur sport training, and sports meetings), (3) elite 
sport (including national training bases and national/international competitions), (4) 
commercial events, (5) public assembly (not sport-related), (6) commercial complexes, (7) 
educational purposes, and (8) commercial space leasing. Except for those demolished or 
abandoned, most of the venues in Beijing were utilized in some of the eight ways after 
the Games. As to the venue post-Games utilization status analyzed through Category 1, 
the results indicated that those pre-existing venues generally reflected a better current 
status than those newly-built, but not with respect to those built on university campuses 
(see Table 1 on next page). Pre-existing venues, such as the Workers’ Stadium, CIS, the 
NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, and the Ying Tung Natatorium, with 
pre-Olympic traditions in sports event hosting, venue management, and their own 
business modes, maintained relatively stable revenue sources, good reputations, and loyal 
customers. According to the study’s results, the Olympic Games had little positive 
influence on those venues in terms of their post-Games operations. However, of those 
new sport venues built especially for the Olympic Games, competition among them has 
intensified during the last three and a half years. Competing with their newly-built 
counterparts, pre-existing venues suffered from such weaknesses as a lack of advanced 
technology and superior equipment, and less comfortable physical environments. On the 
other hand, the “software,” such as management and operation modes, quality of services, 
and customer loyalty, could be considered strengths for pre-existing venues.  
According to the results, among newly-built venues, those located on university 
campuses were better utilized than others of the same classification. Most of the new 
venues on campuses such as the USTB Gymnasium and the BIT Gymnasium, considered  
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Table 1. Venues’ Post-Games Utilization in Category 1 
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student use for physical education courses as the top priority for venue post-Games 
utilization. In addition, university venues are also used as assembly places, leisure time 
recreation areas open to the public, and precincts for commercial events renting. In 
contrast, some newly-built venues such as the Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field, the 
Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park, the Olympic Tennis Center, and the Lao Shan Velodrome, 
have been under utilized after the Olympic Games. Furthermore, venues such as the 
Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay Target Field (SRH & CTF), and the National 
Indoor Stadium have been single function facilities after the Games. For instance, SRH & 
CTF have been used only for national team training and competition. Since GASC is the 
owner of the two venues, the original purpose for the venues was to serve as a training 
base for national elite athletes. This has not been changed for the last three and a half 
years. 
 
1-2. Category 2: Location 
The researcher also categorized Beijing’s Olympic venues based on their 
geographical distribution. According to BOBICO in 2001, Beijing’s Olympic competition 
venues were to be located in four areas of the city: (1) the Olympic Green (the central 
area), (2) the Western Community Area, (3) the North Scenic Area and (4) the University 
Area.4 In the Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games published in 2010, 
BOCOG reiterated this same disposition regarding venue geographical distribution.5 
Realizing the inaccuracy of the BOBICO’s distribution statement, the researcher 
developed a new geographical distribution category for the venues, attempting to place 
                                                        
4 The Candidature File of Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games Bid – Volume II, January 2001. 
5 Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Volume III, pp. 27-38. 
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all the venues into relevant groups.  
Except for the road race cycling route, all thirty venues were grouped into five 
geographical areas: (1) the Olympic Central Area (including the Olympic Green and 
NOSC), (2) the West Community Area, (3) the University Area, (4) the East Community 
Area, and (5) the North Scenic Area. According to this new category, ten Olympic venues 
were located in the Olympic Central Area; six were in the University Area; eight were in 
the West Community Area; four were in the East Community Area; and two were located 
at the North Scenic Area, which was a rural area north of the city. 
The investigation showed that generally the venues in the University Area were 
well utilized after the Games (see Table 2 on next page). This area included five venues 
built on university campuses plus the Capital Indoor Stadium. In the Olympic Central 
Area, the three venues (the Stadium, the Gymnasium and the Natatorium) built in the 
NOSC were well utilized after the Games. In contrast, some venues in the Olympic 
Central Area, such as the Olympic Tennis Center, the Bird’s Nest, and the National 
Indoor Stadium, show general underuse.  
In the West Community Area, the investigation showed that after the Games most 
of the venues were underused, especially the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay 
Target Field and the Lao Shan Velodrome, whose main halls were solely used by the 
national team. Also, the Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field was underused, partially 
because of the unpopularity of softball in the city. In contrast, the Lao Shan Mountain 
Bike Course became a very popular site for biking enthusiasts, though a lack of 
supervision and maintenance for the course was always an issue after the Games. As to 
the MasterCard Center, it became a major venue at city-west to hold commercial events.  
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However, its sport function was weakened due to few national/international competitions 
being held there after the Games, except for two “commercial games” during the last 
three and a half years and three CBA Final games in March 2012. Furthermore, adjacent 
to MCC, the Olympic Baseball Field was demolished directly after the Games. Adjacent 
to the Mountain Bike Course, the Lao Shan BMX Course has been locked up without any 
use for three and a half years. Demolishing or abandoning venues at least could save a 
large amount of maintenance expenses for the owners if cost was really a concern to 
them. 
In the East Community Area, the investigation showed that the Workers’ Stadium 
and the Workers’ Gymnasium Theater were well utilized after the Games, especially the 
Workers’ Stadium, with its long tradition in terms of the venue’s business operation and 
exploitation of sport in the city. It was used not only as a soccer stadium for the Chinese 
Professional Soccer League, but also a place for commercial events. As well, it served as 
a business complex by using space under the spectator stands. The BJUT Gymnasium, as 
the only large scale multifunction gymnasium in city-south, was also well utilized as a 
public leisure time recreation and sporting place, as well as a popular competition site for 
badminton. The Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground was planned to be dismantled 
after the Games; but it remained intact, though seldom used. The owner of the venue 
thought that the cost for demolishing the venue would be higher than post-Games 
maintenance and operation costs. Envisioned daily cost for operation and maintenance 
would be aggregated over time by an uncertain revenue return to compensate. 
The Olympic Central Area and the University Area were adjacent to each other. 
Both areas were at city-north. The number of the Olympic venues in city-north totaled 
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sixteen, more than half of the Olympic venues in Beijing. In addition, there were eight 
venues at city-west, while only four venues were located at city-east. For city-south, there 
were none. In terms of sport facility service functions for local communities in the city, 
the geographical distribution of Olympic venues in Beijing reflected an imbalance 
between city-north and city-south, and between city-west and city-east. As one of the 
principles of the study, the researcher contended that with the opportunity of hosting the 
Olympic Games, host cities should strategically consider the balanced development of 
city sport as one of the most important elements in its blueprint for post-Olympic urban 
development. However, Beijing’s distribution of Olympic venues did not completely 
serve this strategy.  
The imbalance of venue distribution caused at least two problems. First, on the 
northwestern side of the city, twenty-four Olympic venues were located, which was 80% 
of Olympic venues in Beijing. Especially at city-north, after the Games, the plentitude of 
venues (pre-existing ones and newly-built ones) led to competition among them being 
dramatically increased, which brought more difficulties in terms of their business 
operation. On the other hand, on the southeastern side of the city, especially city-south, 
there was no large multifunction sport facility for the public. The BJUT Gymnasium was 
the only one built within the area of city-south. As to city-east, the Chao Yang Park Beach 
Volleyball Ground was not opened to the public, but only used for two 
national/international beach volleyball competitions since the Games closed. This was 
definitely “underused.” As a result, in city-east, only the Workers’ Gymnasium Theater 
and the Workers’ Stadium in the Beijing Gong Ti Center were well utilized after the 
Games. However, considering the large population in the area, the researcher concluded 
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that the government of the city missed its greatest opportunity, to develop sport facilities 
for local communities at city-south as well as city-east.    
 
1-3. Category 3: Ownership 
The researcher also addressed the question of venue ownership and its impact on 
operation, management, and use. According to the investigation, Olympic venues in 
Beijing reflected four types of ownership: (1) government-owned venues, (2) 
GASC-owned venues, (3) university-owned venues, and (4) private enterprise-owned 
venues. Based on the information derived from interviews as well as the documents of 
relevant organizations and official websites of venues, the researcher reported the history, 
use, current operation condition, and future development of each.  
Sixteen Olympic venues in Beijing were owned by multilevel governments, 
including the Beijing Municipal Government, the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions 
supervised by the municipality, five district governments also under the supervision of 
the municipality, and specific government-owned enterprises. Seven venues were owned 
by GASC, the Ministry of Sport of China. Although GASC might be considered a 
governmental department, because of its special meaning and importance for Chinese 
national sport, the venues owned by GASC were separated by the researcher so that their 
special significance could be dissected. Six venues were owned by universities. Finally, 
two venues were owned by private enterprise. One of them, the Olympic Baseball Field, 
was demolished directly following the Games. In addition to GASC, closely associated 
with government, the six universities were supervised by either the Ministry of Education 
of China or the Beijing Education Commission, which means that they were actually 
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under the leadership of government. As a result, for the total of thirty-one Olympic 
competition venues in Beijing, twenty-nine of them were under the leadership of 
government directly or indirectly, while the remaining two were owned by private 
enterprise.        
Of the four groups, the University-owned venues, in general, were well utilized 
after the Games (see Table 3 on next page). All six venues are used as both leisure time 
recreation and sporting places for the public and university assembly places. Moreover, 
except for the BUAA Gymnasium, all university venues are used for student physical 
education courses. Also, except for the BIT Gymnasium, all are available to the public to 
host commercial events. These venues are also used for student athlete training and for 
hosting sports meetings for both students and other organizations away from campus. 
Having a stable user base, namely, students and gym users in the communities nearby, the 
venues on campuses are utilized more frequently on a daily basis. As sport venues, the 
more frequently they are used, the better maintenance they gain, and the more they 
benefit society.6 Campus venues proved this well. 
In terms of the financial condition and supervision of venues on campuses, there 
was no direct correlation between revenue the venues generated and the expense incurred. 
The final decisions for current operation and future direction of venue management and 
operation modes will be made by university authority. In general, the universities are 
responsible for supervising the revenue that venues generate. They also cover venue 
operation expense. Under the umbrella of university authority, the future of these venues  
                                                        
6 Ben Blanchard, and Haze Fan, “Beijing’s Underused Olympic Venues are Draining Funds,” The Globe 
and Mail, April 19, 2012, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-birds-nest-to-white-elephant-beijings-underused-olymp
ic-venues-are-draining-funds/article2396560/ (accessed April 16, 2012). 
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appears secure and predictable: the university will fully support the venue, as long as the 
venue remains under the complete authority of the university. As long as universities do 
not take steps towards changing this relationship, something that has not been seen during 
the last three and a half years, it will be unlikely that a venue’s administrative mode, 
business operation, and financial condition, will change. 
For those venues owned by GASC, the investigation showed diverse conditions in 
terms of their post-Games utilization. The Stadium, the Gymnasium and the Ying Tung 
Natatorium in NOSC and the Capital Indoor Stadium showed reasonably good utilization 
condition after the Games. But the other three, the Beijing Shooting Range Hall and Clay 
Target Field and the Lao Shan Velodrome were relatively underused; indeed the main 
parts of those venues are used only for elite athlete training. The Velodrome and the 
shooting complex were specifically built by GASC for national team training after the 
Olympic Games. No public use was planned. Thus, from one point of view, the venues 
continue to be used with their original purpose in mind. In addition, the administrative 
center of each of them generates revenue from other business, which partially 
compensates for the venue’s maintenance expense. For instance, in the Velodrome, the 
Center utilizes the function rooms around the corridor in the venue to operate a fencing 
club for youth. But for total operation cost, including especially major repairs and 
equipment update, it had to depend on financial support from GASC. Making a profit 
from the venues was not the priority of the supervision departments of those venues. 
They did not need to generate revenue to offset cost. It was not necessary for them to 
explore “venue business.” If GASC wanted the venues to make a profit, venue 
management would attempt to do it. But, if there is no direct requirement from GASC 
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towards revenue generating, then there is no call for marketing development. After all, 
the major task of these Centers was to serve national teams in a mission to secure 
Olympic gold medals for the country. 
In this group, GASC also financially aided those venues that demonstrated 
positive conditions of post-Games utilization. These types were all pre-existing and 
multifunction venues that could generate revenue to help compensate for their daily 
operation costs. For instance, the Capital Indoor Stadium had been generating revenue 
from its venue business since the Games concluded. Such revenue partially compensated 
for its maintenance expenses. However, even if it did not do that task well, the CIS 
management Center would still operate through the financial support of GASC, because 
the Center is responsible for the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy of the country, GASC’s 
top priority. GASC would not cast blame the Center because it did not make money from 
its venue business, but would blame it if the Olympic gold medal count for the country 
seriously declined. Therefore, GASC-owned venues such as the Velodrome and CIS will 
unlikely become a “white elephant,” as long as the Olympic Gold Medal Strategy exists 
in China. Correspondingly, it is unlikely that the administrative mode of these venues will 
change as long as GASC, as the owner, takes no measures towards reform in terms of its 
own structure and administrative system.  
In the “Government-owned” group, there were three sub-groups: (1) state-owned 
enterprise, (2) municipal level government, and (3) district level government. The 
ownership of certain venues in this group was transferred: (1) the National Stadium (the 
Bird’s Nest)’s ownership was transferred from the CITIC Consortium Operating 
Company to BSAM, a state-owned enterprise; (2) ownership of the National Indoor 
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Stadium (NIS) was transferred from Guo Ao Investment to BPA, another state-owned 
enterprise; and (3) ownership of the Olympic Tennis Court, Hockey Field and Archery 
Field altogether, were transferred from BSAM to the Chao Yang District Government. As 
a result, each of the four Olympic venues in the Beijing Olympic Park: CNCC, NIS, the 
Water Cube, and the Bird’s Nest, are owned by different state-owned enterprises. In 
addition, nine venues are owned and supervised by five different district governments in 
Beijing; and the other two in the Gong Ti Center (the Workers’ Stadium and the Workers’ 
Gymnasium Theater) belong to the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions.     
The venues in the Gong Ti Center had been utilized quite well even before the 
2008 Olympic Games. CNCC, owned by Beijing North Star, a state-owned enterprise, 
hosted the fencing competitions and was used as both the Olympic International 
Broadcasting Center and Main Press Center during the Games. After the Games the 
fencing hall was dismantled and the building restored to its originally planned function, 
that being, an international convention center. Although lacking supervision and proper 
maintenance, the Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course has become a popular biking site for 
numerous cycling enthusiasts in the city. The public does not pay to use the site for biking, 
walking, and climbing. In this group, the four venues noted above demonstrated better 
utilization status than the others. 
The Water Cube is owned by BSAM, a state-owned enterprise. Basically, the 
venue has been well used as a public aquatic recreation center, especially after its indoor 
water-theme park commenced to operate in 2009. The Company also leases the main 
competition hall to clients for hosting commercial events. However, due to the huge 
operation costs, the operational management company officially admits that the venue 
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currently faces a CNY 10 million (USD 1.5 million) annual deficit. In addition, as a 
world-class natatorium, the Water Cube seldom hosted international swimming 
competitions, considered by many as its major utilization shortcoming after the Games. 
The venue, closely associated with the Bird’s Nest as both are located in the Olympic 
Park, is one of the landmark tourism destinations in Beijing. During the first two years 
after the Games, the venue’s tourism revenue was significantly high, so that potential 
questions in terms of post-Games utilization were hardly apparent. But as time passed, 
tourist enthusiasm declined causing dramatic revenue decreases since the third year after 
the Games. Although the owner had a post-Games utilization plan for the venue before 
the Games, the management team made no necessary revisions to the plan based on the 
changes in social environment, economic situation, and political circumstance over the 
last five years. The original plan is no longer suitable for the venue, indeed, it has been 
largely abandoned. 
Based on the investigation, the other two venues in the Beijing Olympic Park, the 
Bird’s Nest and the National Indoor Stadium, showed even more underused status than 
the Water Cube. The ownerships of the two venues changed from different enterprises 
(state-owned) back to the government; and then the government transferred them to other 
enterprises (state-owned). The aim was for better control. The ownership transitions 
might be one of the major reasons for the venues’ underused condition. The CITIC 
consortium signed a “chartered rights agreement” with the Beijing Municipal 
Government in August 2003, in which the consortium was granted 30-year management 
rights to the National Stadium. However, one year after the Beijing Olympic Games, the 
government decided to take over the rights from the consortium. After the transition, the 
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National Stadium was actually under the full authority of the government. Because of this 
transition in authority, the first PPP project in China failed. In terms of NIS, the BUCID 
consortium was also granted a 30-year management rights contract for the venue. At the 
beginning of 2009, three months after the Paralympics, the government withdrew the 
rights from the Guo Ao Company (the operating company of the venue representing the 
consortium) and attempted to transfer the ownership of NIS to BPA, which was a 
state-owned enterprise whose major business was in the culture and art industry. The 
operation of NIS under the complete leadership of the Guo Ao Company lasted three 
months. Due to the dispute between NIS’s old owner and the government, the transition 
process took almost two and half years to complete. Under such a situation, regular 
post-Games utilization of the two venues was adversely affected. 
Based on the investigation, the nine venues owned by five different district 
governments were underused after the Games. Some of them were targeted to be 
demolished after the Games, such as the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the 
Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic Hockey Field. However, they 
were designed and built under such high architectural and construction criteria that they 
qualified as permanent venues. Thus, their owners were reluctant to dismantle them. As a 
result, these venues continued to exist, each one heavily underused. In addition, 
newly-built permanent venues such as the Shun Yi Aquatic Park, the Feng Tai Sport 
Center Softball Field, and the Olympic Tennis Center, also showed underutilization 
conditions. The district governments did not engage specialized professionals to manage 
and operate the venues; they regarded the venues as extensions of the government’s will 
and behaviors, which led to the venues functioning in a mode dictated by the government 
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instead of following a free market mechanism. For the other two in this subgroup, the 
Lao Shan BMX Course and the Olympic Archery Field, the investigation indicated that 
they were completely unused following the Games. The former has been closed for three 
and a half years since the Games finished, and the latter was partially demolished to 
create a site for a new tennis court construction right beside the underused Olympic 
Tennis Court.  
In terms of the final ownership group, there were two Olympic venues in it, the 
MasterCard Center and the Olympic Baseball Field. Both of them were owned by the 
Bloomage International Investment Group, the only private owner of Beijing’s Olympic 
venues. The two venues were built together in the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center. 
The baseball field was demolished right after the Games. The original name of MCC was 
the Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium, later changed to the Wu Ke Song Arena. 
After the naming rights sale of the venue to MasterCard in 2010, the venue was officially 
named MCC. It was the first and only Olympic venue in the city that was rebranded 
commercially. Based on the investigation, the major business of its post-Games 
utilization has been to host commercial events; most of which are not sport-related. As 
the only private enterprise-owned Olympic venue in the city, MCC’s financial sheet was 
balanced and a surplus even appeared after the naming rights sale. One of the key factors 
influencing the development of MCC has been the relationship between its owner and 
government, which was the reason why one of MCC’s core tasks was to improve such 
relationships because MCC’s future will definitely need government’s support. 
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1-4. Post-Games Use 
Through discussion of the three categories, the general conditions regarding 
post-Games utilization of Olympic competition venues in Beijing were described (see 
Table 4 on next 3 pages). In general, during the last three and a half years after the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games: (1) the venues built on university campuses were well 
utilized; (2) the pre-existing venues were largely well utilized, such as the Workers’ 
Stadium, the NOSC Stadium, the NOSC Gymnasium, the Ying Tung Natatorium, and the 
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course; (3) the multifunction venues were largely better 
utilized than those of mono function capacity, such as the Beijing Shooting Range Hall  
and the Clay Target Field, the Olympic Archery Field, and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic 
Park; (4) the medium scale venues were better utilized than the large scale venues, such 
as the Bird’s Nest and the Shun Yi Olympic Aquatic Park; (5) venues owned by the 
government, especially the five district governments, were underused, which included the 
Feng Tai Sport Center Softball Field, the Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground, the 
Olympic Tennis Court, the Ming Tomb Reservoir Triathlon Course, and the Olympic 
Hockey Field; and (6), in contrast, venues owned by the universities, GASC, and private 
enterprise, showed better utilization portraits than their government-owned (district 
governments) counterparts. In addition, most of the venues continued to maintain their 
sport functions, either for mass sport or for elite sport, except for CNCC, NIS, the 
Workers’ Gymnasium Theater, and, of course, those venues demolished. 
In terms of the financial condition of the venues, except for MCC, owned by 
private-enterprise, all receive financial support, more or less, from government or 
relevant governmental departments, directly or indirectly. Some of the venues, especially  
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Table 4. A Summary of Venues’ Post-Games Utilization 
  Workers' Stadium 
NOSC 
Stadium USTB BJUT PKU CIS NOSC Gym 
Tourism Destination               
Recreation ●   ● ● ● ● ● 
Amateurs 
Training   ● ● ● ●   ● 
For 
Mass 
Sport Sports 
Meeting   ● ● ● ●     
Training 
Base ● ●       ●   
For 
Elite 
Sport 
Hosting 
National/I'tnl 
Sporting 
Events 
● ●   ●   ●   
Hosting 
Commercial  
Events 
●   ● ● ● ● ● 
Gathering Place 
(not sport-related) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Commercial 
Complex1 ●             
For Education   ● ● ● ●     
Commercial Space 
Leasing ● ● ●     ● ● 
  BIT CAU Water Cube BUAA 
Bird's 
Nest 
Workers' 
Gym 
Theater 
Ying Tung 
Natatorium 
Tourism Destination     ●   ●     
Recreation ● ● ● ●     ● 
Amateurs 
Training ●           ● 
For 
Mass 
Sport 
Sports 
Meeting ●             
Training 
Base               
For 
Elite 
Sport 
Hosting 
National/I'tnl 
Sporting 
Events 
  ● ●         
Hosting 
Commercial  
Events 
  ● ● ● ● ●   
Gathering Place 
(not sport-related) ● ●   ● ● ●   
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Commercial 
Complex               
For Education ● ●           
Commercial Space 
Leasing       ●   ● ● 
  Velodrome Aquatic Park CNCC 
SRH & 
CTF 
Softball 
Field MCC NIS 
Tourism Destination   ●           
Recreation   ●           
Amateurs 
Training ●       ●     
For 
Mass 
Sport Sports 
Meeting               
Training 
Base ●     ●       
For 
Elite 
Sport 
Hosting 
National/I'tnl 
Sporting 
Events 
● ●   ● ● ●   
Hosting 
Commercial  
Events 
          ● ● 
Gathering Place 
(not sport-related)     ●       ● 
Commercial 
Complex     ●         
For Education               
Commercial Space 
Leasing               
  Beach Volleyball 
Triathlon 
Course 
Tennis 
Center
Hockey 
Field 
Mountain 
Bike 
Course  
Archery 
Field BMX Field 
Tourism Destination               
Recreation       ● ●     
Amateurs 
Training               
For 
Mass 
Sport Sports 
Meeting               
Training 
Base               
For 
Elite 
Sport 
Hosting 
National/I'tnl 
Sporting 
Events 
● ● ●         
Hosting 
Commercial  
Events 
              
 
237 
Gathering Place 
(not sport-related)               
Commercial 
Complex               
For Education               
Commercial Space 
Leasing               
1. Commercial complex included entertainment business, hotels, restaurants, and convention centers. 
 
those built on university campuses and those in NOSC and the Gong Ti Center showed 
positive financial conditions, while deficits were reported for others, such as the Water 
Cube and the Bird’s Nest. Whether or not a venue showed a positive figure on its 
financial balance sheet largely depended on the way that the expenses were calculated. 
For instance, the BUAA Gymnasium showed a positive “bottom line” on its financial 
sheet because the expenses calculated consisted of human resources, energy, logistics, 
and maintenance cost, while excluding depreciation of fixed assets. If the depreciation of 
fixed assets were counted in the cost calculation, not only the BUAA Gymnasium, but all 
the Olympic venues investigated, would show negative results on their financial balance 
sheets. 
Regarding Olympic venues in Beijing after the Games, their functional status 
varies. Different types of ownership, geographical locations, administrative systems, 
management modes, even visions, cannot be directly and simply judged by right or 
wrong at this time. Furthermore, the evaluations for host cities post-Olympic 
development are constantly ongoing. For example, Cashman focused on post-Olympic 
effect on the city of Sydney from 1999 to 2006 during which the changing conditions 
regarding the Olympic venues in the city were reported and analyzed continually.7 The 
                                                        
7 Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes, “Cost and Benefits,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its 
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IOC initiated its assessment project regarding the Olympic Games Impact on host cities 
in 2002. Specifically for Beijing, the project lasted for 11 years since then.8 Also, the IO
proposed a 15-year cycle for one Olympic Games regarding its financial impact as well 
as an impact on natural and built environment and local communities.
C 
be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Thus, it might 
too soon to draw definitive conclusions regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic 
venues three and a half years after the Games. More time will be needed to test what has 
to be done to the venues in the city of Beijing. Because of the co-existence of both 
well-used and underused venues in Beijing based on the investigation, the researcher 
contended that the status of Beijing’s Olympic venues at this point not be evaluated as 
either positive or negative in general, due to the complicated socio-cultural environment, 
historical tradition, and rapidly evolving present/future. However, some practical 
observations can be passed on to potential Olympic host cities.  
 
2. Recommendations 
Derived from the investigation, the researcher puts forward fifteen 
recommendations regarding post-Games utilization of Olympic venues for potential 
Olympic host cities in the future. The order of the recommendations followed the order of 
the findings part of the study. 
 
Impact, eds., Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), pp. 195-200; “What is 
‘Olympic Legacy’?” In the Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000, edited by Miquel de Moragas, 
Christopher Kennett, and Nuria Puig (Lausanne: International Symposium, November 2002), pp. 31-42; 
Richard Cashman, The Bitter-Sweet Awakening: The Legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Sydney: 
Walla Walla Press, 2006). 
8 Beijing Olympic Games Impact (Abstract), a document that is included with the published electronic 
version Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. 
9 Christophe Dubi, Pierre-Alain Hug, and Pascal van Griethuysen, “Olympic Games Management: From 
the Candidature to the Final Evaluation, an Integrated Management Approach.” In The Legacy of the 
Olympic Games: 1984-2000, edited by Miquel de Moragas, Christopher Kennett, and Nuria Puig 
(Lausanne: International Symposium, November 2002), pp. 403-413. 
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Recommendation 1. Considering the post-Games four-year effect!  
As to the first four years after the Olympic Games, this study indicated that the 
people’s enthusiasm in terms of visiting the venues, using the Olympic facilities, and 
focusing on and enjoying the Olympic spirit will rapidly decline. Moreover, the new 
Games occurring every four years further dampen enthusiasm about the Olympic venues 
in the previous host cities. Therefore, energetic use during the first four years after the 
Games is a must in order to fully take advantage of Olympic momentum. Closing a venue 
for any reason during the period is a grave danger. If there is a post-Games utilization 
plan established before the Games, then follow the plan; if not, then refrain from 
reconstructing, renovating, or altering function. Halting a venue’s presence during this 
four-year period will seriously affect its later operation and development, especially for 
those major iconic Olympic venues. The first four years after the Games is the “golden 
time” in terms of Olympic venues’ post-utilization; thus, reconsider carefully on carrying 
out any further reconstruction projects for venues after this period. 
 
Recommendation 2. Making a plan and then revising it constantly! 
Having a post-Games utilization plan is good, but not good enough. After the 
Games conclude, factors such as social environment change and economic circumstance 
alteration might seriously affect preliminary plans for post-Games venue utilization. The 
plan might no longer be suitable to changing conditions. Therefore, constant and regular 
evaluation of the plan should be carried out, adjustments and corrections made, further 
evaluation undertaken. 
 
240 
 
Recommendation 3. Avoiding “risk avoidance”! 
Modifying or correcting preliminary plans regarding post-Games utilization of 
venues, approved by “removed” authorities, could pose potential risks. Unavoidably, 
relevant supervision authorities mandating change will be responsible for the 
consequences no matter what they will be. However, this should not be an excuse for not 
acting in a proactive manner in pursuing changes. To deal with potential risks and 
relevant responsibilities, mechanisms such as responsibility, decision making, risk 
sharing, and potential crisis management should be associated with preliminary 
post-Games utilization plans. 
 
Recommendation 4. Considering a sport’s popularity and performance level in cities! 
When deciding which Olympic venues should be built permanently for certain 
sports and which should be built temporarily, the sport’s popularity as well as national 
elite athlete performance level should be considered. For instance, in Beijing, the Lao 
Shan BMX field and the Wu Ke Song Baseball Field were built as temporary facilities, 
because the two sports were quite unpopular in the city and the elite athlete performance 
level in China was relatively low compared to the world’s top athletes. Therefore, 
building them as temporary facilities was a wise choice of the authority.  
 
Recommendation 5. Realistically thinking on a venue’s post-Games function! 
Planning for post-Games utilization should be based on a venue’s actual functions 
and scale. The existing conditions of a venue should be considered as the priority for 
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developing its post-Games utilization, instead of adding new functions or expanding the 
scale and structure of the venue to match potential new business. Avoiding re-investment 
on Olympic venues after the Games is an efficient way to reduce its operating cost and 
generate revenue in the relatively short term. 
 
Recommendation 6. Function-oriented design! 
The design of a venue in terms of its layout, functioning structure, and reservation 
space should be function-oriented toward post-Games utilization so that it will not have 
to invest extra money after the Games for re-design and reconstruction. Therefore, 
positioning post-Games function (s) clearly and in detail before the Games is critical for 
its long-term strategy.   
 
Recommendation 7. Marketing prior to the Olympic Games! 
Marketing promotion before the Games for post-Games utilization of Olympic 
venues must be considered seriously for permanently-built venues. No matter what 
purposes venues will serve after the Games - serving mass sport, offering commercial 
space for lease, as a gathering place for holding commercial events, or being a tourist 
destination - marketing promotions and public relations activities must be carried out 
before the Games so that the public, the media, and potential clients become fully aware 
of future use options. A constant public exposure must be enhanced, the sooner the better. 
 
Recommendation 8. Sport-related departments manage on-campus venues! 
In terms of those Olympic venues on university campuses, sport-related 
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departments should manage and operate the venues instead of service departments, 
logistics departments, supplies departments, maintenance departments, or facilities 
management departments. Sport-related departments such as recreation centers, faculties 
of physical education, or athletics supervision centers will place sports, physical 
education, and recreation-related activities and events as the priority for a venue’s 
post-Games utilization, which is the original purpose for which Olympic venues were 
built on campus. By doing this, the working emphasis of a venue’s operation will focus 
on serving students from a sport base rather than commercializing the venues for 
generating profit. 
 
Recommendation 9. Balancing venue location around the city! 
Under the condition of meeting the IOC’s demands regarding geographical 
distribution of Olympic facilities for a host city, decision makers of the city should try 
their best to balance the distribution of Olympic venues, that is, locate the venues 
(especially those with multi-functions) in areas where sport faculties are lacking. By 
doing this, Olympic-related infrastructure construction can help the city balance and 
improve its own urban development in terms of mass sport and residents’ participation in 
physical activity.  
 
Recommendation 10. Management teams switching! 
The team that is responsible for operation and management of Olympic venues 
before and during the Olympic Games should be replaced for post-Games operation and 
management. The operation focus and working principles for the two-week plus Olympic 
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events vs. post-Games utilization on a regular daily basis are absolutely different. 
Specialized professionals must be engaged. If one team can handle the duties 
professionally in both periods, then fine; otherwise, recomposing the management team is 
necessary. 
 
Recommendation 11. Targeting user groups for post-Games utilization! 
When devising post-Games utilization plans, the purpose as well as the potential 
user groups of Olympic venues should be clarified. Generally speaking, in terms of those 
venues built and owned by municipal or district governments, the need for mass sport 
should be the priority for their post-Games use. On the other hand, venues financed by 
sport ministries of the country, for instance, GASC in China, can be primarily used for 
elite athletes on national teams. In addition, those venues built on campuses should focus 
on both mass sport for students in general and elite sport for gifted student athletes. Those 
owned and developed by private enterprise should normally focus on exploring 
commercial sports and cultural events as their major post-Games utilization goals. Based 
on Beijing’s condition investigated in this study, indications were that it was quite 
difficult to mix two or more purposes or client groups together into one Olympic venue, 
no matter where it was located and the type of ownership attached. 
 
Recommendation 12. Be careful about the conflict between functions! 
Olympic venues, especially those iconic examples such as the Water Cube and the 
Bird’s Nest in Beijing, face conflict in terms of being tourism destinations, gathering 
places for sports competitions or commercial events, or integrated into population 
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neighbourhoods. These functional purposes can lead to different requirements for the 
peripheral environment, structure of the region in which the venues are located, auxiliary 
facilities, and even administrative modes and operation mechanisms. Therefore, 
distinguishing the major and minor functional purposes and then identifying the priority 
for a venue’s vision of future development will be an efficient way to minimize the 
conflict. 
 
Recommendation 13. Professional training offered to venue managers!  
Professional training for post-Games management and operation should be 
offered to venue managers and directors. And the training course should be offered 
during the preparation phase of the Olympic Games instead of after the Games.  
 
Recommendation 14. Private investment? Be careful!  
The Olympic sport venues are always considered public products in China. They 
are financially and politically supported by multilayered government branches or 
departments. The study indicated that most of the venues in Beijing were funded by 
government sources or government-owned enterprises using public funds. In addition, 
some venues funded by government-owned enterprises were reclaimed right after the 
Games by the municipal government, such as the Bird’s Nest and the National Indoor 
Stadium. But, fundamentally, it can be seen that three and a half years after the Beijing 
Games, most of the Olympic venues in the city are directly or indirectly under the 
authority of government. Furthermore, unlike the United States and other western 
industrial states where professional sport has vigorously developed for decades, in China, 
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professional sport is in its early infancy stage. As a result, there are few opportunities that 
might urge private enterprise to enter the realm of professional sport. Obviously, this 
suggestion is only pertinent from the perspective of the Beijing Olympic Games. For 
future host cities, the specific situations have to be applied relevantly.  
 
Recommendation 15. Applying advanced management mode but fitting it into the local 
social environment! 
Certain advanced management and operation modes for Olympic venues, 
especially those in western countries such as the United States and Australia, have been 
proved practical and feasible for venue post-Games utilization. However, future host 
cities have to carefully consider their specific conditions in terms of their own social 
environments, historical tradition regarding sport and recreation, and cultural context 
within which the relationship between governmental departments and venue owners 
might be critical for a venue’s development. Thus, combining both sides might be the 
best way for venue post-Games utilization.  
 
3. Future Research 
In terms of possible research on this topic in the future, four aspects are developed 
based on the current study. First, follow-up research is needed to further investigate the 
status of the venues in Beijing in two to four years hence. Associated with the current 
study, future research will extend a longitudinal line that can achieve a further and 
longer-term assessment of post-Games utilization of Beijing’s Olympic venues. Second, 
deeper investigation regarding district government-owned venues should be done in the 
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future. During the investigation for the current study, because of certain accessibility 
issues, the investigation of district government-owned venues was limited, which might 
influence the evaluation in general. Thus, future study should be focused on those types 
of venues in Beijing. Third, the possibility of privatization of the government-owned 
venues in Beijing should be studied in the future. Although currently most of the venues 
in the city are owned by governments or governmental authorities, given the fast pace of 
development and reform in China, possible privatization of sport facilities in the future 
cannot be ignored. Lastly, two relationships should be treated in future research. In terms 
of the government-owned venues, the relationship between the government’s 
administrative system and the venues should be carefully weighed, because it is the key 
factor that will influence future development of the venues. And, in terms of those 
GASC-owned venues, the relationship between the strategy of Chinese national sport and 
the venues should be examined even more thoroughly, because it will directly decide 
possible reform of the venues in the future, in terms of management modes and 
supervision structures. 
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Appendix A. Brief Maps of the Olympic Venues in Beijing 
 
Source: Google Earth (the author marked all the venues’ locations) 
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Source: Google Earth (without the Triathlon Course and the Shun Yi Aquatic Park) 
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Appendix B. List of the Olympic Venues in Beijing 
 
 
Newly-Built Olympic Venues (12) 
Venue Name Sports Events 
National Stadium (Bird’s Nest) Athletics, Football Final, and Opening/Closing 
Ceremonies 
National Aquatic Center (Water Cube) Swimming, Diving, and Synchronized Swimming 
National Indoor Stadium (NIS) Gymnastics, Artistic, Trampoline, and Handball Final
Olympic Green Tennis Center Tennis 
Beijing Shooting Range Hall Shooting (Pistol and Rifle) 
Lao Shan Velodrome Track Cycling 
Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park Rowing, Canoeing/kayak Flatwater, Canoeing/Kayak 
Slalom, and Marathon Swimming 
Wu Ke Song Indoor Stadium Basketball 
Peking University (PKU) Gymnasium Table Tennis 
China Agricultural University (CAU) 
Gymnasium 
Wrestling 
University of Science and Technology 
Beijing (USTB) Gymnasium 
Judo and Taekwondo 
Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) 
Gymnasium 
Badminton and Gymnastics (Rhythmic) 
 
Converted or Expanded Existing Venues (11) 
Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) 
Gymnasium 
Volleyball 
Beihang University (BUAA) Gymnasium Weightlifting 
Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field Skeet Shooting and Trap Shooting 
Feng Tai Softball Field Softball 
Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) Volleyball Final 
Workers’ Stadium Football 
Workers’ Gymnasium Boxing 
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course Mountain Bike Cycling 
Olympic Sports Center Stadium NOSC Football, Modern Pentathlon (Riding and Running) 
Olympic Sports Center Gymnasium Handball 
Ying Tung Natatorium Water Polo and Modern Pentathlon (Swimming) 
 
Temporary Venues (8) 
China National Convention Center 
(CNCC) 
Fencing and Modern Pentathlon  
(Fencing and Shooting) 
Olympic Green Archery Field Archery 
Olympic Green Hockey Field Field Hockey 
Wu Ke Song Baseball Field Baseball 
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Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground Beach Volleyball 
Lao Shan BMX Field BMX 
Triathlon Venue Triathlon 
Urban Road Cycling Course Road Race 
Sources: Official Website of BOCOG and the Official Report of the Beijing 2008 
Olympic Games. 
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Appendix C. Outline of Interview Questions 
 
Part I. The history of the venue. 
1. When was it built? And was it specifically built for the 2008 Olympic Games, or a 
renovated one, or a re-built one on the top of an existing venue in the city? 
 
2. About the venue’s location? Who was (were) the decision-maker (s)? What 
reasons were considered when the decision regarding the location was made? And 
in addition to sport consideration and budget consideration, is there any 
consideration regarding its future function around local community? From a 
current point of view, please describe the advantages (or disadvantages) of the 
location. 
 
3. What were the main/original functions and features of the venue? And what kinds 
of sport events were hosted during the 2008 Olympic Games? 
 
4. What was the original ownership of the venue before and during the 2008 
Olympic Games? And was the investor the owner? 
 
5. What was the total cost/financing scheme if the venue was brand-new and built 
specifically for the 2008 Olympic Games? And who paid for the design and 
construction (central/municipal government or private/corporate)?  
 
6. (If the venue is a renovated or redesigned one), why and how could the venue be 
chosen as a major Olympic site (based on what you knew about, what could be 
the main principles for the Beijing Olympic sites and venues chosen among the 
existing sport venues)? What was the original functions/features and scale of it 
prior to the change and how about the new one? What was the major difference 
between them? Who was the original owner and what about the new one? Who 
paid for the design and construction cost? And what was the total cost? 
 
7. Was there any plan made at the beginning for the venue’s utilization and 
management after the Games? If yes, please describe it briefly, such as what was 
it about? Who made it? Who would be the one responsible for the future of the 
venue? What would be the financial resources for the future of the venue? What 
would be the targeted purpose and functions of the venue in the future? And was 
it a legal agreement or a kind of suggestion without legal effect? 
 
8. (If the answer to the above question is NO), please talk about the reasons for the 
lack of plan for the venue’s future utilization after the Games. 
 
9. Is there anything that relates to the history of the venue that you feel I did not 
touch on that you would like to comment on? 
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Part II. The venue’s present status. 
 
10. As the manager/supervisor/director of the venue, looking back three years, what 
do you think can be the major contributions of the venue to the community as 
well as the city? And if any, what do you think can be the major concerns for the 
venue currently? 
 
11. Please describe current functionality of the venue (in general sport-related use, in 
specific sport-related use, or multi-functional purpose for both sport-related and 
non sport-related use). Speaking of the functions, are there any different functions 
between the Games period and post-Games period? 
 
12. Compared with its original settings, is there any change on scale, layout, capacity, 
or functioning structure? If yes, please provide details or any written materials 
regarding it. And why did these changes happen? 
 
13. Has the ownership of the venue been changed since the 2008 Olympic Games 
finished? If yes, please talk about the transition of the ownership as well as the 
context and background information. 
 
14. What are the annual operational and maintenance cost of the venue (including any 
expenditures of structural redesign, personnel cost, technique upgrading)? And is 
there any financial legacy from the Games or the Olympic Movement that can 
offset the cost? 
 
15. Is there a healthy financial condition for the venue now? If yes, what is the 
primary financial resource for the venue to make it gaining profit during the last 
three years? If not, what can be defined as the major problems or difficulties that 
cause the financial deficit for now? Please give details about either of the 
situations. 
 
16. Who have been the tenants or major patrons of the venue during the last three 
years? Who are the expected majority customers whom the venue serves? What 
kind of services does the venue provide? And is there any change about service 
content and targeted patrons during the last three years? 
 
17. As the manager/supervisor/director of the venue, what do you think can be 
considered both major strengths and weaknesses of current operating conditions 
of the venue? Please provide details to support your point of view. 
 
18. Is there anything that relates to present status of the venues that you feel I did not 
touch on that you would like to comment on? 
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Part III. The future of the venue. 
 
19. Please identify if, by now, there is any potential plan for the future development, 
with either short term goal or long-term strategy. If there is a plan, does it come 
from the private ownership, municipality, or a public-private joint venture? And is 
the plan a part of the strategic development of the city or local district? 
 
20. If there is a certain of financial profit coming from the operation of the venue, 
how can it be distributed and is there any expansion plan for it? 
 
21. If the venue has any financial trouble now, as the manager/supervisor/director of 
the venue, what are you going to do? Is that possible that municipal authority 
could help out? 
 
22. What do you think can be considered both major opportunities and threats for the 
future of the venue? Please provide details to support your point of view. 
 
23. If there are both “DO list” and “DO NOT DO list” regarding post-Games 
utilization of Olympic venues for future Olympic host cities or venues’ owners; 
what points do you think should be put on the lists? 
 
24. Is there anything that relates to future development of both your own venue and 
Olympic venues in general that you feel I did not touch on that you would like to 
comment on? 
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Appendix D. Venue Category by Newly, Pre-existing and 
Temporarily Built 
 
 
Newly-built Venues (12) Existing Venues (11) Temporary Venues (8) 
National Stadium 
(Bird's Nest) Workers Gymnasium Road Cycling Course 
National Indoor Stadium 
(NIS) Workers Stadium Triathlon Venue 
National Aquatic Center 
(Water Cube) Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) 
Chao Yang Park Beach 
Volleyball Ground 
Olympic Green Tennis 
Court 
Beihang University 
Gymnasium (BUAA) 
Wu Ke Song Baseball Field 
(Dismantled) 
Beijing Shooting Range 
Hall 
Beijing Institute of 
Technology Gymnasium 
(BIT) 
Fencing Hall - China National 
Convention Center (CNCC) 
Lao Shan Velodrome Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field 
Olympic Green Hockey 
Stadium 
MasterCard Center Wu Ke 
Song Arena (Olympic 
Basketball Stadium) 
Lao Shan Mountain Bike 
Course Olympic Green Archery Field
Peking University 
Gymnasium (PKU) 
National Olympic Sports 
Center Stadium 
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto Cross 
(BMX) Venue (Scrapped) 
China Agricultural 
University Gymnasium 
(CAU) 
National Olympic Sports 
Center Gymnasium  
University of Science & 
Technology Beijing 
Gymnasium (USTB) 
Ying Tung Natatorium  
Beijing University of 
Technology Gymnasium 
(BJUT) 
Beijing Shooting Range Clay 
Target Field  
Shun Yi Olympic 
Rowing-Canoeing Park   
 Source: Created by the author 
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Appendix E. Venue Category by Geographical Location 
 
Location Beijing Olympic Venues 
National Stadium (Bird's Nest) 
National Indoor Stadium (NIS) 
National Aquatic Center (Water Cube) 
Olympic Green Tennis Court 
Fencing Hall - China National Convention Center (CNCC) 
Olympic Green Hockey Stadium  
Olympic Green Archery Field  
National Olympic Sports Center Stadium  
National Olympic Sports Center Gymnasium  
Olympic Central Area 
(Olympic Green & 
NOSC) 
Ying Tung Natatorium 
Beijing Shooting Range Hall 
Beijing Shooting Range Clay Target Field 
Lao Shan Velodrome 
Lao Shan Mountain Bike Course 
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto Cross (BMX) Venue (Scrapped) 
MasterCard Center-Wu Ke Song Arena  
(Olympic Basketball Stadium) 
Wu Ke Song Sports Center Baseball Field (Dismantled) 
West Community 
Area 
Feng Tai Sports Center Softball Field  
Peking University Gymnasium (PKU) 
China Agricultural University Gymnasium (CAU) 
University of Science & Technology Beijing Gymnasium 
(USTB) 
Beijing Institute of Technology Gymnasium (BIT) 
Beihang University Gymnasium (BUAA) 
University Area 
Capital Indoor Stadium (CIS) 
Workers Stadium  
Workers Gymnasium 
Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground  East Community Area 
Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium (BJUT) 
Triathlon Venue  North Scenic Area Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park  
  Road Cycling Course  
Source: Created by the author based on the investigation 
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Appendix F. Ownerships of the Venues 
 
OWNERSHIP Beijing Olympic Venues 
BSAM National Aquatic Center (Water Cube) State-owned 
Enterprises Beijing North Star Co., 
Ltd.  
Fencing Hall - China 
National Convention 
Center (CNCC) 
Workers’ Stadium  Beijing Federation of 
Trade Unions Workers’ Gymnasium Municipal level 
Beijing Municipality  Road Cycling Course  
Lao Shan Bicycle Moto 
Cross (BMX) Field  Shi Jing Shan Distr. Gov. Lao Shan Mountain Bike 
Course 
Chao Yang Distr. Gov. Chao Yang Park Beach Volleyball Ground  
Chang Ping Distr. Gov. Triathlon Venue  
 Shun Yi Distr. Gov.  Shun Yi Olympic Rowing-Canoeing Park  
District 
level 
Feng Tai Distr. Gov. & 
Sport Bureau of Feng Tai 
Distr. 
Feng Tai Sports Center 
Softball Field  
CITIC Consortium 
Stadium Operating 
Company to BSAM  
National Stadium  
(Bird's Nest) 
Guo Ao Investment 
(Consortium of Investors) 
to BJPAG 
National Indoor Stadium 
(NIS) 
Olympic Green Tennis 
Court 
Olympic Green Hockey 
Stadium  
Government-owned 
Transferred 
Ownership 
BSAM to Chao Yang 
Distr. Gov.   
Olympic Green Archery 
Field  
Capital Indoor Stadium 
(CIS) 
Beijing Shooting Range 
Hall 
Beijing Shooting Range 
Clay Target Field 
Lao Shan Velodrome 
NOSC Stadium  
General Administration of Sport, China (GASC) 
NOSC Gymnasium  
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Ying Tung Natatorium 
Peking University 
Gymnasium (PKU) 
China Agricultural 
University Gymnasium 
(CAU) 
University of Science & 
Technology Beijing 
Gymnasium (USTB) 
Beijing University of 
Technology Gymnasium 
(BJUT) 
Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and 
Astronautics Gymnasium 
(BUAA) 
University-owned 
  
Beijing Institute of 
Technology Gymnasium 
(BIT) 
MasterCard Center-Wu Ke 
Song Arena  
(Olympic Basketball 
Stadium) Private Enterprise-owned   Wu Ke Song Sports 
Center Baseball Field 
(Dismantled) 
Source: Created by the author based on the investigation 
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Appendix G. Map of the Venues in the Olympic Central Area 
 
Source: Google Earth  
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Appendix H. Map of the Venues in the West Community Area 
 
 
Source: Google Earth  
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Appendix I. Map of the Venues in the University Area 
 
 
Source: Google Earth  
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Appendix J. Map of the Venues in the East Community Area 
 
 
Source: Google Earth 
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Appendix K. Map of the Venues in the North Scenic Area 
 
 
Source: Google Earth (The Olympic Central Area is shown in this map as a reference). 
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Appendix L. Map of the Olympic Central Area 
 
 
Source: Google Earth 
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Appendix M. Route for the Urban Road Cycling Race 
 
 
 
 
Internet Source 
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Appendix N. Aerial View of the Olympic Archery Field in 2010 
 
Source: Google Earth (photo taken in 2010) 
 
273 
Appendix O. Pictures of CIS 
 
 
 
Top: The Capital Indoor Stadium; Bottom: The Board signified an “Apparel Show and 
Market” was held in the venue. (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the author) 
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Top: The Board signified a “Job Fair” was held inside the venue; Bottom: An inside look 
of the “Apparel Show and Market.” (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the author) 
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Appendix P. Aerial View of the National Olympic Sport Center  
 
 
Source: Google Earth 
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Appendix Q. Pictures of the CAU Gymnasium 
 
 
 
 
 
The venue’s main competition hall during the 2008 Olympic Games 
Source: Official Website of China Agriculture University Gymnasium 
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Top: Before the renovation (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the author); Bottom: 
after the renovation in 2011, (Source: Official Website of China Agriculture University 
Gymnasium). 
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Appendix R. Pictures of BUAA Gymnasium 
 
Interior view of BUAA Gymnasium before and after the Games 
 
 
Top: The view before the Games (Source: Official Website of BOCOG); Bottom: The 
view after the Games (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011). 
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Top: The current view of the original resting & catering area; Bottom: Commercial space 
for lease around the BUAA Gymnasium (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 
2011). 
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Appendix S. Pictures of USTB Gymnasium 
 
 
 
Top: The upper level platform, where the temporary seats were installed during the 
Games (Source: Official Website of BOCOG); Bottom: The platform became two 
basketball courts after the Games (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011). 
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Top: The other side of the upper level spectator stands, now it became a tennis court; 
Bottom: The list of the patrons printed on an elaborate board and hung up on the wall 
right beside the main entrance. (Source: Photo taken by the author in August 2011) 
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Appendix T. Pictures of BJUT Gymnasium 
 
 
Top: Beijing PSB Badminton Competitions were held in the warm-up venue in August 
2011; Bottom: The upgraded flooring of the main competition hall (Source: Photo taken 
by the author in August 2011). 
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Appendix U. Pictures of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture 
Center 
 
 
An aerial view of the Wu Ke Song Sport & Culture Center. The dismantled Olympic 
Baseball Field was on the left, beside which, the MasterCard Center (originally, the 
Beijing Olympic Basketball Gymnasium) was on the right (Source: Google Earth, photo 
taken in 2010).  
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Top: The Olympic Baseball Field during the Games in 2008 (Source: Wikipedia); Bottom: 
What the Field looked like in August 2011 (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 by the 
author).
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Top: The previous baseball field in 2011, and MCC situated at the far end; Bottom: MCC 
and the previous baseball field were separated by iron fences (Source: Photos taken in 
August 2011 by the author). 
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Top: A big tent was built up between the previous baseball field and MCC; Bottom: The 
other side of the tent, while MCC was at the far end (Source: Photo taken in August 2011 
by the author). 
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Top: Someone worked on the dumping site; Bottom: The shelters were located around 
MCC where some migrant workers lived (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the 
author).   
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Top: The former Olympic Baseball Field had become a dumping site and a temporary 
park lot; Bottom: No one was allowed to enter into MCC without necessary IDs when 
there was no commercial event held inside (Source: Photos taken in August 2011 by the 
author).  
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